


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BRITISH RELATIONS WITH THE PRINCIPALITY OF SURAPUR



Ph. D. THESIS

1972



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BRITISH RELATIONS WITH THE PRINCIPALITY OF SURAPUR

A Thesis For The Award Of Ph.D. Degree

Submitted in the Department of History

Karnatak University

By

N. H. KULKARNEE

1972

PREFATORY NOTE



I was drawn to this subject while doing some work in connection with writing something about the Mutiny in Hyderabad. It was noticed that the so-called revolt in Surapur in 1858 was claimed as part of the freedom struggle both in Andhra and Karnataka. Particularly the editors of History of Freedom Movement in Karnataka claimed to have based their account on original records available in the National Archives of India and had reproduced many documents in extenso. A detailed examination of these documents convinced me of the necessity of rewriting the whole account given therein. This also led me to three published books on Surapur: the autobiography of Capt. Meadows Taylor who was stationed at Surapur for many years; a small booklet by Nawab Framurz Jung Bahadur, first taluqdar of Raichur district; and some letters of Taylor to his cousin Henry Reeve. The first is as fascinatingly readable as historical romances on Indian subjects for which Taylor is celebrated in English literature. The second one is partly an abridged adaption of Taylor's work but also gives a brief account of the early history of Surapur based on a Kannada chronicle on palm leaves. The last one and the best of all disappoints by abruptly coming to an end. Luckily for the researcher plenty of original documentary material on the subject is available at the National Archives, a veritable treasure-house for modern Indian history. Ready availability of this material, and the many-sided, versatile personality of Capt. Meadows Taylor who belongs to the best line of British district administrators in India sustained my interest in the work. An additional factor that strengthened it was the oblivion into which the

principality of Surapur has fallen. Petty states smaller in size and resources happen to be better known, while Surapur is, even to-day, a "forgotten empire". A Kannada research work on it by Shri Kapatral Krishnarao, octogenarian, revered historian of Karnataka, remains unpublished, and Surapur history continues to be a largely virgin, unexplored area of study. It contains many peculiar features, the most important among them being its foundation by the Bedars, a caste held low in the Hindu hierarchical system of society.

In a popular novel entitled "The Princes", well-known novelist Manohar Malgaonkar, who is also a historian of sorts, has accidentally chosen the term Bedar to describe his fictitious principality, though in reality it has nothing to do with either Surapur or any other Bedar Raj. Though 18th century Surapur is as fascinating as its subsequent history, I had perforce to restrict my study to British relations with it in view of the available material. I am aware that a study mainly based on English records ignoring materials in vernacular languages tends to be lopsided and also creates gaps when relevant materials are not forthcoming. But it is risky to employ historical imagination in filling such gaps in a factual narrative and I have not made such an attempt. I have only endeavoured to bring to light facts lying hidden in voluminous manuscript records and set them in an orderly fashion, incidentally providing correctives to the few published accounts. In the process I had to ignore some interesting information on Surapur society available in the records as it did not have direct or indirect bearing on British relations with the principality. I have used the term

'principality' as an equivalent of "samsthan" in vernacular though it may not be the most apt translation. A glossary has been provided at the end for Indian terms. I have not converted the Fasli era used in the documents into Gregorian calendar. The Christian era is obtained by adding 590 years to the relevant Fasli year. But the two calendars do not coincide exactly and accounts etc. given in the Fasli calendar will not reflect the position with the same accuracy in Christian calendar, and therefore I have not made that attempt. I have modernised the spellings of Indian place and personal names wherever possible. Surapur has been always spelt as Shorapore in English records and even in the Gulbarga District Gazetteer published as late as 1966. I have used the nearest vernacular spelling especially to avoid its being mistaken for Sholapur, a confusion perpetuated either through oversight or ignorance, in many published and unpublished works which happen to refer to the principality.

My thanks are due to Shri K.D. Bhargava, ex-Director of Archives who permitted me to undertake this work outside office hours and to Dr. S.N. Prasad, the present Director of Archives, who not only continued the permission but gave me every possible encouragement with his born courtesy and unflinching kindness to all researchers. Additionally his excellent work on Paramountcy under Dalhousie provided me the clue to a voluminous and valuable set of original records which the indexer to Foreign Department Proceedings had unfortunately failed to enter under the relevant heading. I owe an equally deep debt of gratitude to my colleagues at the National Archives of India, too numerous to be mentioned

individually, who assisted me in a variety of ways, from supply of relevant materials to discussion of peculiar problems which every researcher has to tackle. Raja Venkatappa Naik, ex-Member of Parliament, and worthy descendant of the great Rajas of Surapur very kindly showed me the small but valuable collection of original documents available with him. I continue to hope that he and his brother Raja Pid Naik, ex-Member of Mysore Legislative Assembly will donate this national heritage of documents to the National Archives of India, for study by future research scholars all over the world. In spite of his great age and failing health, Shri Kapatral Krishnarao promptly answered my many queries and immensely helped me by personal discussions, and by permitting me to consult his manuscript history of Surapur compiled by him over the years, mainly on the basis of unpublished sources. Though we might differ on a few points, I have no words in which to thank him for his kindness. It may be incidentally mentioned that Shri Kapatral has not made use of original records so far as 19th century Surapur is concerned. My friends at Surapur, and Shri Mohanappa Vibhute, headmaster at Waghingera, kindly showed me round and supplied valuable information on 18th century Surapur. The State Central Library at Hyderabad provided me with extracts from books. Dr. S.V. Desikachar, my former colleague at the National Archives, and currently Director of Mysore Archives, Shri S.Roy, former Deputy Director of Archives, Government of India, and friends at the Oriental Manuscripts Library and the State Central Archives, Hyderabad, have been

equally helpful. Last, but not the least, my most grateful thanks are due to Dr. G.S.Dikshit, U.G.C. Professor of History, Karnatak University, and my guide, at whose repeated, kindly prompting I undertook this work. He has helped me in ways of which he is not even aware. But for his continued kindness, encouragement and guidance this work would never have been completed.


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ABBREVIATIONS

FDP	: Foreign Department Proceedings
FPC	: Foreign Political Consultation
FPP	: Foreign Political Proceedings
FPSP	: Foreign Political Supplementary Proceedings
FSC	: Foreign Secret Consultation
FSP	: Foreign Secret Proceedings
F.to T.	: (Resident) Fraser to (P.M.) Taylor
HFMK	: <u>History of Freedom Movement in Karnataka</u>
HRC	: Hyderabad Residency Correspondence
PDFSS	: Political Despatch From the Secretary of State
PLFC	: Political Letter From the Court of Directors
PLFSS	: Political Letter From the Secretary of State
PLTC	: Political Letter To the Court of Directors
PRC	: Poona Residency Correspondence
SPD	: Selections from Peshwa <u>Daftar</u>
<u>Story</u>	: <u>The Story of My Life</u> by the late Col.Philip Meadows Taylor
T.to F.	: (P.M.) Taylor to (Resident) Fraser
UHSK	: Unpublished History of Surapur by Kapatral Krishnarao

PROLOGUE

The principality of Surapur was situated in the south-west of the former Hyderabad State between the delta of the Bhima and the Krishna rivers and beyond with an area of approximately 4000¹ sq.miles. Its origin is to be traced to the grant of a sanad by Ali Adil Shah II of Bijapur to the Bedar Chief Pam Naik Bahiri in 1665² A.D. The sanad mentions a large number of specified parganas, districts, forts and fortified places, sanats, kasbas, pethas and mauzas mainly in the manla of Nasratabad (or Sagar) granted as watan and inam with miras rights to the Bedar Chief in perpetuity. Additionally he was given the right to collect sardesgat revenues roughly amounting to 10% of the total revenue of specified villages and cities lying in the modern districts of Bijapur, Sholapur, Gulbarga, Raichur and Mahbubnagar. The sanad also conferred a number of additional privileges³ which considerably augmented the principality's sources of revenue.

The rise of this Bedar Chief is shrouded in obscurity. Capt.Meadows Taylor believed that Pam Naik's ancestors migrated from Ratnagiri in the old Mysore country,⁴ whereas the traditional belief is that they migrated from Kampli. Their footing at Kakkeri, which formed part of the inam, was secured by Gaddi Pid Naik.⁵ The region itself had been a bone of contention between the Bahamanis and Vijayanagar empire and Taylor says that the Bedar⁶ clans helped the latter. They are undoubtedly a martial race and it can be presumed that they did so. Unfortunately published accounts of Vijayanagar armies and battles do not support this⁷ statement. Nor do the Bedars appear to have been always loyal to Vijayanagar.⁸ The sanad itself mentions that the Bedar Chiefs had served the Adil Shahs for 'seven generations' which looks more⁹ like Persian hyperbole than a statement of facts. Suffice it to



say here that Pam Naik (I) had become sufficiently powerful and was probably already in possession of the territory which was now formally granted to him. The Adil Shah must have done so to secure his able services against the Mughals who were constantly harassing Bijapur in the latter half of the 17th century.¹⁰

The Bedar Chief who must have earned the distinction conferred upon him by his loyal services to Bijapur further justified it when in 1680 he put Dilir Khan, a brave Mughal general, to rout when the latter invaded his possessions. The Bedars, reputed as the bravest soldiery of South India, hardy hunters, sure of shot, strong and athletic, proved more than a match for the Mughal forces.¹¹ After the annexation of Bijapur by Aurangzeb in 1686 Pam Naik found it difficult to resist the Mughal forces, surrendered the Sagar fort and in return was given a mansab of 5,000.¹² He, however, died in 1688. His nephew whom he had adopted, Pitambar Bahiri Pid Naik (the First), however, threw off Mughal authority,¹³ shifted his seat to the stronghold of Waghinghera 12 miles away from Sagar, organised and equipped his army and in league with the Marathas continued to resist and harass the Mughal army. Aurangzeb involved in the deadly tussle with the Marathas could not direct his full attention to Pid Naik (the First). He was finally forced by the Bedar Chief's bold plan to recapture Bijapur itself to send his army to besiege the Bedar at Waghinghera in February 1705. The siege lasted for 3 months and the epic struggle that ensued and the valiant defence by the Bedars has been graphically described by contemporary, near-¹⁴ contemporary and modern historians. Pid Naik (the First) had to surrender the fort, but managed to recapture it shortly. He, however, shifted his seat to Surapur, ideally situated for defence, which henceforth became the capital of his possessions. Aurangzeb conciliated him by not only confirming the Adilshahi grants but

by granting additional altanah jagira north of the Bhima to be¹⁵
enjoyed without paying tribute and 7000 mansab and 5000 horse.
There is little reason to doubt the statement that 'he introduced
many reforms and ruled the State in greater splendour than any of
his predecessors'.¹⁶ It was quite possible to do so as the Mughal
power in the Deccan had almost disappeared and the vacuum was not
yet filled by either the Nizam or the Peshwas. After a glorious
reign of 31 years Pid Naik (I) died in 1726 A.D.¹⁷

With the rise and expansion of the power of the Nizam and
the Peshwas in the Deccan the small Bedar principality managed to
retain its independence by becoming nominal tributary of both. The
principality continued to flourish and prosper under successive
Bedar Rajas who paid tribute only when compelled otherwise evading¹⁸
it. It can be presumed that they were helped in maintaining their
autonomy and independence by the fact that both the Nizam and the
Peshwa considered Surapur to be within their sphere of influence¹⁹
and therefore checkmated each other in gaining supremacy over it.
The Bedar Chiefs do not appear to have performed any actual service²⁰
for either of their suzerains, while they continued to collect²¹
their hereditary xuam hagg from specified regions of both.

In the latter half of 18th century a third factor was
added to power politics in the Deccan with the rise of Haider Ali
and his successor Tipu Sultan. Luckily for the samsthan it was
spared by them for whatever reason. The Nizam's power was curbed
by Sadashivrao Bhau's victory over him in the battle of Udgir²²
(1760). This must have helped Peshwa Madhavrao I to establish
definite tributary relationship with the samsthan during his Karnatak
expedition of 1766-7. He imposed and continued to receive a yearly
tribute of Rs. 80,000, exacted chaugh for the mekana of Sagar and
established control over Hunasagi and Korekal regions of the
principality to adjust his frontiers, though he farmed them out²³
to the Bedar Rajas at a low quit-rent.

On the accession of Raja Venkatappa Naik II (1774) the Peshwa exacted a nazrana ²⁴ as well. It was during the regime of this Raja that Parashuram Bhaui Patwardhan undertook a campaign to punish him for encouraging refractory Maratha chiefs, and exacted a huge amount from him. ²⁵ During this period Maratha-Nizam relations were friendly and the Nizam took advantage of it by abolishing Surapur's haq xusma ²⁶ in certain parts of his domains in payment of tribute by the Raja. Despite this Tayler considers him as the greatest of Surapur Rajas. "The Shorapore State then was very flourishing, the revenue being between twenty and thirty lakhs a year. There were two battalions of disciplined sepoy's under European commanders, and a park of artillery, and these, with the Beydur militia, 12,000 in number, and a considerable body of cavalry, made the reigning Raja, Enkappa Naik, truly formidable. Hyder and Tippoo, each in turn, tried to induce him to join them, but he was content to remain as he was; and Tippoo, though he overran part of the neighbouring District, made no attempt to attack Shorapur. Enkappa Naik was a great patron of Hindu learning, and established a Sanskrit College, which I found still existing in a reduced form. He was a good soldier, and skilful administrator, according to the customs of his tribe, and the manner in which he brought his principality out of the troubles and difficulties of those times was truly admirable; but the fortune of the State passed away with him". ²⁷ It was during his regime that his diwan Ishappa (Veerappa?) ²⁸ Nishtti carried out a complete revenue survey and settlement.

The above brief sketch of the political history of the principality would convince that the Surapur Rajas were no ordinary zamindars. Although they paid tribute to the Nizam and the Peshwa the amount was more than balanced by the xusma which they collected in their suzerains' domains. While the tribute to the Peshwa appears to have been regularly paid that to the Nizam

was more often evaded. Neither of the suzerains ever attempted to regulate the internal autonomy of the principality. Except for tribute the small asmathan was independent. The Rajas were not required nor ever compelled to do military service on any occasion for their suzerains. They could grant or resume iqiza within the principality at will. They had the power to coin copper currency and even possessed a mint at Shahapur for silver coinage. They could raise and use troops entirely for their own purpose. They did not permit revenue collectors of other powers within their asmathan. They had yakils at the courts of the suzerains who negotiated the amounts of tribute. Their connection with either²⁹ of the suzerains was direct and independent of the other suzerain.

There was a Kannada chronicle of the Surapur Bedar Rajas inscribed on palmyra leaves in the possession of one Hakim Papayya Sastri who himself descended from an ancient family of Surapur. The chronicle was translated and adopted by Nawab Faramuz Jung Bahadur, First Taluqdar of Raichur district for his second chapter in his Shorapur, An Ancient Bvadar Raj. The authorship of the chronicle is not known. Henry Bruce contemptuously dismisses it as that "sort of thing, unverified and unverifiable which has always gone down in Asia as history. No matter what volumes of it may be printed, it does not help one to any knowledge of the past. The dates here, not even agreeing among themselves within a few³⁰ lines, might as well have been sprinkled from a pepper pot". This is too sweeping and biased an observation. Despite its bad chronology, apocryphal stories, and mention of facts which cannot be squared with known and proved accounts now available, the chronicle does shed light on Surapur's past. It describes in some detail the Bedar Rajas' expeditions against the neighbouring principalities of Anegundi and Kanakgiri which appears to be basically correct. It gives us an indication that the Rajas who

were originally a military class and who took their hobby of hunting quite seriously were gradually absorbed in the mainstream of settled Hindu society, acquired all the paraphernalia of nobility after having risen to rank and position, and ruled the Raj well according to the notions of the time. They not only took good measures for the defence of the principality and maintenance of law and order but created an administrative structure dividing the samathan into different units and appointing officials for smooth revenue collection. They built temples and granted lands for their maintenance, constructed tanks, sunk wells, and repaired those fallen into disuse, for promoting agriculture. They colonised new villages, and encouraged habitations. They built structures, however humble, for public business and laid out gardens.

During the third dynasty of Vijayanagar empire the Bedars³¹ had produced a fine saint poet Kanakdas. It is said that the Bedar Rajas of Surapur kept before them the model of Vijayanagar. It is possible that they encouraged Brahmins with a view to securing social acceptance and a higher position in the Hindu hierarchy of castes. But under their patronage Surapur became a seat of brahminical learning. Legendary tales of respect shown to the brahmins by the Rajas are still current. Even more significantly they displayed a rare spirit of religious tolerance towards all sects - Madhvas, Smartas, Shrivaisnavas, Lingayats and Muslims. They themselves had intimate family relations with the Brahmin Majumdars, Lingayat Nishtis and Muslim Dakhanis. They gained a reputation for charity and liberality. They freely granted iqara and inams not only to those who rendered military or personal service but also to brahmins, janams, painters and musicians. Garudadri family held inams for skill in painting. The title 'Kantharava' was bestowed upon a family of musicians. They were particular devotees of Tirupati devasthanam for which they granted

a jagir at Aikur and continue to send silk nawar to Tirupati as their annual homage even till to-day. The temple of Gopalswami was so constructed that they could have its daily darshan from their residence. ³² Fine cloth was produced at Sagar, Rangampet and Rukumpet (suburbs of Surapur). ³³

There were only three towns of any consequence: Surapur, ³⁴ Shahapur and Andola. The self-governing village communities, ³⁵ common in north Karnatak since ancient times, of course formed the basic structure of this samsthan as well. Complicated systems of tenure such as chali, kutgoots, bhagnal and so on were evolved and respected by the Rajas. Even Veerappa Nishti, though he carried out a complete revenue survey, did not see the necessity of changing these tenures which were convenient to the people on account of long usage. In addition to the land-tax, other taxes such as mohtarfa, kalali, sair, abkari, etc. were levied but appear to have ³⁶ been paid without complaint. Justice was administered according to customs, usage, and Hindu sources of law as interpreted by ³⁷ learned shastris. ³⁸ There were no jails at all.

This brief excursion into the administrative and cultural aspects of the samsthan, besides sketching its political history, has been attempted in order to place British relations with Surapur in a proper perspective, a connection for which the samsthan was not in the least prepared and which was an accident in its history.

Notes and References:

1. The area of the principality in its entirety was never measured. The figure given here is Capt. Meadows Taylor's estimate. The Director General of Revenue in the former Hyderabad State calculated it to be 3500 sq.miles. Editor's note in Story, p.139. In the memo on Surapur by D.A.Malcolm, Ist Asstt. at Hyderabad Residency, it is stated that the principality formed an "equilateral triangle, the sides of which respectively measure about sixty miles". FPC, 19 April 1841, No.102. Capt. Jackson's estimate in his memo that it was fifty sq.miles in extent is an obvious error. Idem, No. 103. What he must

have meant is that it was fifty miles on every side thus measuring to 2500 sq.miles. The Trigonometrical survey computed it to be 2264 sq.miles. FDP, Part A., July 1860, No. 420. Although the most accurate among all, it however, excluded districts south of the Krishna which had been ceded to the Nizam in 1842. The territory of the principality is at present divided among Gulbarga and Raichur districts of Karnatak (Mysore) State.

2. FPC, 15 Oct. 1852, No. 40. The year mentioned in the sanad in figures is 1075 and in words as khams sabain wa alai which works out, both in Fasli and hejira eras, to 1665 A.D. In the letter by which Capt. Taylor forwarded it he wrote the year as 1095 presumably through oversight. Capt. Jackson who had like Capt. Taylor seen the original sanad also gives the year as 1665 A.D. Rani Rangamma, widow of Raja Venkatappa IV who sent a copy of it along with her petition for the restoration of the raj gives the year as 1674 A.D. which is an error. FPP, A July 1867, Nos. 156-7. This copy as well as the original sanad is missing.
3. These privileges were specifically mentioned in the sanad and are mostly rights to collect a variety of taxes and customs and excise duties. FPC, 15 Oct. 1852, No. 40.
4. Story, p. 224. Ratnagiri is at present in Madaksire taluq of Anantapur district, Andhra Pradesh. It appears that since the Surapur chiefs contracted matrimonial alliances at that place Taylor guessed it to be their original home.
5. Unpublished history of Surapur by Krishnarao Kapatral. The author traces their migration from Kampli (in Bellary District) to Anegundi to Kanakgiri to Mudgal and finally to Kakkerla. It is noteworthy, however, that though Kakkerla contained a sizable Bedar population it was mostly a wild region sparsely inhabited when Taylor made his first survey. FPC, 9 Mar. 1844, Nos. 89-94. The revenues of Kakkerla in the time of Muhammad Adilshah of Bijapur were believed to be Rs. 2,25,000. B.P. Modak and D.G.Vaze, History of the Adilshahi dynasty of Bijapur (in Marathi).
6. Story, p. 225.
7. See, for instance Ancient India and South Indian History and Culture by S. Krishnaswamy Aiyangar, Vol. II, pp.153,155,158; Sources of Vijayanagar History, by S.K. Aiyangar, p.133; Further Sources of Vijayanagar History, Ed. K.A. Nilkanth Sastri and N. Venkatramanayya, Vol. I, p.214; Vol. III, pp.2, 22-4, 102,105,143,189; History and Culture of the Indian People, Vol. VI, p.315; History of the Rise of the Muhammadan Power in India till the year A.D. 1612, by Ferishta, trans. by J. Briggs, Vol. III, pp. 15-7, 22, 48-51; Social and Political Life in the Vijayanagar Empire, by B.A. Saletore, Vol. I, p.421; Studies in the History of the 3rd Dynasty of Vijayanagar, by N. Venkatramanayya, p. 124. In the last mentioned book there is a reference to Krishnadevraya's having invited Boya chiefs from the forests to plunder Muslim country. (pp.137-8). Shri Kapatral believes it to be a reference to the Bedars. Verse No.41 in Krishnadevraya's own Amuktamalyada which briefly refers to his conquest of Gulbarga and Sagar region does not mention the Bedars. As for the reference to Boyas numbering 5476 having formed part of Ramraja's army as mentioned in the Bakhair of Ramraja,

Dr. Saleore says: "(it) may not be entirely wrong, but it would be interesting if independent evidence could be found to confirm them". Idem, pp.452-3. The main difficulty on this point is that all sources of Vijayanagar history have not yet been exhaustively published. Another difficulty is that probably the Bedars were not known by that name in those times. The establishment of Bedar principalities at Kanakgiri, Kosaji, Chitaldurg, Bellary and Jarimala on the disintegration of Vijayanagar would not be easy to explain without their experience in that empire's army, or at least in battles of that empire with the Bahamanis. UHSK.

8. The Bedars created many disturbances against the empire and even looted the capital after the famous battle of Talikot. Saleore, op.cit. Vol.I, pp. 137-8, 318-9; Vol.II, pp.46,54.
9. Kapatral takes it literally and says that the Bedars fought on the Adilshahi side in the battles of Raichur and Mudgal against Vijayanagar, in which case it would contradict his own view that the Bedars always sided with Vijayanagar.
10. It is noteworthy that though Shivaji subjugated the palanars of Kanakgiri, Harapanhalli, Raidurg, Chitradurga etc. he spared Surapur. Sir Jadunath Sarker, Shivaji and His Times, p. 301.
11. Sir Jadunath Sarker, History of Aurangzeb, Vol.IV, pp.193-5.
12. Tarikh-e-Dilkusha, p.96 of the Marathi translation entitled Mogul and Marathe by Setumadhav Pagdi. The dates have been supplied by the translator on the basis of Sir Jadunath's work, as the original author Bhimsen Saxena 'Burhanpuri' hardly gives any dates. Taylor disputes Pam Naik's submission to the emperor. EPIC, 15 Oct.1852, No.39, para.6; but Burhanpuri being a contemporary is more to be relied upon.
13. Six translations of so-called sanads of Aurangzeb have been printed by Nawab Faramuz Jung Bahadur in his Shorapur, pp.52-6, which are likely to create the impression of Bedars' friendliness towards the emperor. But a study of them shows that only 2 of them were addressed to Pld Naik I and are not sanads but letters inviting him to submit. Two of them are addressed to one 'Chakna Naik' and another to one 'Linga Naik' presumably subordinate Bedar chiefs, with similar purport merely indicative of the fact that the emperor was trying to create dissensions among Bedar ranks. The remaining is a copy of Shah Alam's letter to Nizamul-Mulk re. the Bedar chief Venkatappa Naik.
14. Tarikh-e-Dilkusha, pp.173-9,181; Muntakhabul-Lubab-e-Mahmudshahi by Khafi Khan, pp.89-96 of the Marathi translation entitled Marathyanche Swatantrya Yuddha by Setumadhav Pagdi; Maasir-i-Alamgiri, pp.291-2, 296-301 of English trans. by Sir Jadunath Sarker. Sarker's own account in his History of Aurangzeb, Vol.V, and Dr.Yusuf Husain Khan's description in his Asaf Jah I are based on

these chronicles. P.B.Desai in Madgal Malla (in Kannada) has also described it but confuses the then Bedar chief Pitambar Bahiri Pid Naik with his forefather Gaddi Pid Naik. Sir Jadunath is also in error as regards the name. It has been corrected by Shri Kapatral in UHSK.

15. Translation of Aurangzeb's sanad, FPC, 15 Oct. 1852, No.41.
16. Castes and Tribes of H.E.H. the Nizam's Dominions, by Syed Sirajul Hasan, Vol.I, pp.35-6.
17. It must be noted, however, that it was probably during his regime that Peshwa Bajirao I forced tribute from Surapur. G.S. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, Vol.II, p.90; Sannurichi Bakhar (Marathi) pp.6,19; but Fasli 1128 mentioned in the latter as Bajirao's year of Karnatak expedition is obviously wrong as he became Peshwa only in 1720 A.D. i.e. Fasli 1118.
18. The genealogy of Bedar Rajas in 17th and 18th centuries is given thus in Shorapur (pp.17-31):

Gaddi Pam Naik	..	1622-56 A.D.
" Pid Naik	..	1657-74 "
" Pam Naik(II)	..	1675-95 "
Pitambar Bahiri Pid Naik	..	1695-1726 "
" Pam Naik(III)	..	1727-41 "
Pid Naik Pitambar Bahiri	..	1741-46 "
Mandgal Venkatappa Naik	..	1747-52 "
Pam Naik (IV)	..	1753-74 "
Venkatappa Naik	..	1774-1801 "

Capt. Jackson(FPC,19 Apr.1841, No.103) mentions only eight Rajas:

Pam Naik	..	1656
Pid Naik	..	1696
Pam Naik II	..	1726
Pid Naik II	..	1741
Enkatappa Naik	..	1747
Pam Naik III	..	1753
Enkatappa Naik II	..	1776-1802.

I have not succeeded in securing authentic genealogy from the present descendants of Surapur chiefs in the absence of which it appears preferable to accept the periods of their respective rule as given in UHSK after considerable research:

Gaddi Pid Naik	..	1636-66
Pam Naik I	..	1666-87
Pitambar Bahiri Pid Naik	..	1687-1726
Pam Naik II	..	1727-41
Mandgal Venkatappa Naik	..	1741-52
Pam Naik III	..	1752-74
Venkatappa Naik II	..	1774-1802

The chronology of 19th century Rajas is known with certainty and has been dealt with later.

19. FPC, 15 Oct. 1852, No. 39. It is significant that a full-fledged study of the first Nizam by Dr. Yusuf Husain Khan does not refer to any attempts by the Nizam to establish supremacy over Surapur, but there are references to it in Selections from Peshwa Daftar, Vol. 25, Lre Nos. 11, 11, 14 and 46. SPD, Vol. 28, Lre No. 177 mentions extraction of tribute from Surapur by Peshwa Balaji Bajirao in 1757.
20. The legendary story in Madagaia Malla of Mandgal Venkatappa Naik, the Bedar Chief, having helped Nizam Nasir Jang to conquer Pondicherry is not supported by either English or French histories concerned.
21. FPC, 15 Oct. 1852, No. 39.
22. Surapur appears to have given supplies to the Marathas but not any actual military aid in Raghunathrao's preceding campaign. SPD, Vol. 25, Lre Nos. 304-5.
23. FPC, 15 Oct. 1852, Nos. 49-51 contain translations of original papers in this connection. Madhavrao's Karnatak expedition is dealt with in SPD, Vol. 37 and relevant Lres are Nos. 108, 110-1, 113, 116, 119, 133. The figures of tribute etc. mentioned in Selections from the Satara Rajas' and the Peshwas' Diaries, Vol. IX, (Items 282-3) are different. A memo on Surapur in HRC, Vol. 190 (pp. 267-80), however, claims regular accounts of Surapur's tribute to the Peshwas from 1753 onwards.
24. Selections from the Satara Rajas' and the Peshwas' Diaries, Vol. VI, Item 556.
25. This campaign has been described in Aitihashik Lekhanamraha, (ed. V.V. Khare), Vol. VII, Lre Nos. 2439-42, 2446-7, 2449, and 2469-99.
26. FPC, 15 Oct. 1852, No. 39.
27. Story, pp. 226-7. Shri Kapatral is of the opinion that what has been considered as Bedar militia by Taylor was Surapur's standing army. UHSK has a separate chapter on Surapur's military organization and administration in 18th century.
28. FPC, 9 Mar. 1844, No. 90. According to Kapatral his name was Veerappa and not Ishappa.
29. Capt. Jackson's memo. FPC, 19 Apr. 1841, No. 103.
30. Story, p. 140. In spite of years of search Kapatral could not trace this chronicle and is therefore inclined to believe that the Nawab did not actually use the chronicle but made notes of what some old man told him verbally.
31. Studies in the History of the 3rd Dynasty of Vijayanagara, p. 428. It may be noted, however, that there is some controversy over Kanakdas's caste, some believing him to be Kuruba.
32. UHSK; also information collected from present descendants of ancient Surapur families and by personal visit.

33. On account of the fine quality of cloth the Peshwas usually accepted a part of the tribute in that commodity. This, industry, however, declined in the following centuries.
34. Capt. Jackson's memo. FPC, 19 Apr. 1841, No. 103.
35. "... for it is only in Maharashtra and North Karnataka that village communities were better preserved under the Muhammadian rulers than in other parts of India". The system of self governing communities was in existence in Karnatak at least from the 10th century onwards. G.S. Dikshit, Maratha History Seminar Papers, pp. 328, 332.
36. FPP, Part A, June 1860, No. 420.
37. Capt. Jackson's memo. FPC, 19 Apr. 1841, No. 103.
38. FPC, 22 Aug. 1846, No. 97.

CHAPTER I

THE BEGINNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH RELATIONS WITH SURPUR

A - Beginnings of British Connection:

The beginning of British connection with the principality of Surapur whose history has been briefly sketched before, is to be traced to the 17th article of the treaty concluded between the East India Company and the Hyderabad State in 1800. The relevant sentence in the article relating to Surapur reads as follows: "It is therefore hereby agreed that if in future the Shorapur or Gudwal Zemindars, or any other subjects or Dependents of His Highness's Government should withhold payment of the Cirkar's just claims upon them or excite rebellion or disturbance the Subsidiary Force, or such proportion thereof as may be requisite (after the reality of the offence shall have been duly ascertained) shall be ready in concert with His Highness's own troops to reduce all such offenders to obedience".

Although in accordance with this article the East India Company undertook to supply armed aid to the Nizam against Surapur whenever necessary, the beginning of this relationship was quite accidental and to reverse a well-known phrase the stage was not in the least set for it. By the Anglo-Nizam treaty of 1798 Lord Wellesley had already brought Hyderabad under his system of subsidiary alliance. In 1800 he felt the need for another treaty of defensive alliance with the Nizam mainly with a view to checking the growing power of Daulatrao Sindia. But on either occasions he expressed no anxiety to extend military aid to the Nizam against his rebellious feudatories. In fact while issuing instructions to the Resident at Hyderabad in 1798 he had clearly stated, "In framing the new

subsidiary engagements with the Nizam you will endeavour to restrict the employment of the British troops within His Highness's Dominion, to those important cases in which his person or authority shall be really endangered, and that you will provide effectually against the use of the British force in those disgraceful services against petty renters and zamindars, which more properly belong to Subudy Corps; this is an essential point³. Wellesley could not have attached any more importance to the Surapur Raja in 1800, who was described in the article as a 'Zamindar'. Moreover he was fully aware that Surapur was not only a feudatory of the Nizam but also equally a feudatory of the Peshwa⁴. Were he keen to assist the Nizam against Surapur there was reason enough in the reports that Surapur Raja had been assisting Dhandya Wagh, a freebooster who was creating disturbances in the Company's territories⁵. But Wellesley paid no attention to these reports⁶.

How then did the British come to undertake a treaty obligation to aid Hyderabad against Surapur? It was at the insistence of the Hyderabad Government. In 1798 relations between Hyderabad and Surapur were friendly, so much so that the district of Devadurg in the Nizam's dominions had been farmed out to Surapur Raja for Rs. 10,000⁷. But in the two subsequent years these relations deteriorated as a result of the Raja's non-payment to the Nizam of Hyderabad's dues on account of Devadurg. The Hyderabad Minister, Azimul-Umara, was therefore keen to take advantage of this fresh treaty and alliance with the East India Company to secure British military aid against Surapur for realization of these and other tributary dues in arrears. In fact before negotiations for the treaty (of 1800) were set afoot the Hyderabad Government had already assembled a force more to subdue the Raja with threats than to

chastize him actually. The Poona Government was also informed of the proposed expedition and that Government had conveyed its claim to half the territory in lieu of long-standing chauth dues to it by Surapur in case the principality was annexed by the Nizam. Resident Kirkpatrick, although aware that the intended expedition was a mere show of force, had firmly asserted that the subsidiary forces could be employed for the purpose only with the Governor General's consent and that Poona Government's acquiescence should be conveyed in proper form to Col. Palmer,⁸ Resident at Poona, and not to the Nizam directly. However, in the treaty negotiated by Kirkpatrick he agreed in a separate article to help the Nizam against his refractory dependents after duly ascertaining the reality of the offence. The treaty as concluded by him contained only 14 articles and even in the 3 separate articles which the Hyderabad Government regarded as the sine qua non of the treaty,⁹ Surapur was not specifically mentioned. In fact during the negotiations Kirkpatrick secured the Nizam's order to Surapur Raja to help in operations against¹⁰ Dhondya Wagh. Azimul Umara, however, persisted during the negotiations in including a clause specifying measures against Surapur. But Kirkpatrick, while promising assistance in a general way, refused to put down in so many words specific military measures. The dissatisfied Minister, even after the conclusion of the treaty wrote an express letter to Lord Wellesley conveying the Nizam's intention to annex the principality and seeking¹¹ British assistance for the purpose.

As the treaty was to be still ratified by the Governor General he succumbed to Hyderabad's pressure as a point of bargain. In his observations to the Resident on the treaty as finalized by the latter, Wellesley expressed his dissatisfaction at the manner of conducting negotiations in which the Resident

had failed to derive maximum advantage for the Company in return for assistance against the Nizam's rebellious zamindars. He was, however, pleased that the British were to investigate and determine the merits of disputes arising between Hyderabad and its tributaries.¹² It is he who drafted the article concerned in its final form and embodied it in the text of the treaty as its 17th article instead of keeping it separately. He informed Azimul-Umara that the article "provided for the objects in his Excellency's contemplation to as great an extent as is consistent either with the honor of the British Government or the justice of the Nizam".¹³

Thus began the British connection with the principality of Surapur. By offering military aid to the Nizam against a tributary of whom he knew nothing whatever, Lord Wellesley did grave injustice to Surapur which had nothing to do with the British so far, which had done no harm to the East India Company nor had the small samsthan ever come or had any possibility of coming into clash of interests with the growing power of the Company. True, there was no real intention on the part of the British to offer assistance nor could it be accorded without investigating the justice of the Nizam's claims. But the Nizam did not need much military aid against the small samsthan. He could use the mere threat of British bayonets to subdue the samsthan and mulct it whenever he found an opportunity. He could now enlarge and complicate his claims upon the Raja to such an extent that the British Residents could no longer investigate their justness with ease, and left the Nizam with freedom to deal as he chose with his hitherto independent tributary. By this article British relations with Surapur turned in the main into a long tale of injustice perpetrated by a bigger power upon a smaller

State through the connivance and instrumentality of the British, even though they had no such intention. Surapur was used as a pawn in Wellesley's game of power politics and suffered from its consequences. The history of small States which unwittingly, without their knowledge and consent, become involved in the power game of bigger States with disastrous consequences was once again repeated in the case of Surapur.

Curiously enough, Nani Gopal Chowdhry remarks that the 17th article in the Anglo-Nizam treaty of 1800 curtailed the autonomy of Hyderabad. In theory it was so, as the British were to offer assistance against the Nizam's tributaries only after examining the dispute. But in practice the Nizam was no longer powerful enough to punish them independently, as before. Hyderabad had already been reduced to a British protectorate. The power ¹⁴ which the Nizam lacked in dealing with his tributaries was now supplied by the British and he could use as well as abuse that power. The British, none too keen on offering aid to him, conveniently ignored looking into the justice of his claims. And this in actual practice proved an advantage to the Nizam.

Wellesley thus bartered away the semi-independence of a small principality to gain political advantage for the East India Company. By ignoring Surapur's tributary relationship with the Peshwa, of which he was fully aware, he showed temporary political wisdom, thus cutting off the Marathas from the principality. But he thereby helped Hyderabad to gradually assert its own exclusive relationship with Surapur, which in the long run was not beneficial to the Company itself. And finally, by describing Surapur Raja as a mere 'zamindar' in the article, he reduced the status of the Raja for which there was no justification in its previous history.

Raja Venkatappa II and the British (1801-02)

As soon as the Treaty of 1800 was concluded¹⁵ Minister Azimul-Umara took the earliest opportunity of suggesting action against Surapur. Two battalions of the Subsidiary Force were about to leave for restoring order in the Edguntla region; these could be simultaneously employed for this purpose. But the Resident, Kirkpatrick, was in no hurry. He was not prepared to act upon mere hints; he needed documentary proof of the Raja's¹⁶ failure to pay. Meanwhile the Minister was further enraged over a report that two Pathan subjects of the Nizam had been robbed and drowned by the Raja. He urged that the Subsidiary Force should join Hyderabad's own troops for an expedition against Surapur after monsoon.¹⁷ On the Resident's stock demand for written evidence were produced copies of the Raja's sahada for Devadurg district and the fort at Sagar and the agreement by Surapur yakila regarding payment of tribute.¹⁸ Even then the Resident stalled action by insisting that the Raja should be given a chance to explain his conduct and to pay up. Time had to be gained as part of the Subsidiary Forces were then busy¹⁹ against some southern palegars. A letter to that effect was, therefore, despatched to Surapur, additionally asking the Raja to deliver the fort of Sagar, but simultaneously orders were issued for assembling the expedition. Sikandar Jah, the Nizam's eldest son, was to lead it and two battalions of the Subsidiary²⁰ Force were to join it.

The Resident, however, still hoped that the mere threat of action would bring the Raja to reason and at his instance another letter was sent similar to the earlier one but informing him of the intended forces. Kirkpatrick sent his own messengers²¹ along with the letter to urge the Raja to accommodate. After

some delay the expeditionary force left with Lt.Col. Kenny as in charge of the Subsidiary Force, but he was instructed not to storm the fort of Sagar without Sikandar Jah's written authority. The Minister was also anxious to avert such an attack to prevent the Company's troops from claiming a share in whatever treasure might be found in the fort. In fact the Subsidiary Forces were directed to stay put as far as possible. They were only to demand from the Raja the cost of the expedition and a written engagement agreeing to pay tribute punctually in future, surrender fugitives²³ if any and protect travellers passing through his domain.

While the expedition was on its way to Sagar, a yakli from Surapur met the Resident at Hyderabad but merely conveyed the Raja's inability to pay; he was not entrusted with powers to execute any agreement. However, by then the Nizam's letter, the Resident's verbal message and news of the departure of the expeditionary force had reached the Raja and he hastened to send²⁴ his near relation Yenkappa as yakli entrusted with full powers. Yenkappa arrived at Hyderabad on 2nd May 1802, met the Minister as well as the Resident and the result was an agreement to be ratified by the Raja. He was to clear off by instalments the annual tribute of Rs. 1,45,000 and Nizam's annual share amounting²⁵ to Rs. 37,500 on account of Devadurg revenues, both not paid for the past four years. From this amount were deducted uncollected rusums of Surapur upon raiqah estates. A Hyderabad mutasaddi was to be stationed in Devadurg for receiving revenues from that district. The cost of the expedition fixed at Rs. 4 lakhs was to be paid up in two instalments. The Raja was to submit in 15 months' time his title to the territories under him. The rest of the items were the same as conveyed to Lt.Col. Kenny. Finally²⁶ the Raja was to give up the Sagar fort.

The expedition which thus started with a loud bang ended in a mere whimper. The ratified agreement was received in Lt.Col. Kenny's camp on the northern bank of the Bhima. It now only remained for the force to take possession of the Sagar fort which was quietly delivered to Sikandar Jah, accompanied by Lt. Winfield of the Subsidiary Force, in the first week of June 1802. The combined forces returned to Hyderabad in July 1802.²⁷

In this first ever employment of the Subsidiary Forces in accordance with article 17 of the Treaty (of 1800) one can clearly notice the Resident's anxiety to limit its use. Surapur was yet terra incognita to the British²⁸ and the Governor-General had been silent on the nature of assistance to be given to the Hyderabad Government in respect of Surapur.²⁹ The British did not wish to enter into any armed clash with the Surapur forces and hence the Resident was keen to bring about an amicable settlement among the contending parties. He acted as a mediator and succeeded as the old and infirm Raja could not have offered any resistance. The Nizam's Government was equally anxious that the Resident should only provide troops but not intervene directly. In fact the Resident had to threaten the Minister that if the Surapur vakil was not allowed to meet him (the Resident) the march of the Subsidiary Force would be halted. One would expect the Resident to be enthusiastic in chastizing the Raja who had helped the rebel Dhondya Wagh, but he seems to have taken his cue from the silence of the Governor General on this point. The British Resident's increasing importance at the Hyderabad Court also may be noted by the fact that the Minister could discuss Hyderabad's requisition for troops only at the Resident's convenience.

Death of Venkatappa II and Installation of Pid Naik III

Shortly after the surrender of Sagar fort the aged Raja Venkatappa II died, news of which was received at Hyderabad on 20th July 1802. Apprehending disturbances, the Hyderabad Minister proposed to depute Raja Raghattamrao with a cavalry detachment to Surapur but that Raja having declined the mission only a letter of condolence and mourning clothes were sent for the sole heir, the late Raja's minor daughter Venkat Rangamma, and Timmappa was confirmed in his post of ³⁰ diwan. The Hyderabad Government now began to look forward to a sizable amount as naxrana, the usual condition for confirming the accession. But neither diwan Timmappa nor any one of the numerous widowed ranis proved to be suitable as regent. Timmappa was reported to be fomenting quarrels among the ranis and some of the zamindari in the principality also appeared to be refractory under such unsettled conditions. The late Raja's relation Yenkappa also joined the fray and tried to secure the gadi for himself but the diwan and some of the ranis combined to oust him. Troops were reported to have collected with a view to defying the agreement executed by the late Raja with Hyderabad. The eldest rani tried to secure the Resident's support by presenting him with dogs and hawks. But the Resident refused to be involved in any way; he only advised the Hyderabad Minister to keep troops ready for employment near Sagar. ³¹ The Minister acted upon the suggestion and sought the ³² presence of Subsidiary Forces as well whenever required. Meanwhile the ruling party in Surapur attacked the Hyderabad forces near Sagar but were repulsed. Thereafter Raja Mahipatram was despatched to restore order. He managed to capture several ring-leaders of the attacking party. But in the whole affair the

Resident remained so neutral as to observe that Surapur's fate³³ was uncertain and that perhaps it might be annexed by the Nizam.

It is not understood why the Hyderabad Government did not then choose to add the principality to its dominions. Perhaps it might have been afraid of resistance from the local populace among whom the military clan of Bedars was predominant. Even if annexed, it would have had to appoint a revenue collector instead of which it was less troublesome to extract a tribute from someone willing to pay it. It is not known how the minor daughter's claim to the gadi was altogether set aside and as successor how the choice fell upon one Pid Naik, a cousin of the late Raja³⁴ living in a distant place like Pandi. Anyway he succeeded to the³⁵ samathan by agreeing to pay a huge amount of nazrana in coins and jewels. He also bound himself to abide by the agreement executed by his predecessor. But during the first years of his regime he was unable to pay the annual tribute on account of various³⁶ calamities. Gratified with the jewels, the Hyderabad Government also made no special efforts to realize it. British relations with Pid Naik III were also confined in the beginning to only demand of fugitives like Diwakar Nair who were suspected of concealing themselves in the Surapur region. But Pid Naik could render no help, as such rebels immediately sought asylum in the³⁷ neighbouring regions of the Peshwa.

Raja Pid Naik III and the British (1807-8)

But very soon the British appeared on the Surapur scene³⁸ indirectly owing to the interference by Raja Mahipatram, former civil administrator of Berar, into Surapur affairs.

When Raja Mahipatram was dismissed from his Berar post and banished to Sagar on the border of Surapur and the Nizam's dominions, two military officers of Berar, Muhammad Riza Khan

Sindhi and Nabi Yar Jang attached themselves with their troops to Mahipatram and were consequently dismissed by the Hyderabad Government. Mahipatram, however, found it difficult to maintain these troops and was looking for some means for their subsistence. It occurred to him that he could make use of the principality of Surapur for this purpose. Surapur lay within easy distance from Sagar the fort of which had been delivered to the Nizam just 5 years back. Besides, during the disturbances that were created sometime after that Raja's death Mahipatram had succeeded 'more by intrigue than force' in dispersing the Surapur forces bent upon defying the Hyderabad Government and had captured the main leaders.³⁹

Thus he was well-acquainted with the principality and saw in it a happy hunting ground to establish his influence and to maintain his small army. Therefore, he at first proposed to Diwan Timmappa of Surapur that the Diwan should employ at least 200 cavalymen under the Qiladar of Shahapur. Timmappa turned down the proposal. Timmappa also refused Mahipatram's offer of standing as surety for the Surapur tribute to Hyderabad, and thus incurred his enmity. Mahipatram thereupon made common cause with Yenkappa Naik (Sellapar) who was inimical to Timmappa. Thwarted by Timmappa in his attempt to secure the gadi of Surapur for himself, Yenkappa had fled to Sagar, collected a band of adventurers and was living by making raids upon Surapur and its neighbouring regions. Mahipatram had not forgotten Yenkappa's previous offer to him of Rs. 10 lakhs for securing the gadi of Surapur.⁴⁰ The gadi was now occupied but it was possible to secure the Diwani. Mahipatram now offered it to Yenkappa (in the place of Timmappa) if he agreed to take some of Mahipatram's troops into his service. Yenkappa eagerly accepted this proposal. It was agreed that Riza Khan Sindhi's troops should be engaged by

Yenkappa for which Mahipatram would secretly pay in the beginning. As soon as Yenka ppa felt sufficiently strong he attacked Surapur, but Timmappa repulsed him successfully. Thereupon Riza Khan Sindhi with his remaining troops and Nabi Yar Jang joined Yenka ppa who, thus reinforced, succeeded in his second attack. Timmappa escaped with his eldest son, took refuge first in the Peshwa's territory and later arrived at Hyderabad to seek support.

Meanwhile Raja Pid Naik III welcomed Yenka ppa presumably because he was his relation. He did not hesitate to appoint Yenka ppa as a Diwan jointly with Murugappa, another influential man of Surapur. Pid Naik even agreed to have guards placed over Timmappa's house where he had left his family. Pid Naik's quiet acceptance of Yenka ppa's authority as Diwan seems due to the fact that he had suspected Timmappa of having embezzled some money from the State treasury. Riza Khan Sindhi and Nabi Yar Jang were also taken along with their troops into Surapur service and thus Raja Mahipatram succeeded in establishing his influence over Surapur. This change in Surapur was brought about in just a fortnight's period in June 1807. Raja Mahipatram also undertook to be security for the payment of Surapur tribute.

When the British Resident Sydenham discussed this change in Surapur administration with the Hyderabad Durbar he found that the Nizam had instructed the Minister Mir Alam to ignore it. Fully aware of Mahipatram's anti-British attitude the Resident would have liked the Hyderabad Government to take some action to curb Mahipatram's growing influence at Surapur. The only ground on which it could be done was the tribute due to Hyderabad from Surapur. Mir Alam, therefore, proposed to despatch troops to secure it, but the Nizam had granted inayatnama to Mahipatram

despite Mir Alam's remonstrances, agreeing to Mahipatram as a guarantor for the tribute. Mahipatram even gave some bills on Hyderabad sahukars for that purpose, so the idea of despatching troops had to be abandoned and a Hyderabad agent was ordered to go to Shahapur (where Mahipatram was residing) to settle the peshkash. The Resident had to keep quiet since it was an internal affair between the two States.⁴¹

Raja Pid Naik soon came to regret Yenkappa's Diwani; for, Yenkappa began to make exactions from the Surapur inhabitants for Mahipatram. When the Bedar population seemed rebellious Yenkappa left for Bijapur to collect Surapur's rusums from that region. Obviously Surapur had been sufficiently fleeced. While Yenkappa was away Mahipatram and Riza Khan Sindhi accused Raja Pid Naik that he had instigated a Nizam's official to seize some Surapur territories. The Raja, afraid for his life, fled to the hill-fort of Wandrug, but there too felt insecure. Mahipatram, perhaps no longer able to squeeze further money from Surapur, seized the Raja's jewels and other personal property, and finally brought the Raja and his family as well as Diwan Timmappa's family to Shahapur and kept them there under strong confinement.⁴² The Raja was also made to sign a bond that he owed money to the troops of Riza Khan Sindhi on which pretext Mahipatram held the Raja's son as a hostage.

The Raja, however, managed to send piteous appeals to Minister Mir Alam and Resident Sydenham for the restoration of his authority over Surapur which was now being ruled over by Riza Khan Sindhi and indirectly by Raja Mahipatram. On 22nd December 1807 Diwan Timmappa presented these petitions to the Minister and the Resident and sought assistance of troops from Hyderabad. Timmappa represented that there was no possibility of Hyderabad's receiving the tribute in the Raja's present

condition. Yenappa had already openly admitted his inability to pay as no revenues could be raised any further from Surapur. The Resident got Timmappa's narrative of Surapur affairs written down but could only assure that if called upon he would suitably advise the Hyderabad Government, though in reality he was anxious to check the conduct of Mahipatram.

Neither Mir Alam's nor Sydenham's representations on behalf of the Raja and the Diwan would have had any effect on the Nizam, since Mahipatram was his friend and confidant. But the Nizam was compelled to move, as by then news had been received that Nabi Yar Jang and Riza Khan Sindhi had raised palgah estates of the Nizam in Gulbarga district. Though reluctantly the Nizam had to agree to punish these former dismissed officials for such depredations. It was, therefore, decided by the Hyderabad Government to send its own forces under Nizamat Jang and Maj. Gordon to Gulbarga for that purpose and as Nizamat Jang had no military experience he was to be guided by Maj. Gordon. In his discussions with the Resident the Minister informed him that troops being sent to Gulbarga would also be employed to restore Pid Naik's authority over Surapur; that Diwan Timmappa would accompany the troops and use his influence at Surapur to persuade influential persons there to abandon the cause of Yenappa. Only thus could the tribute now amounting to Rs. 8 lakhs 'which would shortly become 13 lakhs in a few months' due from Surapur, could be realized. Since Riza Khan Sindhi and Nabi Yar Jang were ostensibly in Surapur service, the only way to stop their depredations on Nizam's territories was to punish them and restore Pid Naik's authority. It is significant to note that the Resident plainly told the Minister that he was not particularly concerned with the fate of Surapur as much as with the conduct of Mahipatram. The Nizam agreed that

Mahipatram should be asked to abandon Yenkappa's cause, deliver Raja Pid Naik and his family, as well as Diwan Timmappa's family, surrender the Raja's jewels and other personal property, sever his connections with Riza Khan Sindhi and Nabi Yar Jang and to undertake not to interfere in Surapur affairs. When the Nizam asked about reinforcing Nizammat Jang's detachment with troops from the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force the Resident replied that only if the Nizam's troops failed in their objective Subsidiary Forces might be drawn upon. He also did not offer the services of any European from the Residency to talk over matters with Mahipatram for fear of offending the Nizam.⁴³

Mahipatram, alarmed at the despatch of troops from Hyderabad, announced his disassociation with Yenkappa. Yenkappa and Riza Khan Sindhi returned from Gulbarga region to Surapur and proceeded to raid the Peshwa's territory to maintain their troops.⁴⁴ Meanwhile Mahipatram played for time by requesting that the Nizam's troops be halted at Narayanpet, away from Shahapur, and that William Palmer (later of the notorious Palmer & Co.) be sent for negotiations. Mahipatram offered to retire to Benares if given an allowance and during his talks with Palmer he even handed over the son of Raja Pid Naik. Later he gave up the family of Diwan Timmappa as well. By then Yenkappa and Sindhi returned to Shahapur with their troops from the Peshwa's region. Yenkappa now out of panic decided to leave Sindhi's camp but was held up for payment of arrears to troops. Mahipatram persuaded Sindhi to let Yenkappa escape; thereupon the latter surrendered himself to Maj. Gordon and was sent to Hyderabad.

But it appears that Mahipatram was only temporizing. Perhaps his nephew Sripatram instigated him to assume an imperious attitude and roused his anti-British frenzy; he also failed to persuade the desperate Sindhi to quit the Nizam's dominions. In

any case Palmer was required to leave Shahapur; the Nizam's forces marched towards it, but retreated on the mere sign of a forceful attack during which however, a number of Europeans including Maj. Gordon were killed (12 Feb. 1808). On hearing of this defeat the Resident prevailed upon the Nizam for the despatch of a detachment of Subsidiary Force under Col. Montresor⁴⁵ against Mahipatram. Pursued by Montresor Mahipatram fled to Holkar's camp and later lost his life there having refused to⁴⁶ leave it.

On the withdrawal and flight of Mahipatram from Shahapur, Raja Pid Naik IIIrd's authority over Surapur was restored and Timmappa secured back his Diwani. This was an indirect result of British action against Mahipatram. But it is seen that the British Resident's intervention was restricted to removing Raja Mahipatram's influence over Surapur administration since the latter's anti-British posture was manifest. The Resident displayed no anxiety to secure Surapur tribute to Hyderabad, nor did he feel called upon to lend the services of Hyderabad Subsidiary Forces for that purpose. Neither the Nizam nor Minister Mir Alam, referred to article 17 of the Treaty (of 1800) though it was obvious that without restoring Pid Naik's authority it was not possible to realize the tribute. It is doubtful if the Resident would have taken any notice of this fact had the anti-British Mahipatram not been involved in Surapur affairs. It is possible to argue that the Diwan's or Raja's petitions would have at best been passed on by the Resident to Hyderabad Government for such action as they considered necessary. At this period non-intervention in Hyderabad's relations with the Surapur seems to be the stand-point of British policy, in sharp contrast to their approach three decades later.

After the restoration of his authority Pid Naik III devoted his attention to the long neglected problem of revenues. Though he was illiterate he proved himself to be a skilful administrator. He "was a man of great decision of character and took great pains to improve his country, and so endeared himself to the people that they were always ready to meet his wishes, and from their cordial cooperation he was enabled to pay off with comparative ease his large Nuzzurana and Peshkash. He was in every way a friend to the Ryot and permitted none to be⁴⁷ ill-treated or ruined by famine or other adverse circumstances".

Another important factor that helped Pid Naik III to pay off his financial obligations to Hyderabad was the quiet on the Peshwa's front in this respect. He was no longer bothered about the tribute to be paid to the Peshwa. During his regime Surapur's tributary relationship with the Peshwa gradually lapsed and ceased altogether owing to the British alliances with Hyderabad and the Peshwa. Though Bajirao II was installed as the Peshwa in December 1796, the domestic turmoil at Poona that followed his installation, the plots and counter-plots of those opposed to him, the troubles he had with Deulatrao Sindia and the invasion of Yashwantrao Holkar left him no time to pay any attention to his tributaries.⁴⁸ Even after his re-entry into Poona in May 1803 with the help of British bayonets, he had to deal with the revolts of the sulky, southern iqaidars. Fishing in troubled waters Surapur not only ceased to pay either the Nizam or the Peshwa but even tried to extract more than its xuzum dues from the latter's domains. With the installation of Pid Naik III the Hyderabad Government was able to settle its claims, but the Peshwa was himself too insecure to think of his claims on tributaries. Only by 1806 did he attain some measure of tranquillity and comparative⁵⁰ peace not known for years. Thereafter in the beginning of 1806

he made over his claim on the mokasa of Sagar in Surapur samsthan to Shidojirao Nipanikar (a southern lagirdar popularly known as Appa Desai) who went to Surapur with an army to realize it. When Hyderabad protested against Nipanikar to Barry Close, Resident at Poona, he replied that "The Poligar of Surapur, like the Peshwa's other tributaries, will discharge no tribute unless⁵¹ compelled to do so by force". But meanwhile the Supreme Government sent orders that mutual claims between the Nizam and the Peshwa⁵² be submitted to it for arbitration in accordance with the 13th⁵³ article of the Treaty of Bassein which Bajirao had concluded with the British. The Poona Government committed the blunder of including Surapur tribute in its claims though it had nothing to do with the Nizam directly. On 10th May 1806 Barry Close⁵⁴ forwarded these claims to Calcutta Government which sat over it⁵⁵ till the end of 1815 and thereafter felt no need to consider them in view of its own deteriorating relations with Bajirao which led to his eventual deposition and the end of the Peshwaship itself in 1818.

In the meanwhile Bajirao continued to complain against Surapur and in 1807-8 even despatched Bapu Gokhale with troops to realize tribute from the samsthan. But Gokhale's advance was halted by the Hyderabad Resident's plea that Surapur was in difficulties on account of Mahipatram. Thereafter the Raja was expected to send a yakil to Poona as in the past to negotiate the⁵⁶ amount but no such step was taken. Instead a non-committal despatch was received from the Calcutta Government emphasizing the inferior status of the Peshwa in respect of Surapur vis-a-vis the Nizam, and challenging the Peshwa's right to send troops to enforce his demands. However, it was admitted that "the Peishwa is entitled to some security for the discharge of the acknowledged tribute, and if he is withheld from enforcing it by his troops, it

must be guaranteed to him by the Nizam".⁵⁷ When pressed through Hyderabad Pid Naik III did at last, send a yakil to Poona who protracted the negotiations till the matter was forgotten. At intervals the Peshwa renewed his threats and the Raja his negotiations,⁵⁸ but no payment was ever made. Nor could the Peshwa pursue it with the British since the whole subject continued to be under their consideration for years together, and he could not afford to lose his patience. All in all, the British indirectly and almost unconsciously helped Pid Naik in non-payment to the Peshwa who was fettered by the 13th article of his treaty (of Bassein) with the British. In the end Bajirao lost and the Nizam gained in this bureaucratic game and Pid Naik managed to pay only one of his two suzerains. Meanwhile he continued to collect his traditional rusums in the Peshwa's territories⁵⁹ thereby adding to his revenues.

Despite the favourable lapse of tribute to the Peshwa, continued collection of rusums in the latter's districts and his own kindly but wise management of the revenues Pid Naik III must have found the huge amount of more than 34 lakhs to be paid to the Nizam albeit in instalments, too heavy for the modest resources of the principality. Moreover the samathan⁶⁰ suffered from a short-lived but severe famine in 1813. In a report on Hyderabad prepared at the instance of Lord Moira on 30th March 1816 Henry Russell states that the revenues had dwindled from 8 lakhs to 6 lakhs. Pid Naik could maintain only a small army of 2000 on regular pay, most of the ghuries (fortified towns) were out of repair and besides Surapur there were only three other strong forts viz. Wakingera, Wandrug and Guikotah.⁶¹

Raja Venkatappa III and the British (1821-23)

On the death of Pid Naik III his son Venkatappa III succeeded to the samathan in 1818 A.D. He had to pay a nazrana⁶² of Rs. 6 lakhs to the Nizam for confirmation of his accession. It can be easily seen that the nazrana was a purely arbitrary amount his father having agreed to Rs. 15 lakhs. If the amount was much less this time it cannot be ascribed to the generosity of the Hyderabad Government. It took full advantage of the troubled condition of Surapur at the accession of Pid Naik III, to exact a huge amount; it had no particular pretext on this occasion. Nor can the Nizam be considered to have been lenient on account of the severe famine which afflicted the principality. Crops were damaged by heavy rains and price of jauar which usually sold at 70 seers per rupee rose to 3 seers per rupee.⁶³ But this happened in 1819. However, the principality quickly recovered in the following favourable seasons. And the Raja appears to have managed to pay not only the nazrana but also the annual tribute punctually as the Nizam made no call upon the British for assistance in its realization. The Raja was, perhaps, enabled to do so by his unremitting efforts to collect the traditional xuzma due to him in the Nizam's regions employing force whenever necessary. The Company's military officers in Hyderabad State complained against the violence that attended such collection but Minister Chandulal paid no attention, presumably because he was aware that the Raja had a right to these xuzmas; moreover he was satisfied with the nazrana and tribute.⁶⁴

It was during the regime of Raja Venkatappa III that the territories of the Peshwa were conquered by the British. (in 1818).

This was the occasion for the British Government to assert its sovereignty over Surapur by demanding the Peshwa's tribute as his successor. True, Surapur had ceased to pay anything to Peshwa Bajirao II; and also it had an equal traditional right accepted by the previous Peshwas of collecting rusams as well in some of his southern regions adjoining Surapur (Bijapur and Sholapur districts). But the amounts mutually due to each other could have been settled by investigation. In fact Neelkanth Rao, amlatdar of Bijapur held the amounts due to Surapur for Fasli 1229-33 (the beginning of British rule over the Peshwa's territories) in deposit submitting the question to William Chaplin, Commission^{er} for the Deccan. A yakil from Surapur Raja had met the Commissioner in December 1820 and returned to Surapur for relevant papers. The yakil had expressed his anxiety to settle the question without interference by the Nizam. The Commissioner however, formally requested Resident Metcalfe at Hyderabad to arrange the despatch of the yakil from the Surapur Raja to assist in the investigation of mutual claims. But the Resident only informed that the Hyderabad Minister was opposed to the despatch of such a yakil and desired the accounts to be settled between the Resident and the Commissioner among themselves. Chaplin's repeated efforts to get the assistance from Surapur yakil supplying such information about them as was available to him to the Resident to investigate the accounts bore no fruit due to Hyderabad's persistent opposition and Resident Metcalfe's acquiescence in it. It was undoubtedly in Minister Chandulal's interest to prevent a measure by which the British could claim equal suzerainty over Surapur. What is difficult to understand is the Resident's reluctance to help his own government. The Resident's final decision was: "... the cessation of tribute to the British Government by the Shorapoor

Chief, and of Huqa and Husooms on the part of the British Government would, it appears to me, to be the most convenient arrangement for all parties⁶⁵, and the Commissioner agreed with him. It was no doubt convenient to drop examination of 20 year old unsettled accounts but thereby the Company lost the opportunity to claim equal suzerainty over Surapur and allowed the Nizam to treat Surapur as his exclusive tributary.

In 1823 the Company further strengthened the Nizam's hands against Surapur by transferring to the Nizam chauth amounting to Rs. 15,000 per annum due to the British Government from Appa Desai Nipnikar. As we have seen before this chauth on account of mokasa Sagar due to the Peshwa from Surapur was handed over by Bajirao II to Appa Desai for collection. As Bajirao's successor the Company should have got this amount from Surapur on behalf of Appa Desai. For the sake of convenience they chose to realize it from the Nizam allowing him to collect it from Surapur⁶⁶. The British were not losers by this arrangement but it provided Hyderabad with an additional pretext to mulct the principality. Minister Chandulal took immediate advantage of the arrangement by informing Surapur Raja that he was no longer required to pay anything to the British on account of the Peshwa by treaty agreement but peremptorily demanded from him Rs. 30,000 per annum as dues from Surapur on account of the Peshwa now transferred to him⁶⁷. It can be safely presumed that the Raja dared not protest against this arbitrary double enhancement of the demand as British name was deceitfully used to awe the small samathan.

These transactions proved ruinous to the finances of the samathan. Its own revenues were already on the decline on account of the visitation of cholera and mismanagement by the Raja's revenue officials⁶⁸. The Peshwa's districts from which it used

to collect its hereditary rumas were now under British occupation and the Raja dared not collect them any more. Even if he had attempted to do so he would have been prevented by the Resident's decisive observation. The Resident and the Commissioner believed that mutual dues between Surapur and the Company neatly balanced and therefore, mutual surrender of them did not result in loss to either. But this was decided upon without investigating the actual accounts nor does the Raja appear to have been informed of it; it was a unilateral decision on the part of the British. It is possible to argue as Capt. Meadows Tayler later did that the balance might have been in Surapur's favour. Whereas Surapur's tribute to the Peshwa was a fixed amount as per treaty its rumas in his territories were a percentage upon the revenues which had improved under the British administration and might have resulted in a surplus for Surapur. Not only this additional source of revenue for Surapur was stopped but Minister Chandulal imposed an additional burden of Rs. 15,000 which went unnoticed by the Resident. The decline in the asmathan's income must be traced to these transactions which later on called for increasing British intervention and ultimate British management of the principality.

B - Increasing British Intervention

Raja Krishtappa and the British (1828-1841)

In the beginning of 1828 Raja Venkatappa III died leaving behind a succession dispute. His son Krishtappa was the eldest but he had promised the gadi in writing to Hanamappa, another son by a second wife. The party supporting the latter first appealed to Hyderabad Minister Chandulal who demanded Rs. 23 lakhs as nazrana and unable to pay such an exorbitant

amount they sought recognition from Resident Martin. Martin's assistant Ravenshaw was in favour of Hanamappa but meanwhile Krishtappa's party secured recognition for him by agreeing to Minister Chandulal's rapacious demand of Rs. 15 lakhs as nazrana and Rs. 2,30,600 as annual tribute both to be paid in 9 years by instalments but Rs. 4½ lakhs as cash down. While the nazrana was the same as was imposed upon his grandfather ascending the gadi in similar circumstances the tribute was exorbitantly enhanced by adding ghauth, farm of Devdurg, fees to the Minister, darbar kharch and so on. The Minister assured the Resident that customary usage had been respected regarding succession and showed Rs. 4½ lakhs, the immediate cash kiat from the Raja as the tribute demanded from Surapur. The Resident considered it equitable accession to the resources of the State⁷¹ (of Hyderabad) and did not care to make any further enquiry. He might not have considered the demand as exorbitant vis-a-vis Surapur's resources its yearly revenues being erroneously estimated at Rs. 10 lakhs by his assistant⁷² though these had dwindled to half that amount long ago. The Resident undoubtedly failed in his duty enjoined upon him by the 17th article of the Treaty of 1800 by ignoring to conduct a detailed enquiry into the Nizam's demands and claims.

Raja Krishtappa's pecuniary troubles started almost immediately after his accession. He had committed the initial blunder of agreeing to sums beyond his capacity to pay. His father had died indebted to the tune of Rs. 2 lakhs. Decline in revenues had already begun in his father's time. Had he possessed in any measure his grandfather's administrative ability he might have been able to augment them and meet the Nizam's demands with some degree of punctuality. But as testified to by various British officers who were required to meet him subsequently he

was incapable of managing his principality. Consequently he got completely into the hands of his agents who possibly had pleaded his case at Hyderabad and had agreed to exorbitant demands ultimately with a view to filling their own pockets and managing the samathan for the Raja. His credit and resources were expended in meeting his liabilities in the very first year (1829) and in the subsequent year Minister Chandulal had to exert pressure upon him through the Resident who in turn asked the Commanding Officer at Matkal on the frontiers of Surapur samathan to see to the payment of kiat by the Raja. Henceforth this became a regular procedure. The British Commanding Officers at Matkal came to exercise the functions of some kind of political agent with the Raja. But in the main their duty came to be to dun the Raja for his dues to the Nizam and to arrange for payment through shukars. They performed the unpleasant task of acting as the strong arm of professional money lenders. The Nizam was the creditor, the Raja the debtor and the British the agents of the creditor helping him with their military might. The Raja of an autonomous principality was reduced to this pitiable position and the East India Company whose power was growing in all directions to this ridiculous role of a creditor's agent for a small samathan. The rise of Motigir Gossain, an indigenous banker who started with a small capital, may be ascribed to this condition and period.

In 1831 the Raja expressed his inability to pay the kiat as his revenue collection was prevented by turbulent Arab moneylenders. Some zamindars in Surapur had borrowed from them but were not in a position to return the loans. The Arabs insisted on being paid first before revenues could be collected. Capt. Raynsford, Commanding Officer at Matkal was ordered to

investigate and he managed to disperse them by arranging for
74 their payment. But it would appear that the Arabs proved only
an opportune pretext for the Raja to delay the payment of khat.
In fact his main banker Motigir had refused to advance any sums
unless his earlier loans to the Raja were cleared by the latter.
In 1832, therefore, the Raja's khat fell in arrears and Capt.
Raynsford had to proceed to Surapur to arrange with Motigir
Gosain who undertook to pay the khat on behalf of the Raja only
75 if districts equivalent to that amount were handed over to him.
The arrangement was tantamount to revenue management of Surapur
by a banker! The Raja was hopelessly dependent upon the Gosain
and refused to have his accounts with him examined even though
the balance was likely to be in his favour lest it gave offence
to the banker.

It was during the course of this arrangement that
Capt. Raynsford for the first time came to realize the actual
76 break-up of the Raja's dues amounting to Rs. 3 lakhs per annum.
Till then neither he nor the Resident were even aware what these
were though they were required to realize them! But owing to
the policy of non-interference in the affairs of Indian States
dictated by the then Governor-General Bentinck, Capt. Raynsford
was prevented from conducting any detailed enquiry. It is doubt-
ful how far he would have succeeded even if he were empowered
to do so since details regarding the naxrana payments and
income and expenditure receipts of the Raja were concealed from
him. Raynsford's own attitude is evident from his remark,
"His [Raja's] whole life will probably be passed in a state of
pecuniary difficulty but this does not come within my province,
which was to secure to the Government the payment of its dues,
and which I trust the Resident will be of opinion, I have done
on as favourable terms for all parties as under existing

circumstances was practicable".

Till July 1836 British assistance was not again required as the Raja managed to pay the kiata however irregularly. But his financial troubles were on the increase. Though he had promised to Raynsford to reduce his expenses and troops and to look into his accounts of which he was profoundly ignorant, he did not dare to reduce his troops composed of sanguinary Arabs. To meet payment to them he had to interfere with Motigir Gosain's revenue collection. Once again the kiata fell into arrears and Motigir refused to oblige any more. Though Hyderabad reduced the amount of kiat (but not the total amount of dues) it was not of much help to the Raja under such circumstances.

In the beginning of 1837 Minister Chandulal once again sought British military aid to realize the kiata. But this time he proposed sequestration of part of Surapur territory towards payment. The Officiating Resident at Hyderabad, Maj. Cameron, was initially agreeable to temporary sequestration if the Raja failed to pay and Capt. Lee at Matkal was ordered to Surapur. For the first time, however, the affairs of the principality were brought to the notice of the Government of India which expressed itself against such an extreme measure as sequestration and suggested the services of Capt. Raynsford who was experienced, to arrange for payment. However, Capt. Lee who was on the spot was entrusted with this task. He was directed to arrange payment through Motigir Gosain. The Resident appears to have been aware of the flight of ryots on account of oppression by the banker's agents and yet he could not think of any alternative. However, Motigir's persistent refusal to lend any more to the Raja made him ^{turn} shun to a Parsi banker at Hyderabad. But the Minister did not agree. This led the Resident to suspect that he was more keen on sequestering the principality placing it in the Raja's

half-brother Hanamappa's hands than in realization of the kiats and that Motigir Gossain was in league with this secret plan. Capt. Lee, however, succeeded in arranging payment by assuring the Gossain in writing that the British Government would intervene if the Raja failed to pay back the Gossain's debts. He misunderstood the Resident's instructions that he should only countersign the gabulavats to be given by the Raja to the banker. Once more the districts were assigned to Motigir Gossain as before. Neither the Resident nor the Government of India were aware of the exact nature of Lee's guarantee and in their blissful ignorance were happy that the Raja had not to be set aside.⁷⁹ It was left to the Court of Directors, where the Raja's obligations to the Nizam were brought to their notice, to observe the disproportion between the Raja's resources and demands upon him and to urge for more lenient settlement with him. The payments had to be enforced as a British officer was standing guarantee but non-payment was not to be made a pretext for measures such as sequestration or deposition of the Raja.⁸⁰

Another instance of Minister Chandulal's rapacity was his mention of chauth from Surapur which he alleged was transferred to Hyderabad by the Anglo-Nizam treaty of 1822, while keeping the successive Residents ignorant of the fact that a part of the kiat was composed of Appa Desai's chauth which he had unilaterally doubled. The Officiating Resident Cameron ignored the demand, but by not bringing the subject fully to the Government of India's notice he exhibited the same strange reluctance to enquire thoroughly into the Nizam's demands while agreeing to provide⁸¹ armed aid for their realization.

In October 1837 the Minister informed the Resident that payments were to be received through his agent, one Bishan Sing, and an Arab Sidi Mannu and that both he and the Raja were highly

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satisfied with this arrangement. In view of the Court's observations, the succeeding Resident, J.S. Fraser persuaded the Minister to reduce the khat to 2 lakhs per annum to enable the Raja to pay. Fraser's profound ignorance of the Minister's continual extortions by which the Raja had been driven more and more to financial morass can be seen in his remarks forwarding the arrangement. "In the whole of my intercourse with the Rajah Chundee Lal in connection with Shorapore affairs, I have certainly found him far more liberal than I would possibly have anticipated". He believed the sanathan's revenues to be 4 lakhs of which 2 could be certainly paid to the Nizam, and he went so far as to suggest that the British would not be justified in preventing sequestration in the event of the Raja's failure to pay henceforth. He was completely unaware of the different undue components of the khat itself nor of the Raja's heavy indebtedness on account of loans incurred from a variety of sources mainly to meet Hyderabad's demands.

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Though the khat was reduced the Raja did not find it easy to pay it. With the death of Motigir Gosain towards the end of 1837 his disciple Mahadevgir gained ascendancy over the Raja on account of the Gosain's loans to him, appointed Arabs to hold the Raja in thraldom and took over entire revenue management, appointing his own mansabdars and diwan. His intrigues at Surapur, particularly to oust Lakshmangir, the illegitimate son of Motigir, ultimately resulted in his own expulsion. Capt. Hampton, the Commanding Officer at Matkal was required to expel the turbulent Arabs in Surapur service. The Raja had to take recourse to borrowing from another sahukar, one Siddappa from Bogalkot who would oblige only on his own terms, such as grant of a jagir, exorbitant rate of interest, and so on.

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It cannot be said that the Raja did not try to augment his revenues or attempt some kind of management. He set apart certain villages for essential establishments and put them in charge of Chanbasappa, an honest and capable servant. He tried to persuade the fleeing ryots and weavers to return by giving them kharis at fixed rates. There were sporadic attempts to collect ryas dues from the Nizam's dominions. Additional temporary taxes were imposed upon every house, every door and every head of cattle. His own personal expenses were little. Instead of cash salaries he chose to grant iqars to hereditary servants. But his efforts to prop up his collapsing mansion were of little avail. He was powerless with ashukars and his servants acted more as their agents resorting to private speculation than as royal servants. He could not check or remove them. The iqardars considered themselves independent and refused to pay dharapatti. It was beyond a Raja weak by nature and heavily indebted, to set his finances on a sound footing.

In January 1841 or thereabouts Minister Chandulal once again complained of not having received any kists for the past 4 years. This was a blatant lie as these had been paid upto September 1840. Capt. W.B. Jackson, the Commanding Officer at Matkal succeeding Capt. Hampton himself had helped their collection employing pressure. The memorandum on Surapur affairs compiled by Assistant Resident D.A. Malcolm on this occasion on the basis of Residency records, howsoever imperfect it might have been, clearly revealed the blunder committed by former Resident Martin in conniving at the huge nazrana to which almost all of Surapur's troubles could be traced. It shed sufficient light on the extortions practised by Hyderabad under different pretexts and concluded: "The whole case from first to last

affords ... an admirable illustration ... of the embarrassments in which we [the British] have been involved consequent on our ... Military Force ... the services of which have ... been employed for a period of twelve years in enforcing claims with the real merits of which we do not appear at the outset to have made ourselves sufficiently acquainted". Capt. Jackson, prepared another memo which after briefly sketching the history of the samathan gave full indication of decreasing revenues and the financial crisis towards which Surapur was heading. He too opined, "... from the present impoverished state of the country it surely behoves a liberal Government to lessen the amount of Kist, and wipe off all old scores in the shape of Muzzurana, in order that country may remain in the hands of a family whose claim is so undeniable". He suggested new, fixed terms of payments by Surapur failure of which could justify sequestration... But these memoes left Resident Fraser unmoved. He refused to interfere in Surapur affairs under the specious plea that the Raja had not complained against the excessive demands and that these were quite common in the Nizam's country. He postponed any detailed enquiry to future failure of kista.

This occurred sooner than expected by the Resident. Meanwhile in the south of Surapur an Arab ismadar named Kohran began creating disturbances and later even captured Badami fort. The disturbances were suppressed but the Minister took advantage to allege that Surapur Raja was helping Kohran. On the contrary the Raja prevented Kohran's Arabs from passing through Surapur and even apprehended one Jag Mohan Sing of the party. Brig. Tomkyns who was sent to check Kohran also took the opportunity to clear the Raja of Bombay Government's allegations that he was in league with some conspiracies in Southern Maratha States. The Raja's borrowing from the Swami of Sonkeshwar and granting

him a jagir in return, an instance of the Raja's increasing financial difficulties, was quoted as an example of the Raja's alleged conspiracy ! Tomkyns also confirmed that Surapur was heading towards bankruptcy. ⁹² Already the Raja had asked for time to pay the kist, the Minister had refused and sought British military assistance as usual. The Resident now proposed temporary British management of the principality. But before taking this decisive step he proposed a full enquiry into ⁹³ Surapur's finances and suggested Henry Dighton, a European banker from Hyderabad for the purpose. The Government of India agreed but directed that the person to be deputed should be from among covenanted or commissioned servants of the Company or the ⁹⁴ Nizam. With this decision the period of unilateral intervention on behalf of the Nizam in the past 40 years of British relations with Surapur came to an end.

Notes and References:

1. The earlier sentence reads: "By the present Treaty of general defensive alliance the ties of Union, by the blessing of God are drawn so close that the Friends of one party will be henceforward considered as Friends of the other, and the Enemies of one party as the Enemies of the other". The remaining part of the article has been deleted here being not relevant to British connection with Surapur. FSC, 20 Nov.1800, No.136. Also Aitchison, Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Vol.IX (1929), p.67 wherein the punctuation etc. is slightly different.
2. FSC, 20 Nov.1800, No. 1.
3. FSC, 1 Oct. 1798, No. 1.
4. Wellesley's Despatches (ed. Montgomery Martin), Vol.II, No.LXXIX, para.36.
5. Dhondia Wagh, a Maratha by descent but born in Channagiri in Mysore served in Mysore cavalry, left it with a considerable booty during the 3rd Anglo-Mysore war, collected a gang of freebooters and made many depredations in Dharwar district then under the Marathas. Defeated by them in 1794 he re-entered Tipu's service but incurred his displeasure and was thrown into prison. After the

fall of Seringapatam in 1799 he escaped and fully launched upon his freebooter's career. He was ultimately killed in 1800 in Arthur Wellesley's campaign against him. Details of the campaign are available in FSP, 1800, Parasnis, History of Sangli State, pp.25-32 and V.V. Khare, Aitihāsik Lekh Sangraha, Vol. X.

6. FSC, 20 Nov. 1800, No. 5.
7. Originally this district was among the direct possessions of Surapur which, however, gradually appears to have lost control over it after the rise of the Nizams in the Deccan. The amount of farm is mentioned in FSC, 26 Apr. 1802, No. 41.
8. FSC, 24 Apr. 1800, Nos. 26-7.
9. FSC, 20 Nov. 1800, Nos. 11 and 14.
10. Ibid., No. 39.
11. Ibid., Nos. 81, 88 and 90.
12. Wellesley's Despatches, No. LXXIX, paras. 35 and 37.
13. FSC, 20 Nov. 1800, No. 91.
14. British Relations with Hyderabad, p. 96.
15. Instruments of the ratified treaty were exchanged on 12 Oct. 1800. FSC, 20 Nov. 1800, No. 137.
16. FSC, 16 Apr. 1801, Nos. 99-101.
17. FSC, 26 Apr. 1802, No. 37.
18. Ibid., Nos. 40-3.
19. Ibid., No. 39.
20. Ibid., Nos. 55-6, 93-4.
21. Ibid., No. 98.
22. Sadashiv Manakeshwar, Peshwa's yakil at Hyderabad suggested to Bajirao II that he too should take advantage of the situation and join the Nizam's forces to realize the tribute due to him. Bajirao ordered Ramchandrapant and Chintamanrao Patwardhans to march towards Surapur but soon recalled them apprehending Holkar's invasion. V.V. Khare's surmise that the yakil's suggestion was in consultation with the British Resident at Hyderabad is, however, unfounded. Khare, Aitihāsik Lekh Sangraha, Vol. XIII, p. 6892 and Nos. 6369, 6380, 6384.
23. Kirkpatrick to Wellesley, 30 Apr. 1802, FSC, 3 June 1802, No. 21.
24. Meanwhile the alarmed Raja was trying to arrange emergency asylum with the Patwardhans of Miraj and sent a yakil, Mudbasappa, there for the purpose. Khare, XIII, No. 6382.

25. The annual share was stated to be Rs. 10,000 only in FSC, 26 Apr. 1802, No. 41. This is an instance of how Hyderabad Government started enlarging its claims and began to realize them through armed aid of the British.
26. FSC, 18 Nov. 1802, No. 32.
27. Ibid., Nos. 44-51.
28. The Resident wrote to Lt.Col. Kenney to obtain every possible information re. Surapur as their knowledge of the country was limited and imperfect. Ibid., No.35.
29. See Wellesley's instructions on the implementation of the Treaty of 1800. FSC, 9 July 1801, No. 42.
30. FSC, 18 Nov. 1802, No. 52.
31. Ibid., No. 56.
32. Ibid., No. 69.
33. Ibid., Nos. 72-3.
34. HRC, Vol. 126, p. 220. Pandi is a small town in Anantapur District, Andhra Pradesh.
35. The nazrana amount agreed was Rs. 15 lakhs of which 9 lakhs were to be paid in coins and the rest in jewels. The actual worth of the jewels presented to the Nizam, the Minister and his wife and Raja Raghottamrao was Rs. 4,90,300. FSC, 2 May 1805, No. 269. The total demands agreed to by Pid Naik III amounted to Rs. 34,50,000 which included numerous other items like pashkash, durbar expenses, diwani expenses, Devadurg revenues, cost of expedition to Sagar and so on.
36. Enclosure III in Sydenham to Minto dt. 22 Dec. 1807. (HRC, Vol. 36).
37. FSC, 2 May 1805, No. 269, and 29 May 1806, Nos. 12-3. Entries dt. 27 Oct., 5 Nov., 2, 3 and 19 Dec., 1805 and 9 Feb. 1806 in Thomas Munro's diary. Diary of the Principal Collector Divisions of the Ceded Districts. (Unpublished, Hyderabad Central Archives). The demand for surrender of fugitives from the Company's dominion was based on Surapur - Hyderabad agreement in 1802, vide FSC, 18 Nov. 1802, No. 32, para. 8.
38. He was the son of Amritrao, a Gujarati Khatri, took service in the 'petitions office' (Arzbeqi), and accompanied the Hyderabad Minister Azimul-Umara to Poona where he was appointed 'house steward' (Khan-gaman). Later he served as pashkar to the French troops in the Nizam's dominions, who detained him during their mutiny. He attained prominence at the Hyderabad Court on account of his loyalty and devotion to Secundar Jah, the son of Nizam Ali Khan and held such posts as rai-rayan, civil administrator of Berar etc. On Azimul Umara's death in 1802, administrator with permanent authority of the Western part of the Nizam's dominions. Nizam Sikunder

Jah was keen to have him as pashkar at Hyderabad. But he was thrown into the anti-British party at Hyderabad owing to his tussle with Mir Alam, the Minister. Jealous of Mahipatram's influence over the Nizam Mir Alam, in concert with the British Resident who was keen to crush this leader of anti-British party, managed to have him banished to Sagar in the beginning of 1807.

39. FSC, 18 Nov. 1802, No. 73.
40. Ibid., No. 67.
41. Sydenham to Minto, dt. 22 Dec. 1807, paras. 6-26, and enclosure II. (HRC, Vol.36).
42. Ibid., enclosures I, III-IV.
43. Sydenham to Minto, dt. 25 Jan. 1808. (HRC, Vol. 36).
44. PRC, Vol. VII, No. 251.
45. Sydenham to Minto, dt. 25 Feb. 1808, (HRC, Vol.36).
46. PRC, Vol.VII, No. 308.
47. Capt. W.B. Jackson's memo, FPC, 19 Apr. 1841, No.103.
48. However Parashurambhau Patwardhan, heavily indebted and himself obliged to pay the Peshwa for his release sent his son towards Surapur and proposed to follow him, in Oct. Nov. 1708. But Venkatappa Naik III sent his yakil for negotiations and cleared off the tribute in the form of cloth in lieu of ready money. He even agreed to render military service with a thousand infantry and 500 cavalry. Khare, X, No. 4426; XI, No. 4545, 4550.
49. There was a report of Surapur trying to plunder Chand Kawath and Bardola in the southern insidiars' regions. Khare, XI, Nos. 4618, 4647. Chhatrapati of Kolhapur negotiated with Surapur for military aid. Khare XI, Nos. 4529, 4988, 5156; In Sept. 1803 it was reported that Surapur collected $1\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs from Midgundi in Peshwa's region. Khare, XIV, No. 6723 and 6735.
50. P.C. Gupta, Bajirao II and the East India Company. (2nd edition), p. 95.
51. Close to Sydenham dt. 24 Feb. 1806. FSC, 10 Apr. 1806, No. 130.
52. FSC, 27 March 1806, Nos. 87-8.
53. Aitchison (1929) Vol. VII, pp. 53-4
54. FSC, 5 June 1806, No. 44 & K.W.
55. PRC, XII, No. 199.
56. PRC, VII, No. 300.

57. PRC, XII, No. 23.
58. T. Warden, Chief Secretary to Bombay Government to William Chaplin, Commissioner in the Deccan, 8 Nov. 1821, HRC, Vol. 190.
59. FPC, 15 Oct. 1852, No. 39, paras. 20-1.
60. Nawab Framurz Jung Bahadur, Sherapur, p. 8.
61. Reproduced in The Indian Archives, Vol. IX, No. 2 from the original in the Bodleian Library, Oxford.
62. D.A. Malcolm's memo on Surapur. FPC, 19 Apr. 1841, No. 102.
63. Sherapur, p. 8.
64. HRC, Vol. 126, pp. 220-4.
65. FPC, 15 Oct. 1852, No. 39, paras. 25-38.
66. Under Secretary Edwards's memo on Surapur. FPC, 23 May 1845, No. 146, paras. 4-5.
67. No. 9 in appendix to supplement of FPC, 15 Oct. 1852, No. 39.
68. Capt. Jackson's memo on Surapur, FPC, 19 Apr. 1841, No. 103.
69. Malcolm's memo, FPC, 19 Apr. 1841, No. 102.
70. FPC, 15 Oct. 1852, No. 39.
71. Memoes of Capts. Malcolm and Jackson, FPC, 19 Apr. 1841, Nos. 102-3. Martin's remark received rough treatment at the hands of all British officials who had to deal with Surapur subsequently.
72. Ibid.
73. "His ignorance and imbecility of character have hitherto prevented him from taking any part in the management of his affairs." Capt. E. Raynsford, letter to Milly Secy to Resident at Hyderabad dt. 28 Oct. 1832, extracted in FPC, 20 Mar. 1837, Nos. 96-9 and Endg. "The Rajah is described by Capt. Lee ... as a reckless spendthrift or drunken lootcha in debt to every one and pays no one" "almost always intoxicated with opium and seldom in a fit state for business ... To the list are added the laziness, indifference and sensuality". Capt. Malcolm's memo, FPC, 19 Apr. 1841, No. 102. "Raja Krishnappa Naick is a good man and means well, but is of a very weak and indolent character and since his accession his country can scarcely be said to have been governed by himself but by those who possessed influence on the death of his Father, in connection with Saheokars". Capt. Jackson, FPC, 19 Apr. 1841, No. 103. "The Raja is too indolent and puerile to think of anything which would head exertion and organization. ... His habits are degrading, appearance indicative of excess. He spends his time in trifling amusements ... influenced by unprincipled advisers whom he himself has raised to lucrative offices

from low status, he is quite incapable of managing the sumthan's affairs". Brig. Tomkyns to Resident Fraser, 27 Oct. 1841, FPC, 15 Nov. 1841, No. 46.

74. FPC, 14 Oct. 1831, Nos. 59-63.
75. FPC, 26 Nov. 1832, Nos. 70-71.
76. Peshkash for Shorapur, 1,25,000; for Deodroog, 20000; chauth paid formerly at Poona 30,000; fee to Dewar, 20,000; Hyderabad Durbar expenses, 35,600; nazrana instalment 1,25,000 / variable in the first and last instalments; to be deducted Raja's rumma in Hyderabad State, 55,000, Malcolm's memo, FPC, 19 Apr. 1841, No. 102.
77. Lre to Military Secy to Resdt dt 28 Oct. 1832, FPC, 26 Nov. 1832, No. 71.
78. FPC, 20 Mar. 1837, Nos. 96-9.
79. FPC, 1 May 1837, Nos. 60-3 and 5 June 1837, Nos. 8
For more details see Appendix I.
80. PLFC, No. 43, 25 July 1838, para. 38.
81. Malcolm's memo, FPC, 19 Apr. 1841, No. 102.
82. Ibid.
83. Quoted in minute by F. Millet (member of Supreme Council), FPC, 23 May 1845, No. 148.
84. Capt. Jackson's memo, FPC, 19 Apr. 1841, No. 103.
85. FPC, 21 Dec. 1840, Nos. 46-51.
86. Capt. Jackson's memo, FPC, 19 Apr. 1841, No. 103; also FPC, 9 Mar. 1844, No. 90 and FPC, 23 May 1845, No. 116.
87. FPC, 23 May 1845, No. 116, para. 8.
88. Malcolm's memo, FPC, 19 Apr. 1841, No. 102.
89. Jackson's memo, FPC, 19 Apr. 1841, No. 103.
90. FPC, 19 Apr. 1841, No. 101.
91. This has been treated as part of the freedom struggle in Karnatak by the editors of History of Freedom Movement in Karnatak (Vol. I).
92. FPC, 14 June 1841, No. 31; FPC, 16 Aug. 1841, Nos. 77-80; FPC, 15 Nov. 1841, Nos. 46-8.
93. He was a rival of the notorious Palmer and Co. at Hyderabad and presumably very much in the good books of Resident Fraser on that account. Fraser repeatedly attempted to associate him officially with the East India Company's transactions. Memoir of James Stuart, pp. 192, 218, 219, 221, 272, 370, 389, 390.
94. FPC, 11 Oct. 1841, Nos. 45-7.

CHAPTER II
THE MISSION OF CAPTAIN GRESLEY
(Dec.1841 - Nov.1842)

Appointment and Instructions

When the Government of India agreed with Resident Fraser's proposal to depute an able officer for full-scale and on-the-spot enquiry into the affairs of Surapur this in itself did not constitute a conclusive measure. But it was a step in that direction; for, British policy towards Surapur would hinge on the deputed officer's report. His recommendation would help the Resident to decide whether the British should assume temporary administration of Surapur till the Raja's financial liabilities towards Hyderabad were liquidated or to effect some other feasible arrangement. Whatever the final decision it could be carried through by winning the confidence of the Raja about which the officer was being specially instructed.

The Resident's choice for this delicate assignment fell upon Capt. Francis Gresley, firstly because he suited the Government of India's requirement that the officer should be either covenanted or commissioned; and secondly because the Resident had the fullest confidence in the "distinguished ability and judgement of Capt. Gresley". While intimating the Government of India of his appointment and enclosing a copy of his instructions to Gresley on 29th November 1841, the Resident wrote, "no public interests committed to his (Gresley's) charge would ever suffer".

Guidelines were laid down by the Resident for the proposed enquiry. Gresley was instructed to report especially on the following points: (i) Was the Raja of Surapur merely a tributary Zamindar, like many others of Hyderabad State or was

be more or less independent except for periodical payment of tribute? (ii) Was the tribute and naxxana imposed upon him by the Nizam's Government higher than that of his predecessors and disproportionate to his resources or was he treated fairly? (iii) What was the precise, total amount paid by the Raja to Hyderabad so far and what was the unpaid balance? What were his other liabilities and general debts? (iv) In case the Raja's dues were merely arbitrary demands of a stronger power what should be considered as fair and correct dues and on what basis? To what extent could the British justifiably assist Hyderabad in its future demands upon the Raja or be a party to enforcement of his dues? and lastly (v) Gresley was to report on Surapur's revenues and resources, find out whether there was any decrease in it and if so, whether the decline was due to the Raja's extravagance, mismanagement or partly or wholly due to the exorbitant amount of naxxana and tribute. As a result of the recent disturbances a wing of infantry regiment had been stationed in Surapur region. Gresley was also to advise on its exact location. Particular emphasis was laid upon establishing direct communication with the Raja and on winning his confidence. If Gresley happened to recommend temporary British assumption of Surapur administration it was necessary to reassure the Raja that his own welfare and that of his subjects was the sole object in view and that his interests would be fully protected. Similarly, Raja's suspicions had to be allayed by explaining that British detachments were stationed in his raj merely to guard the frontiers and prevent repetition of disturbances like the recent ones.

Gresley had already studied all the records connected with Surapur available in the Hyderabad Residency. He was to be further assisted by a yakil on the part of the Nizam's

Government. Minister Chandulal named Bishan Sing who had already been Hyderabad's yakil at Surapur as a knowledgeable person. But the Resident considered him as undesirable on account of his past record; so the Minister nominated Qasimud-Daulah, a mansabdar in the Nizam's service who was to accompany³ Gresley. A couple of letters intimating Gresley's appointment to the Raja and seeking his co-operation were to be personally delivered by Gresley to the Raja. One was from the Resident and the other from the Hyderabad Government. On 13th December 1841 the Government of India conveyed their approval of Gresley's appointment, and of all the above arrangements and instructions⁴ to him. Gresley was now ready to set out for Surapur for his mission.

Gresley's mission thus differed from previous deputation of other British officers who were sent merely to enforce payment of Surapur's dues. He was to conduct a full enquiry that should result in decisive regulation of Surapur-Hyderabad relations and definition of the part to be played by the British in it.

Question of Rusums, Cattle-lifting and Other Depredations

As soon as Gresley was ready to launch upon his special assignment the Raja was ready with complaints of his own. As we have seen before financial relations between Surapur and Hyderabad were not one-sided but mutual. If Surapur owed tribute and nazrana to Hyderabad it had also the right to collect rusums in Hyderabad's domains. The Raja now requested Gresley to pass on to the Hyderabad Minister his request for their payment. Gresley recommended it by stating that Resident Martin in 1829 had promised such assistance to the Raja in this matter.⁵ Thereafter, the Raja complained that

Kundola, a igir village and three other villages, viz. Khanapur, Hungalli and Bomanpal in Arikere taluq of his asmathan were plundered and cattle from these villages carried off, by the villagers of Balchakar in Narainpet taluq and Gobbur in Raichur district respectively, both under Hyderabad. He substantiated his complaint with statements of patwaris concerned. The Raja could have sent his own ahandi for recovering the plunder but forbore hoping that Gresley would get them restored through the Nizam's taluqdars. Once again, Gresley passed on the request recommending orders by the Hyderabad Minister to his taluqdars⁶ for restoration. Very soon Gresley was involved in a more serious threat to peace in the region than petty plunder.

⁷ Disturbances of Hanamappa Naik

In the third week of January 1842, Raja Krishnappa Naik informed Gresley that his half-brother Hanamappa Naik was preparing to cross the Bhima river with a large body of armed followers with a view to invading Surapur and seating himself upon the Surapur gadi. Hanamappa could not cross it immediately as the river was in flood. It is a sad reflection upon the character of the Raja that after soliciting Gresley's assistance he himself proceeded on a hunting expedition ! Nor his servants would help to secure supplies for Gresley's camp. Perhaps, the Raja expected his half-brother to forfeit claim to the stipend by such open revolt, a situation quite welcome to him as the Raja was already deep in debts. Gresley who was then at Andola, however, moved to Naikal, 24 miles away, close to a ghat on the Bhima to investigate the matter. He also asked Capt. Palmer to be ready with his detachment.

On his arrival he found the region in a state of alarm, absurd rumours prevailing and armed assemblies in the taluqs of

Hyderabad adjoining Surapur ready to join any disturbances. The taluqdar of Yadgir admitted that 30 - 40 Arabs had bought ammunition at Yadgir and returned to Mundargi [now in Gulbarga District] from where Hanamappa was to cross the river when it subsided. Gresley issued warnings to Sidi Bilal, the amir at Mundargi, to Hanamappa himself and to the Amindar of Gurnatkal who was also suspected to be in league with Hanamappa. Gresley thereby hoped to nip any disturbances in the bud. Intelligence reports made Gresley, along with Capt. Palmer, move to Koulur from where Hanamappa's armed party was reported to have decided to cross the river on 30th night. Ghats at Naikal and Ahur were guarded by the British troops. The forces at Lingugur and Firozabad were ready to assist and Brig. Tomkyns, commandant of Hyderabad Division was ordered to defend Surapur.

These defensive moves caused the Arabs and others to abandon the enterprise. Gresley found some Arabs encamped at Mundargi, Sidi Bilal defiant as before and the Arabs quarrelling with him over their pay. Hanamappa was reported to be hiding in some village under the Sidi's authority. On 2nd February Gresley reported that the danger of attack on Surapur had disappeared. However, Brig. Tomkyns who had arrived at Koulur, opined that troops should not be withdrawn as troubles may erupt again. The Resident in the meanwhile had been urging Minister Chandulal to check movements of armed Arabs and the Minister, besides taking other measures, informed that Gresley could seize Sidi Bilal if he wanted to. Brig. Tomkyns's suggestion of a reward for the capture of Hanamappa was turned down by Resident Fraser, presumably at Capt. Gresley's instance. Hanamappa had already been directed to return to Chadarghat (at Hyderabad) and threatened with forfeiture of his stipend. His seizure on 13th February put an end to this abortive coup.

Meanwhile, a number of other conspirators had been apprehended and inquiry set afoot. These later investigations confirmed current rumours that at the back of it all was Raja Balaprasad, Minister's own grasping and unscrupulous son. He had loaned about 1½ lakhs of rupees to Raja Krishtappa. As there was no hope of realizing it through the Raja, Balaprasad, planned to recover it through Hanamappa by promising the Surapur gadi to him. Hanamappa, like most disinherited princes, had never ceased hopes of one day ascending it. Besides, he had grievance enough in the stoppage of stipend by Raja Krishtappa. There were other disgruntled iqaidars, Raja's own uncles in Surapur whose iqaid had been resumed, reportedly mutinous sibandi at Surapur willing to join hands with Hanamappa and any number of mercenary Arabs in Hyderabad region on the look-out for plunder. Sidi Bilal was to help in recruiting them and his father too was a party to these intrigues. In the opinion of the Resident, Hanamappa, was a half-wit and lacked energy for enterprise but became bold with such encouraging elements. Himself living in penury he made reckless promises to Balaprasad, his agent Bishan Sing (who had been Hyderabad's former yaki at Surapur) and others. It was suspected that the would-be palace revolution had been blessed or at least connived at by Minister Chandulal himself.

The Resident did not hesitate to convey these suspicions to the Minister who hotly denied the allegations and promised punishment to the guilty. As the conspirators had already been confined and Hanamappa himself was under the Resident's custody, no further action on the part of the British was considered necessary except stationing detachments of troops strategically for the defence of Surapur. Depositions of various persons who had been apprehended lead one to the conclusion that the

Hyderabad Government was playing an underhand double game. While always seeking British aid to recover Surapur's dues it did not hesitate to try its own plans behind the back of the British. Readily agreeing to Gresley's mission it felt no qualms to thwart it by using Hanamappa as their own instrument.

Plunder of Hanapur and the Problem of Han Ruzma

As soon as Hanamappa Naik's conspiracy was suppressed Gresley had once again to turn his attention to the recurring problem of frontier disputes between Surapur and Hyderabad. Like financial dues between the two, depredations into each other's adjoining territories were mutual and frequent. We have already referred to the Raja's complaint of looting of his 3 villages in Arikeri taluq by the Nizam's subjects. Now, the ryats of Hipperga taluq in Nizam's dominions were reported to have been robbed of their cattle by the Raja's subjects. Gresley, though not himself convinced that the theft had been proved against Surapur, urged the Raja, as instructed, to restore the cattle whereupon he offered to pay Rs. 18 or give two bullocks to the villagers of Hipperga¹¹. A few days later, he received further complaints from the Nizam's officials about similar depredations by the Bedars and officials of Surapur. In particular, the villagers of Hanapur in Raichur taluq jointly protested that they were looted by the Bedars and Rohillas engaged by Gururao and Govindarao, officials of the Surapur Raja in Arikeri taluq. The villagers of Gobbur attested to this depredation. Gresley refrained from any interference but offered to investigate if directed, since the Nizam's officials were pressing for his assistance and ignoring the affair might lead to more such instances¹². The

Resident directed that the Raja should either restore the stolen property and cattle or pay cash compensation. His general instruction, however, was that Gresley should endeavour to settle the disputes amicably and maintain peace till he could finalise his report on Surapur.¹³

Gresley took up the investigation into Hemnapur plunder only after the submission of his report. The villagers of Hemnapur readily repeated their story of how 51 households were attacked and robbed while the defendants from Arikeri had to be pressurised to depose. The property looted was probably worth Rs. 14,000. To Gresley's surprise the sale proceeds of cattle heads carried away were reported to have been credited to the Raja's taluqa accounts and it appeared that he had ordered the attack in retaliation of looting of villages in Arikeri taluq. The Raja evaded when questioned and would not care to apprehend the ring leaders of the attack. However, Gresley held him responsible for the loot and recommended that he should compensate.

This investigation, however, revealed to Gresley the real nature of these frontier depredations. The Bedars of Arikeri and Devadurg had time-honoured rustam claims on the adjoining taluqs of Hyderabad. If these were not paid punctually or disputed, they considered it as their right to realize them forcibly. It must be noted that there was no indiscriminate looting. The Bedars took away only what they considered as their rightful due. It included a fixed number of buffaloes, sheep, coconuts and mangoes, a definite quantity of hairs, lamar, rice, saltpetre, tamarind, cotton, gura, ghes, oil, betel-nut and betel-leaves and a measured length of cloth. All this was commuted into cash and demanded. Probably the Hemnapur inhabitants offered no resistance at the time when

attacked but chose to protest later because the Bedars were justified to a certain extent. Several other villages in Raichur taluq had similar experience. Stationing of regular troops to prevent them was of little use. Perhaps, better policing would stop them if Devadurg and Arikere were transferred to the Nizam as suggested by him in his report. The terrain in these taluqs was difficult and it was easy for those who took law into their hands to conceal themselves. But the problem was much larger. Mutual depredations could not be stopped or settled by merely investigating two or three prominent instances. That would merely provoke further similar cases then dormant where one party would be determined to enforce and the other to withhold demands till it was settled by the British. The Bedars had claims upon nearly 2000 villages in the Nizam's territory. If plundering had to be permanently checked all these rumu claims had to be investigated, adjusted finally and guaranteed.

The problem was similar to that of the Bhils in Khandesh and Berar who were in the habit of plundering the plains to realize what they considered to be their hac rumu and used to take refuge in the Satpura ranges. Military campaigns against them proving of no avail, a conciliatory policy was adopted, and Capt. Owens was appointed as 'Bhil Agent' to deal with the problem. He and succeeding Bhil Agents investigated and guaranteed the claims, granted the Bhils lands in lieu wherever possible and raised a local regiment of Bhils to channelise their habits. It had taken ten years (1819-29) to find a lasting solution. Gresley felt that some such measure would have to be adopted in this region as well. If it was not possible to tackle it thus, complete non-interference was preferable.¹⁴

Though Gresley's letter on this subject displays deep insight into the problem he appeared to have overlooked its alternative solution, viz., the commutation of Surapur's rumma for which the Raja could get credit in his dues towards Hyderabad. He himself had recommended it in his report. Since the Government of India's orders on it were awaited, the Resident refrained from any instructions on this subject. The Government fully accepted his report. Their acceptance of Gresley's recommendation in the report in respect of rumma appears to have been reinforced by their fear that otherwise such depredations may extend to other parts of Hyderabad which were already disposed to throw off the Nizam's authority.¹⁵ But pending the actual implementation of Gresley's settlement the question of rumma continued to erupt. In June 1842 the Raja sought the assistance of Maj. Hugh Inglis, Cavalry Commander at Gulbarga, to realize his rumma from the darga villages of Hussain Wali of Gulbarga which had not been paid for 2 years; otherwise he would attack those villages. The Wali on the other hand complained that the Raja's people had already taken away cattle from three of his villages which had affected cultivation thereby forcing him to stop paying his taxes. He expected Inglis to have the cattle restored first. The Resident directed that both the parties should refer the matter to Hyderabad Government whereas the Government of India permitted¹⁶ Inglis to mediate, presumably because Gresley was busy during this period in reducing the Arabs at Marched in Raichur taluq.

Gresley's Report and Settlement

Though for the sake of convenience we have dealt with the plunder of Hemnapur earlier we have already noticed that Gresley was directed not to undertake any investigation into

it till he submitted his report. Therefore, his main task after the suppression of Hanamappa's abortive invasion of Surapur was to carry out the instructions given by the Resident at the time of his appointment by a full-scale enquiry.

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Gresley's initial account was more in the nature of a tirade against Raja Krishtappa's maladministration than a report giving information sought by the Resident. Though Gresley went to Surapur and stayed there for 6 days the Raja would not meet him. Perhaps, his officials prevented him. Gresley reported that no class of people in the principality was satisfied with the Raja's administration; they were blaming the British for saving his rotten government from Hanamappa's conspiracy. Gresley had no opinion of the Raja's manager, Chanbasappa (which was to have such an impact, almost out of proportion, on later British relations with the principality), who, he said was neither paying the sibandi nor returning loans raised from bankers, and was starving iqirdars by resuming iqirs. Unless the Raja appointed a proper diwan discontent in Surapur would reach a point where the Raja himself might be killed in a palace revolution (khadaiani). His subjects had been plundering the neighbouring regions and he would forfeit British friendship if they carried out depredations into the Company's territories. When Gresley demanded accounts he submitted false statements. He had no intention of paying anybody though in favourable season he ought to have had money in his treasury. At the same time, finding his affairs sinking day by day, he sought Gresley's advice. Though Gresley found that he was not going to follow it, nevertheless he advised him to appoint a suitable diwan, turn out bad advisers, redistribute iqirs properly and pay up arrears to Hyderabad. He exhorted him to rule as a Raja

responsible for the welfare of his principality and warned him of catastrophe otherwise.

A couple of days later, Gresley submitted his report proper, with special reference to the Resident's queries. It is a longish document of fifty-five paragraphs accompanied by 12 appendices which are extracts from official papers to substantiate his report.¹⁸ In it he confirmed that the Surapur Rajas were independent chiefs. Though they paid tribute to the Nizam and the Marathas the amount was never fixed. The Nizam fixed it at Rs. 1,45,000 in 1802 when he first took British aid for its enforcement. In 1823, the British gave up claim to Surapur's tribute to the Peshwa as his successor the amount being considered equal to the Raja's rustams in the former territories of the Peshwa which he was no longer collecting. But the Nizam was allowed to collect Rs. 15,000 for the British as chauth owed by Appa Desai Nipaniakar to them. Thus, the total tribute from 1823 onwards should have been Rs. 1,60,000 but the Nizam arbitrarily raised it to Rs. 1,75,000. Adding up other sums under various pretexts and instalments of a huge naxxana of 15 lakhs imposed on Kristappa's accession in 1828 the Hyderabad Government's annual demand upon the Raja now had been raised from Rs. 1,60,000 to Rs. 2,30,600. The Raja had agreed to these hard terms for the sake of recognition as Raja; it was no wonder, if he fell into arrears and could raise money to pay Hyderabad only by farming out his territory to bankers. The British had assisted Hyderabad from 1833 onwards to enforce the demand.

Surapur's revenues in 1842 were about 5½ lakhs (land revenue from khalsa lands 2,80,000 and revenue from iqars¹⁹ 1,30,000, taxes like kullali etc. 40,000 and rustams in Nizam's region 1 lakh). Not all of it could reach the treasury,

however, on account of the Raja's weakness in enforcing his just demands, the peculation of his servants, and the turbulent nature of his subjects who would resist if they considered some assessment as unjust. In addition to strict management he could add to his revenue by resuming some iqirs; as many as 213 villages had been given away in iqir, more than half of them by the present Raja; but only the previous year the Hyderabad Government had forbidden him to resume any iqira thus encroaching upon his rights. Another way to augment his revenues was by extensive cultivation of cotton for which the soil was fertile and great export potential existed. As for rusums in the Nizam's regions, in former times their amount was greater than the so-called tribute to Hyderabad. With Krishtappa's accession the Hyderabad Government decided to collect Rs. 55,000 on his behalf and credit the amount to his account, and only the remaining Rs. 46,000 were allowed to be collected by him. Though the British had assisted the Nizam, a stronger power, to collect his demands, they had always refused the Raja, a weaker power, to collect his rusums from Hyderabad. Their collection had often led to mutual depredations and disputes.

Gresley had been unable to procure an exact statement of State expenditure. That furnished by the Raja indicated it to be Rs. 3,85,652. It was palpably false, as many items appeared fictitious. Several khalsa villages were shown as iqirs and revenue underrated at Rs. 2,68,343 to prove the Raja's inability to pay. Gresley estimated that the Raja spent about half a lakh on military establishment of various description (cavalry, aligol, pidas, golandaz, European style infantry, Telinga matchlockmen, Bedars and Bohillas) and about Rs. 20,000 on civil establishment the latter being very

rudimentary. His personal expenses were not known; he was extravagant if he had the means but had no reputation for liberality. He kept up very little state and whatever he spent was on his harem.

The Raja's debts amounted to nearly Rs. 17 lakhs without interest. The principal creditors were the Gossain bankers. Others were Siddappa ~~sahukar~~²⁰ of Bagalkot, the Swami of Sanke²⁰shwar and Raja Balaprasad; of these the British stood guarantee only for the Gossains. They had also interfered for payment of annual stipends of Rs. 12,500 and Rs. 3,600 to Hanamappa Naik, Raja's half-brother, and Yenkappa Jellapalli, a cousin, respectively. The former had forfeited it at present but forfeiture was not yet declared to be final.

Gresley pointed out and underlined the iniquity of the British acting as the strong arm of the Nizam to extort all sorts of arbitrary exactions from Surapur, apart from tribute proper. The only ground on which the Nizam was justified even in asking for tribute was that the Nizam's contingent afforded protection and security to the Raja. This was the only just principle on which the amount of tribute could be computed. Keeping in view the Raja's revenues his share of expenses for such protection would amount to Rs. 2 lakhs. It could also be calculated as: (i) Tribute in 1802 - Rs. 1,45,000, (ii) Nipani²⁰kar's ghauth Rs. 15,000 and (iii) Naxxana, fees, and all other demands present or future - Rs. 40,000. Thus, Gresley arrived at Rs. 2 lakhs as the Hyderabad Government's annual demand upon Surapur, which the British would be justified in enforcing upon the Raja.

How best could the British ensure that the Raja punctually paid this amount of Rs. 2 lakhs to Hyderabad? One alternative was to place Surapur under temporary British

management till all arrears calculated on the above principle were liquidated and firm basis laid for payment in future. This would also help to liquidate the Raja's other debts including those guaranteed by the British to the Gossain bankers. Another advantage was that Surapur's administration would improve considerably, particularly in policing the principality. But Gresley felt that disadvantages outweighed the advantages and foresaw far too many objections to this alternative in actual implementation. For one thing, no party in Surapur except the Raja's creditors were in the least anxious for British interference. By taking over the management, the British would be responsible for settling many other claims upon the Raja with which they had no concern so far. Jagir grants would have to be revised and the Raja's expenses curtailed. The European officer in charge would have to appoint his own people to carry out his reforms. Those thus displaced would be very jealous and disgruntled. Taking the management out of his hands would be most unpalatable to the Raja himself though he apparently used to request for British assistance in managing his affairs. Disgruntled iqirdara, displaced state servants, pensioned off Raja - it was not a desirable set-up. Moreover, while temporary British management might remedy present evils, it did not guarantee their non-recurrence. When the principality would be restored to the Raja, the British would have to ensure that pledges given by them during temporary management would be honoured by the Raja. This would lead to further disputes and complications ultimately forcing the British to annex Surapur permanently, a measure not contemplated by them so far. Immediate permanent annexation, justified on the grounds of maintaining peace in the region was preferable to temporary management by the

Gresley, himself did not prefer either alternative and made his recommendations on the basis that the Raja should not be deprived of his power and influence enjoyed by him and his ancestors for the past two centuries. These recommendations were: (i) Relinquishment by the Raja of all ryasms in the Hyderabad region Rs. 55,000 collected by Hyderabad but credited to his account and Rs. 46,000 collected by himself. This would account for half of the Nizam's annual demand and remove permanently a constant source of disputes between the officials of the Nizam and the Raja; (ii) cession of the districts of Devadurg, Arikeri, Jalahpalli and Gunawattal all south of the Krishna river, yielding a total revenue of Rs. 60,000, to be transferred to the Nizam. These districts were comparatively recent acquisitions of Surapur, Nizam Ali²¹ having rented them out in 1797 to the then Raja for Rs. 37,500. The Nizam, therefore, could be said to have a right to resume these districts; (iii) The first two accounting for Rs. 1,60,000 the Raja should pay in cash the remaining Rs. 40,000 out of the Nizam's demand fixed at 2 lakhs annually, agreeing to cede further territory of this value in case of failure to pay. The only objection Gresley could think of to this arrangement was that the inhabitants of the districts to be ceded attached to the Raja as their ruler might resist. But this objection could be overcome by guaranteeing their hereditary rights and by seeing to it that the Nizam's officials did not over-assess the districts.

Gresley's proposed settlement was fully approved by the Resident and forwarded to the Government of India who appreciated the able and creditable manner in which the report was drawn up. They recommended it for implementation, asserting that no British guarantee of any kind should be given for districts

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to be ceded. Gresley had already been recommended by the
Resident to effect the settlement and to deal with subsidiary
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matters.

Subsequent to this report, Gresley put forth another
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proposal. He suggested that the district of Andola yielding
a revenue of Rs. 40,000, unencumbered with iqara, could also
be transferred to the Nizam in lieu of cash payment. The
district of Nilogi could also be transferred temporarily to
Hyderabad but its revenues amounting to nearly Rs. 40 to 45,000
could
/ be assigned towards liquidating debts of Cosain bankers and
stipends to Hanamappa Naik and Yenappa Naik Jellapalli. He
was, however, of the opinion that once the settlement was
accepted it would be very harsh to enforce arrears of pashkash
to the Nizam by the Raja. As we shall see later, the Hyderabad
Government accepted the settlement only on the latter condition
and continued to dun the Raja for it through Capt. Gresley.
The Minister's demand was that he should at least pay the recent
kata which were overdue and it became Gresley's duty to call
the Raja for these kata, though unsuccessfully.

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Reduction of Marched

As we have seen before, though Capt. Gresley was now
essentially employed in a civil capacity, he was not free from
military duties as Commanding Officer at Matkal for maintenance
of peace in the region. That is how he was required to suppress
the disturbances threatened by Hanamappa. A similar occurrence
demanded his attention in the beginning of June 1842 when the
Raja reported to him the plunder of the village of Joladadgi in
Surapur samathan by Arabs from Raichur and Marched. Harkaras
sent by Gresley confirmed the report and brought in graphic,
gory details of the outrage. They found traces of blood shed,

mutilated corpses, wounded men and women, burnt cotton and grain, and houses set on fire. The village was not fortified and though the villagers could offer scant resistance bullets and daggers had been used to kill 17 persons including the village patil. Common plunderers had joined the Arabs to surround the village, had looted about half a lakh of rupees, had torn ornaments off women and carried away the cattle. The patil's sons had been tortured for money and later taken away as prisoners. Only a few villagers escaped to tell this horrifying tale. Some of the gangsters had been recognised as being in the service of the Zamindar of Marched (in Raichur district) and his uncle. As there was no feud between Marched and the village, reported wealth of the patil appeared to be the sole cause of this violence. Gresley himself attributed the carnage to enmity between the Arabs and Surapur Raja. It had sent out such a wave of terror that other villagers apprehending revenge by the Surapur Bedars had taken refuge in Raichur.

Gresley apprehended that if no punitive measure was taken it would provoke further disturbances between Surapur and the neighbouring Zamindars of Hyderabad Government. Raja Krishtappa demanded to know whether the Hyderabad Government would punish the perpetrators of the outrage or he himself should do it. Gresley was also informed that Arabs from Hyderabad had gone to Raichur either to defend it against possible attack by Surapur or to attack Surapur itself. He suggested regular troops to reduce the Arabs. When the Zamindar of Marched refused to restore the loot or release the patil's sons as ordered by the Hyderabad Government, Gresley was ordered to march against the Arabs who were rallying at Marched fort and the Raja was advised to desist from any revengeful action on

his own. Gresley succeeded in reducing the strong fort of Marched. The Arabs were imprisoned for later trial. The Zamindar of Marched and his uncle had surrendered themselves and the patil's sons released. Gresley listed the arms found in the fort, restored such property taken there as could be returned to Joladadgi people, held the remaining in deposit till the trial was over, and handed over the fort to the taluqdar of Raichur. Only some culprits of the carnage at Joladadgi still remained at large.

Gresley was occupied with this affair for the whole of June 1842. And even when his mission came to an end at the end of 1842 he was required to forward the list of Marched property held in deposit. The Amil of Matkhal and the Company's troops from Lingsugur under Capt. Adam gave excellent co-operation throughout. But it is Capt. Gresley who earned ²⁶ encomium from Governor-General, Lord Ellenborough for his reduction of Marched in the face of fierce defence by the Arabs.

Implementation of Gresley's Settlement

On 7th May 1842, the Government of India approved Gresley's settlement and left it to the Resident to secure the consent of both the Hyderabad Government and the Surapur ²⁷ Raja to the new arrangements. Curiously enough, in the meanwhile, Gresley did not anticipate any opposition to cession of his territory on the part of the Raja. His only apprehension was that the Raja's officials might excite the Bedar population of the districts to be ceded who might resist the change of masters. He, therefore, suggested that the Nizam's officers who would take charge of the districts should be accompanied ²⁸ by troops.

Immediately on receipt of the Government's orders the Resident sent his assistant Capt. Malcolm to explain

the arrangements to the Minister who wrote back that Devadurg district did not belong to the Raja; that its revenue should be estimated only at Rs. 20,000; that the Raja, besides surrender of his ruyas in Hyderabad region and cession of territory, must pay all arrears upto the end of Fasli 1251. The Resident in reply urged the Minister to accept Gresley's valuation of Devadurg and sent a copy of Nizam Ali Khan's original sanad to the Surapur Raja to prove his full title to that district. In characteristic style the Minister exclaimed, "There is no limit to the Government's losses ! How great is the distress of the Government !" He agreed to whatever was proposed by the Resident as if in extreme disgust and as if the whole settlement was unfair to the Hyderabad Government. He gave an impression of accepting it under duress. The Resident ignoring the Minister's pretended pique now enquired from the Minister the names of officials who would take charge of the ceded districts and disapproved of Sultan Nawazul-Mulk, taluqdar of Raichur who was obnoxious to the Bedar inhabitants of the region. Thereupon the Minister nominated Budun Khan, ²⁹ taluqdar of Matthal, which was approved.

It is characteristic of the high-handed methods and pressurizing tactics of the Resident that even before he had obtained the Minister's full consent he informed Gresley that he had done so and directed him to negotiate with the Raja. He was to obtain the Raja's willing consent if possible. threaten him verbally if necessary, and as a last resort requisition troops from Bolarum to enforce the settlement if the Raja tended to create difficulties. He also agreed to temporary transfer of Nilogi to the Nizam to cover partly Surapur's dues to Hyderabad and partly in payment of debts ³⁰ due to the heirs of Metigir Gossain. We have already noticed

that the transfer of Nilogi was not proposed by Gresley in his original report but at a later date and as such the Government of India knew nothing about it and had not issued any instructions. After approving of Budun Khan as new official of Hyderabad in charge of ceded districts, the Resident directed Gresley to fix a day for the actual transfer of territory which should be 20 days after the receipt of the letter to the Raja to that effect. He was to inform the Resident as to how he would meet any reluctance on the Raja's part. Copies of the proclamation to be issued regarding transfer of the territory were to follow soon. To the Government of India the Resident justified possible use of troops and measures of coercion in effecting the settlement by referring to the 17th Article of the Anglo-Nizam Treaty of 1800.

Gresley was mistaken in thinking that the Raja would not resist the cession. As soon as the Raja was informed of it, he made his opposition clear. He had no objection to giving up his rusums in Hyderabad territory, though. After all, under his weak administration he had hardly been able to collect them regularly or to account for them in his treasury. The irregular mode of collection of rusums had meant only filling up of the pockets of his officials or Bedar subjects. It was certainly advantageous to get credit for them in his dues towards Hyderabad. Permanent cession of territory, however, was quite another matter. Unable to obtain the Raja's willing consent to the latter, Gresley proposed that the Hyderabad Minister should fix a day for the transfer of territories and send his officials with sibandi to take charge of the thanas. Regular troops should be held in readiness to meet any opposition. He, however, still expected that if the Hyderabad Government guaranteed hereditary rights in the ceded districts

and the new district officers were proper persons there would be no actual opposition. He was certain that estimated revenues of the districts to be ceded would meet the Hyderabad Government's permanent demands upon Surapur. It might even produce additional revenue which could be ascertained at the³³ collecting season and surplus lands restored to the Raja.

On receiving the Resident's final instructions and copies of the proclamation regarding transfer, Gresley wrote to the Raja that on 20th Jamad-us-sani (29th July) the specified districts must be handed over to the Nizam's authorities. He sent him a draft tagid to be issued by the Raja to his own officials and a yakil to explain it all to the Raja in Kannada. As instructed by the Resident, the Raja was threatened with loss to the samsthan if he or his officials dared to oppose. If there were delay or difficulties, Gresley proposed to proceed to Surapur personally to effect the new³⁴ arrangement.

The Raja's immediate reaction was to submit an humble and piteous appeal to Gresley, to the Resident and to the Nizam. He supplicated that he should be saved from the disgrace of transferring parts of his hereditary, ancient possessions. Once again he made promises to pay his dues but agreed to abide by Gresley's advice regarding the management of his principality and requested Gresley to visit him for that purpose. Gresley now proposed that British detachments at Gulbarga and Lingsugur should help the Nizam's officials to take charge of the cessions. Even then he did not apprehend actual disturbances but suggested that it was better to be³⁵ prepared to meet resistance. The Resident had learnt reliably that the Raja had sent yakils to Hyderabad to carry his petition. A douceur to the Minister or his son Balaprasad

from the yakil might halt the arrangement. Bent upon effecting it through force, if necessary, he directed Brig. Tomkyns to hold troops at Matkhal and Lingsugur ready for possible requisition by Gresley, even requested troops at Sholapur, which was nearer to Surapur than Hyderabad, to be prepared, informed the Raja that he should forthwith order his officials to hand over the districts and not to compel Hyderabad Government to employ force and directed Gresley to proceed to Surapur with a small detachment to hand over to the Raja personally his own and the Minister's letters rejecting the Raja's petitions. Gresley was to requisition additional troops only after making sure that they were necessary. ³⁶ At a later date, he authorised him to send for troops from Kalghatgi as well. Gresley was to intimate if a large-scale campaign would be necessary in which case the commanding officer of Bolaram Division would be sent down to head it. ³⁷

Though Gresley does not report it in his letter to the Resident, it would not be wrong to presume that the Raja must have been cowed down by this British preparation to enforce the settlement of which Gresley must have talked to the Raja in his personal interview. The bullied Raja handed over all the districts proposed to be ceded to the Nizam, but showed utmost reluctance in respect of Andola and Nilogi. These were his most ancient, hereditary possessions. He sent a wasikul-arg to the Minister that if his rusums and taluqs were restored to him he would assign them to bankers and secure loans to pay off all his dues to Hyderabad. In another petition he made such a request only regarding Nilogi to pay off the bankers. As for Andola its irregular boundaries would provoke many disputes and the Bedars, many of whom had inam lands there, would resist. He was ready to pay Rs. 30,000 for allowing him to retain them

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in one instalment after Dasra when kharif crops would be harvested and annually without fail in future. ³⁸ Gresley agreed with him and recommended that the Raja be allowed to retain them on giving security for payment of Rs. 40,000 in lieu; and actual payment of Rs. 1 lakh as arrears of peshkash to the Nizam and the stipend to his half-brother Hanamappa. ³⁹ Maj. Inglis from Gulbarga who had occupied thanas in Andola-Nilogi for the Nizam should continue till final orders were received. When the Resident communicated his agreement with Gresley's proposal the Minister demanded the security of Siddappa shukar for Andola-Nilogi. The Resident objected as this banker was staying at Bagalkot in the Company's territory. While submitting to the Government of India that Andola-Nilogi would be under British military occupation till their orders were received he urged that the Raja must forfeit these districts if he could ⁴⁰ not furnish some other security.

It is noteworthy that Gresley also reported the reluctance of Hyderabad officials to take charge of the ceded districts as they had not received sandaks for it and also on account of current rumours about further negotiations between Surapur and Hyderabad on the subject. It was here, for the first time, finding that neither party appeared to be fully satisfied with his arrangements, that Gresley recommended the ⁴¹ policy of complete non-interference in Hyderabad-Surapur affairs. The permanent transfer of the ceded districts and the surrender of Rasum, however, became a settled fact during Raja Krishtappa's life time. Only the question of Andola and Nilogi remained under consideration even after his death.

Gresley After the Death of the Raja

During the course of the implementation of his

settlement Capt. Gresley received the news of Raja Krishtappa's sudden demise and transmitted it to the Resident on the 10th August 18⁴². The Raja must have died a sad ruler losing almost half of his hereditary raj which might have hastened his death-pangs. Unlike in many other Indian states and in Surapur itself on the previous occasion, succession to the gadi was smooth this time. Venkatappa Naik (IV), the late Raja's 8 years old son by Rani Ishwaramma was immediately acknowledged by all as the rightful successor. As was customary in the Surapur samsthan, the dead body of the Raja could be cremated only after the seal of the Raja's office and his sword were handed over to his heir and his subjects had paid their obeisance to him. ⁴³ It was true that Raja Krishtappa, when he had no hopes of any male issue, had adopted his brother Pid Naik's son to be his successor. But on the birth of Venkatappa, the nephew's claim lapsed automatically. None, therefore, not even Pid Naik who could be the real interested party had any objection to Venkatappa's succession. ⁴⁴ Capt. Gresley apprehended disturbances ⁴⁵ if any one else was appointed by the Nizam's Government. Resident Fraser, however, directed Gresley not to take the young lad's succession for granted before making further enquiries. ⁴⁶ He himself enquired from Minister Chandulal about it. The Minister's reply revealed that he had no definite information, but, perhaps, out of sheer habit, expressed doubt about the legitimacy of Venkatappa. ⁴⁷ Gresley's own enquiries ⁴⁸ discounted this and confirmed the above.

What was at issue, however, was not who should be the Raja but who should wield authority and act as regent since the new Raja was a minor. Rani Ishwaramma, the queen-mother, was the natural regent. She was a clever, competent woman, perhaps a shade too temperamental to earn everyone's affection

but certainly capable of commanding loyalty and respect of her subjects. With the support of Chanbasappa who had on account of his integrity and competence, the management of the late Raja's household, private agars, and other establishments for which specific assignments had been made by the Raja, the Rani could shoulder the responsibility of running the administration. She did, in fact, assume administration of the State in the name of her son. All she needed was recognition of her authority as regent and the customary khilat for her son in token of his recognition as Raja from the Nizam's Government. She applied for such recognition.

How it must have dismayed the Rani to learn that instead of being recognised as the rightful regent, her brother-in-law Pid Naik, her enemy, soaked in wine and sunk in debauchery, was being proposed as the divan ! It was Capt. Gresley who was responsible for this nomination. Though Gresley feared no succession disputes or disturbances after the Raja's death he certainly anticipated a struggle for power among the late Raja's relatives. To the Resident's queries on the subject he answered that the Rani in league with Chanbasappa would in future resume a number of agars. The dispossessed agardars would consequently create troubles similar to those in January 1842 created by Hanamappa. They would be again aided by Arab isadars anxious to have a footing in Surapur. In consequence of recent arrangements Hyderabad Government could not levy naxras any more on any succession in Surapur. But it would make the payment of Rs. 5 lakhs which it claimed as arrears from Surapur upto end of Fasli 1251, a pre-requisite for conferment of khilat. As the Rani and Chanbasappa were reported to have amassed private fortunes during the past 3-4 years when they virtually wielded authority in Surapur, it is they alone

who would be in a position to guarantee payment of these arrears. Thus, they would secure Hyderabad Government's support. Their ample resources would also be used to recruit Arabs and other mercenaries and thus strengthen them, if appointment of a suitable divan was delayed. But what had really scandalized and antagonised Gresley against the Rani was her reported illicit connexion with Chanbasappa. He believed that this was detested by all and reported that he had several messages from the Raja's relatives to use his influence for removing Chanbasappa. But for the fear of British intervention the abominable Chanbasappa would have been banished, even killed, long ago. If it was made known to the people that he was not supported by the British he would not be able to maintain his position for long.

The nominal divan at the moment was one Basappa Desai who, however, did not enjoy any authority. Gresley did not consider anyone from Surapur as really fit for the office of divan. They were, without exception, the most disrespectable set of people he had ever had any dealing with. He had heard nothing about one Ranga Naik whom Capt. Jackson had proposed as divan in 1840. Though Lakshmangir Gosain was a respectable character, his personal pecuniary claims upon the samathan disqualified him. Gresley had no opinion of Pid Naik either; he considered him to be ignorant and no more honest than the rest of the Raja's family. But he was the best of the bad lot.⁵⁰ Moreover, Pid Naik promised to pay in instalments the Hyderabad Government's arrears urging at the same time that this be kept a secret; otherwise the Minister might auction the samathan to the highest bidder and he would meet Hanamappa's fate !⁵¹

As was rightly observed by Gresley, Minister Chandulal's sole interest in the question was the realization of arrears. It did not matter to him as to who paid them. When the Resident asked him as to whom he considered as the fittest person to be regent during the young Raja's minority, to begin with, he opined that the Rani was the rightful claimant. "In proof of this all high and low have obeyed her and they are all much attached to her", he wrote.⁵² But the Resident ascribed this opinion to secret negotiations at Hyderabad between the Rani's supporters and the Minister. He firmly held it as an 'unquestionable fact' "that in this Government no political or other arrangement ever takes place without being intimately blended and combined with some negotiation or intrigue having the acquisition of money for its object".⁵³ The Resident forwarded extracts from Gresley's letters condemning the Rani and Chanbasappa and informed the Minister that "they would ultimately prove extremely injurious to the interests of Surapur". He, therefore, urged the Minister to accept Pid Naik as divan and issue letters to that effect. The Minister agreed after initial hesitation, explaining that he had not been made aware of the Rani's immoral character till then.⁵⁴

Thus, with Capt. Gresley's recommendation, the Resident's insistence, the Minister's acquiescence and the Government of India's approval,⁵⁵ Pid Naik, the 'least undesirable' among all was imposed upon Surapur as divan. As it turned out, it was a most significant step on the part of the British that led them to intervene in Surapur to a much greater extent, brought them closer to its internal administration which they had avoided so far and entirely altered the course of Surapur's political history, so to say.

The Rani was not altogether unaware of what was happening and what was going to happen. The Resident had instructed Gresley to secure the Rani's consent to Pid as divan in a friendly way. Nomination of, or even future support to, Pid should not appear as a positive act by the British Government. Tact was to be employed. But instead, while informing the Rani of khilat for her son which was on the way, and reassuring her that no nagrana would be levied, Gresley had peremptorily urged her to remove Chanbasappa who would ruin the sansathan, to arrange to pay the Nizam's Government's arrears immediately, to stop thinking of recruiting Arabs from Hyderabad, about which her late husband had also executed an agreement, and to accept Pid Naik as divan.⁵⁷ In reply, she sought exemption from any payment on compassionate grounds in consideration of the sansathan's previous losses. She pleaded on behalf of Chanbasappa emphasising that he was holding his position for the past 10 years on account of his competence, integrity and honesty. His enemies indulging in intrigues might spread malicious gossip but otherwise none else had any complaints against him. It was the late Raja's last wish to continue him in office. Unfortunate circumstances had intervened and the Raja had not been able to convey this wish to Gresley. If Chanbasappa were removed resulting in anarchy in accounts, "what good will result from making complaints after the mischief is done"? she asked. As for recruiting Arabs, she stoutly denied the allegation, invited Gresley to conduct a strict enquiry and satisfy himself. How could she ever allow herself to fall into the hands of those who were Surapur's inveterate enemies and who had looted its property which had recently been restored to Surapur by

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Gresley himself? So far as the State administration was concerned, district affairs and accounts were looked after by confidential servants. Supreme authority always rested in the Raja which had now come to her according to custom but she was running the government with the advice of her relatives and officers of the State. It was not the custom to appoint the Raja's or Rani's relatives who belonged to the nobility to high posts; their help in administration was of an advisory nature. Pid Naik belonged to the nobility; he too was associated, like others, in running the government. But it was against the custom to appoint him divan as the nobility was not expected to exert itself. She repeatedly and politely said that it was incumbent on her to seek Gresley's advice as well, that she would not depart from any advice that was meant for her good. But she urged him to come to Surapur, listen to what she had to say and then she would abide by his advice. "Your allegations add to the grief caused by the death of my husband. Please do not believe in stories against me. Satisfy yourself personally on all points. I look forward to you to uphold the dignity of my son. Please favour us and earn a good name for yourself".

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As we have already seen, this reasonable explanation was like throwing water on duck's back. Gresley's mind had already been prejudiced and made up against her and her pleas fell on deaf ears. The appointment of Pid Naik as divan became a fait accompli.

It must be noted that the Government of India had cautioned the Resident against coercion in anything respecting Surapur. While upholding young Venkatappa's claim to the gadi they had not only insisted that no nazrana should be levied by Hyderabad Government but had specially instructed

the Resident to extend to Surapur his 'care in the spirit of friendship and goodwill'. He was required to convey the Government of India's warm feelings and friendly disposition towards the young Raja who was succeeding in difficult circumstances and towards the queen-mother or the Rani who was specifically mentioned.⁶¹ Had the Resident interpreted these instructions in the right spirit, he would have refrained from imposing Pid Naik as divan. Instead, he deviously sought the Government of India's approval soliciting that it be not considered as undue interference as it had been agreed to by⁶² Hyderabad Government as well. On the one hand he pressurized the Hyderabad Government into accepting Pid Naik and on the other presented the Government of India with a fait accompli so that they were inclined to take the line of least resistance and approved it. And all this relying entirely on reports from Gresley.

It would be pertinent to point out here that Gresley's reports on the character and competence of the Rani and Chanbasappa were largely influenced by Lakshmangir Gosain. This ambitious banker who had lost his position with Raja Krishtappa by refusing him loans, bore personal enmity to Chanbasappa who knew the wicked nature of this wily man, and the mischief of which he was capable through intrigues. Chanbasappa had managed to pay some arrears of Hyderabad by raising loans elsewhere. To regain his position and control the Gosain had at first prejudiced Gresley's mind with anti-Krishtappa reports. After the Raja's death he began to spread canards against Chanbasappa and the Rani which were entirely false. It was he who suggested to Gresley the name of Pid Naik as divan with a view to gaining his personal ends. Given the weak and debauched character of Pid he expected him to be a puppet in his hands, so

that he himself would be the power behind the throne. Gresley ought to have kept an open mind on the subject and judged the Rani and Chanbasappa for himself by personal, independent enquiries. But Lakshmangir was a master artist so far as the crafts of poisoning a person's mind was concerned. Unostentatiously, with pleasing manners, the banker managed to prejudice Gresley against the Rani and Chanbasappa, so that he came to suggest Pid despite his weaknesses. However, there is no trace of Lakshmangir's underhand influence and behind-the-scene activities in Gresley's official letters and reports. He was completely deceived and his honest, straightforward nature easily taken in. The deceit of Lakshmangir Gosain practised upon Gresley and its baleful influence upon Surapur politics came to light much later.⁶³

While conveying the Government of India's good wishes to young Venkatappa the Resident now wrote to him to accept Pid Naik as divan. He also wrote to Pid Naik, "... the high character you bear, ... the general esteem in which you are held by the inhabitants of Surapur, afford satisfactory assurance that your administration will be a just one". So long as he was just he would receive the friendly support of the British and Hyderabad Government.⁶⁴ These high sentiments regarding a man of whom he knew little, that too based on hearsay reports, though fitting with the tone of diplomatic correspondence make strange reading especially in the light of later events and the Resident's own adverse comments about Pid Naik a few days later.⁶⁵ Gresley was to carry these letters personally to Surapur for delivery, instal and support Pid Naik in office and take with him whatever troops were necessary for this purpose.⁶⁶ The Resident thus retracted from his own instructions to Gresley just 4 days before in which he had

left to Gresley's discretion visit to Surapur for this purpose but had cautioned him against any steps that might provoke quarrels or compel recourse to arms. At that time the Resident had admitted that the Rani might be the regent according to Hindu custom but had expected Pid Naik to assume virtual control of administration on his own. As for Gresley's fear that the Rani might recruit Arabs in support, the Resident had considered it enough firstly to instruct Gresley to eject them from Surapur and secondly to get this conveyed to Arab iamadars at Hyderabad through Minister Chandulal.

As instructed by the Resident, Gresley arrived in Surapur on 26th September 1842. On his way Pid Naik passed on his request for British aid against the Rani who was not willing to hand over power to him. On his arrival he found the gentry of Surapur preparing to leave the town expecting disturbances. While Pid Naik was trying to enrol some men to strengthen himself the Rani had already recruited Rohillas and some sibandi sufficient to overpower Pid Naik. In her personal talks with Gresley she pointed out the worthlessness of her brother-in-law both as a man and as a ruler. She particularly feared that her son's life would not be safe if Pid was made divan. On Gresley's guaranteeing the minor Raja's safety she agreed to Pid Naik's divani. In a meeting of royal family, iamadars, Bedar chiefs and servants of the State the following day all accepted Pid Naik as divan, but some Rohilla iamadars and Bedar chiefs and the qiladar of Wandurg would agree only if the Rani ordered them. The Rani's orders were dependent upon a guarantee about her jagirs which were under Chanbasappa's management. She wanted to retain the royal seal and the sibandi under her and a promise that nothing in state

administration would be done without her consent. This amounted to virtual defiance. Gresley thus failed to achieve his purpose, but stayed on in Surapur at the request of bankers who were afraid of disturbances if he left. He now awaited the Resident's further instructions. In his opinion the Rani's party had grown stronger in the long period that passed between the Raja's death and the appointment of Pid Naik as diwan. She was now not likely to part with power without struggle. Gresley did not consider the Rani's adherents as respectable, but she had a following of 600-700 loyal Bedars. A large force would have to be sent to subdue her and all the ghats leading into Surapur guarded to prevent her recruitment of outside mercenaries. Moreover, even if she accepted Pid Naik as diwan but retained power as regent, the British Government's purpose would be defeated. ⁶⁸ The Resident now instructed Gresley, in consultation with the Minister, to threaten the Rani with dire consequences of her defiance and to leave Surapur taking with him Pid Naik or whosoever else wished to accompany him. ⁶⁹

Henceforth almost all letters from Gresley on the situation in Surapur were a reiteration of his reports that the Rani continued to defy the Government though at a later date she agreed to Pid Naik as diwan at least on paper, that her party was gaining strength day by day, that Pid Naik was incapable of securing authority for himself without British support, that a strong show of British force was necessary to reduce the Rani to submission and that without it he was unable to instal or support Pid Naik in the office of diwan. ⁷⁰

Thus, he raised an important problem of the limits of British interference in the affairs of Indian States. So far as Surapur was concerned Gresley gradually veered to the view that there were only two alternatives - either to abandon

Surapur to its fate and let things take their own course or to assume complete control during the Raja's minority.⁷¹

Resident Fraser, by temperament an aggressive imperialist, preferred the latter alternative. He would have liked to move in the troops immediately but for the Government of India's earlier instructions⁷² to avoid extreme measures. Secondly, while there were troops enough to guard the ghats on the Krishna and the Bhima leading into Surapur which he was arranging to check the movement of mercenaries who might strengthen the Rani, they were not adequate for full-scale military action. Calculating on the basis of Surapur's military strength as furnished by Gresley in an earlier memo⁷³ he estimated that 2000 bayonets with proportionate artillery and cavalry would be necessary for such a campaign. British detachments stationed on the frontiers of Surapur did not muster to this strength. He could detach troops from Bolaram-Secunderabad but that would be taking a security risk. So, he decided to play for time till other troops under his command⁷⁴ but on duty elsewhere became available for service.

Meanwhile, to prepare the Government of India for complete assumption of Surapur administration, he pleaded that Pid Naik did not appear to have any character, ability or energy enough to discharge his duties as divan competently. His installation with British armed support did not ensure immediate restoration of order in Surapur nor did it guarantee liquidation of Surapur's dues towards Hyderabad.⁷⁵ He thereby spoilt his case for a military campaign. For, the Government of India rightly retorted that if nothing was to be gained by installing Pid Naik in office it was enough to check the Rani or her adherents from employing Arabs (or similar mercenaries) and not to deploy detachments from Secunderabad thereby weakening

that region's defences.

Temporarily disappointed that the Government of India did not accept his recommendation the Resident appeared to be at a loss as to the instructions to be given to Gresley. All he could ask him to do was to watch the situation, to inform Pid Naik that he was responsible for whatever happened as the Rani had accepted him as divan at least on paper, to avoid showing open hostility towards the Rani but at the same time to see to it that her party did not gather strength. He even suggested to Gresley to proceed to Surapur so that he might help Pid to succeed to his office by tact and diplomacy, to give first-hand, on-the-spot reports on relative strength of the parties. He expressed his anxiety that Surapur could not be regarded as a lost case, if for nothing else at least to honour British treaty obligations towards Hyderabad in respect of Surapur. He even idly asked Gresley again to confirm whether Pid was the fittest person to be divan, himself underlining the futility of such a query by pointing out that the divan having been accepted by the minor Raja and the queen-mother nothing could be done about it any more !⁷⁷

Howsoever anxious the Resident might have been to extend armed support to Pid Naik he felt that this could be only in general line with British policy towards other Indian States over which he certainly had no control, nor was it easy to suggest isolated intervention in Surapur alone. He indulged in an astonishing degree of equivocation to persuade the Government though, by writing, "Extreme measures are not always those which are decided by the wisest and best policy though I am not prepared to say that it would be otherwise in the present instance".⁷⁸ The Government of India must have somehow managed to make some sense out of this astounding ambiguity. At last,

on 15th November 1842 they permitted the Resident to support Pid Naik against any opposition by the Rani or others. There was silence as to employment of troops or any overtly coercive measure.
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So far as Gresley was concerned these instructions came too late. The temporizing policy temporarily adopted by the Resident and recommended to Gresley while awaiting these orders had left him extremely dissatisfied. Even earlier he had refused to go to Surapur personally for supporting Pid unaccompanied by troops. He pleaded for at least a small detachment which he felt would be sufficient but which it was not within the Resident's power yet to sanction openly. Without such a detachment Gresley felt quite powerless in his mission. He clearly wrote that his mere advice to the ruling party at Surapur was futile as by now his personal influence was destroyed. Without troops his presence at Surapur would "merely exhibit a spectacle of a British officer, endeavouring as an unsuccessful partisan, to bring about a measure which he has not the authority to enforce and professing to support a party, while he has not power to do so". He could not put up with such a humiliating situation.
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He acknowledged failure, submitted formal resignation from his current mission and requested for return to Mominabad where he had served formerly in a purely military capacity.
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Gresley had sought transfer even earlier on grounds of ill-health, though his mission was far from nearing an end, successful or otherwise. The Resident had not been thinking of another officer in his place and he was awaiting the Government of India's final instructions about the extent of British intervention. Now that he received them he accepted Gresley's resignation and appointed Capt. Meadows Taylor in his place.
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Capt. Taylor states that the Rani defied all
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arrangements made by Gresley which is not borne out by the
official correspondence. As we have seen before, the cession
of Devadurg and other taluqs had already taken place. The
Hyderabad Government appointed Budun Khan to take charge of
them. Gresley himself assembled the watandars, etc. in the
ceded taluqs and explained to them that their hereditary
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rights, etc. will not be infringed by their new rulers. Since
Budun Khan wanted to bargain for the amount of annual revenues
to be paid to Hyderabad Government by him he consequently
presented a below average statement about it to the Minister
and the Minister felt that further cessions would be necessary
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to have the full revenue. Gresley refuted the Minister by
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actual enquiry. In any case the question of the Rani defying
the cession never arose. As for Andola-Nilogi the question
continued to hang fire. But this too had nothing to do with
the Rani's defiance. At one stage, Gresley suggested that they
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be handed over to Hyderabad. Pid Naik, though unable to
establish his authority, yet begged that at least Andola be
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retained with Surapur. But influenced by Lakshmangir Gosain,
Gresley recommended that Nilogi should be handed over to the
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Gosain for his dues. The Resident turned down his suggestion
and directed him to inform Pid that he would be held responsible
as diwan for both the taluqs. These could be ceded to the
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Nizam only in case of failure of payment. The revenues collect-
ed by officials were to be held in deposit till the actual
restoration which would take place only when Pid furnished
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necessary security for payment. The question was of the kind
of security Pid Naik could or should give. The Minister
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repeatedly asked for security of Sidappa shukar of Bagalot,

but the Resident turned down the suggestion in the strongest possible terms.⁹³ He was against any influence of bankers in Hyderabad administration itself and to provide opportunity for it through a banker residing in the Company's territory was most repugnant to him. Thus, the question continued till Pid was firmly established in office i.e. after Gresley's resignation, but the Rani had no hand in it. As for payment of 5 lakhs arrears on which the Minister had been harping throughout Gresley was not convinced of his calculation,⁹⁴ just as Taylor was not at a later period, though the Resident was. As directed by the Resident, he, however, asked the Rani to pay it, she expressed her inability, and as it turned out later, justly so as the Government of India itself considered these arrears as unfair.

What the Rani objected to was the imposition of Pid Naik as divan since she considered him incompetent, an opinion shared alike by Gresley, his successor Taylor and the Resident. Even here she continued to inform through the minor Raja that Pid had been appointed.⁹⁵ But she did not transfer real authority to him, for which Pid himself was partly responsible as he could not assert himself. It now became the task of Capt. Meadows Taylor to settle him in office with the avowed object of securing the Nizam's peshkash arrears.

Notes and References:

1. FPC, 13 Dec. 1841, No. 42.
2. Ibid., No. 43. The reference is to disturbances created by Kohran, an Arab jamadar, but these were not in Surapur samsthan.
3. FPC, 20 Apr. 1842, Nos. 61-2.
4. FPC, 13 Dec. 1841, Nos. 43-4.

5. HRC, Vol.551, Gresley to Malcolm, 10 and 16 Jan.1842.
6. Ibid., 15 Jan. 1842.
7. FPC, 30 Mar.1842, Nos. 43-5; HRC, Vol.551, Gresley's letters to Malcolm and Fraser, 28 Jan; 2,8,14,17,18, Feb.; 1 Mar.,1842.
8. Gresley reported that Gurmatkal samindar gave him up to Tomkyns (Gresley to Fraser, 14 Feb.1842), whereas the latter reported that a taluqdar handed him over. (Tomkyns to Mily Secy, 14 Feb.1842), FPC, 30 Mar.1842, No.44.
9. According to Taylor's later report this was not an actual loan but a promise to pay in consideration of Balaprasad's influence and services when the Raja's succession was yet to be confirmed. FPC, 23 Jan.1852, No. 165, para.13.
10. References to his earlier intrigues, Raynsford to Mily Secy, 28 Oct.1832, FPC, 20 Nov.1832, No.71; FPC, 21 Dec.1840, Nos. 47 and 52.
11. HRC, Vol.551, Gresley to Fraser, 5 and 7 Mar.1842.
12. Ibid., 7 Mar. 1842.
13. FPC, 8 June 1842, No. 173.
14. Ibid., No. 175; HRC, Vol.551, Gresley to Fraser, 24 Apr. 1842.
15. FPC, 8 June 1842, No. 176.
16. FPC, 27 July 1842, Nos. 142-6.
17. HRC, Vol.551, Lre to Fraser, 23 Mar. 1842.
18. FPC, 8 June 1842, Nos. 167-8. Copies of the report available in these and in HRC, Vol.551, are defective inasmuch as para 54 and appendix No.8 are missing in both.
19. Gresley is not justified in including the whole amount in State revenues as the Raja could claim only one third of it as dharapatti.
20. Gresley mistakenly refers to him as Sankeshwar Swami of Peona. The Swami might have been temporarily residing at Peona. Sankeshwar, famous only for its math, is a small town in Belgaum District.
21. Gresley was not quite well-informed on this point. See Note No.7 in Chapter I.
22. FPC, 8 June 1842, No. 171.
23. Ibid., No. 166.
24. Gresley to Fraser, 22 May 1842, HRC, Vol.551.

25. Ibid., pp.449-500, 501-2.
26. Memoir of Gen.Fraser, pp.156-7.
27. FPC, 8 June 1842, No. 171.
28. Gresley to Fraser, 22 May 1842, HRC, Vol.551.
29. FPC, 3 Aug. 1842, No. 346.
30. Ibid., No. 344. The Minister's consent was obtained on 1st June 1842 whereas instructions to Gresley were issued on 25 May 1842.
31. Ibid., No. 348.
32. Ibid., No. 343.
33. Gresley to Fraser, 27 June 1842, HRC, Vol.551.
34. Ibid., Gresley to Fraser, 6 July 1842.
35. FPC, 17 Aug. 1842, No. 164 and HRC, Vol.551, Gresley to Fraser, 18 July 1842.
36. FPC, 17 Aug.1842, Nos. 158-63.
37. FPC, 31 Aug. 1842, No. 141.
38. FPC, 14 Sep. 1842, No. 38.
39. Gresley to Fraser, 7 Aug. 1842, HRC, Vol.551.
40. FPC, 14 Sep.1842, Nos. 36 & 39.
41. Gresley to Fraser, 7 Aug. 1842, HRC, Vol.551.
42. Ibid., Gresley to Fraser, 10 Aug. 1842.
43. Pld Naik to Gresley, FPC, 19 Oct.1842, No. 133.
44. It was reported that after Raja Krishtappa's death Pld Naik himself went to the Rani, resigned all claims on the part of his son and tore up succession documents receiving in return the promise that his jagirs would not be resumed. Capt.I. Campbell to Resident, 11 Jan. 1855, para.5, FPC, 22 June 1855, No. 78.
45. Gresley to Fraser, 23 Aug. 1842, para 7, HRC, Vol.551.
46. Fraser to Gresley, 19 Aug.1842; FPC, 12 Oct.1842, No.72.
47. FPC, 14 Sept.1842, Nos. 44 and 46.
48. Gresley to Fraser, 23 Aug. 1842, paras 1-6, HRC, Vol.551.
49. Additionally he was addicted to opium and had got involved with Arabs on that account. Maj. Hampton's report on Surapur, pt.III, FPC, 22 June 1855, No.78.
50. Gresley to Fraser, 15 and 23 Aug.1842, HRC, Vol.551.

51. Ibid., Gresley to Fraser, 9 Sep. 1842.
52. FPC, 26 Oct. 1842, No. 49 Resident-Minister exchange of notes, 13 Sep. 1842.
53. Ibid., No. 46.
54. Ibid., No. 49.
55. Ibid., No. 51.
56. FPC, 19 Oct. 1842, Nos. 130 & 132.
57. Gresley to Rani, 3 Sep. 1842, HRC, Vol. 551.
58. Translation in FPC, 26 Oct. 1842, No. 49.
59. Refers to property secured by Gresley from the Arabs at Marched.
60. FPC, 26 Oct. 1842, No. 49.
61. FPC, 14 Sep. 1842, No. 48.
62. FPC, 2 Nov. 1842, No. 178.
63. Capt. Meadows Taylor laid these bare in a detailed letter to the Resident on Lakshmangir's doings. FPC, 23 May 1845, No. 116.
64. Resident to Pidi Naik, 14 Sep. 1842, FPC, 26 Oct. 1842, No. 49.
65. FPC, 30 Nov. 1842, No. 196.
66. FPC, 26 Oct. 1842, No. 50.
67. FPC, 2 Nov. 1842, No. 181.
68. FPC, 30 Nov. 1842, No. 197.
69. Ibid., No. 199.
70. Letters from Gresley, 12, 22 and 24 Oct. 1842, HRC, Vol. 551.
71. Ibid., 13 Oct. 1842,
72. FPC, 14 Sept. 1842, No. 41. This also dismisses Taylor's statement in the Story (p. 143) that "General Fraser, however, did not consider an exhibition of force necessary".
73. FPC, 30 Nov. 1842, No. 200. According to it Raja Krishtappa's armed strength had been: 100 Rohillas; 150 Aligals; 150 linevallas; 200 bodyguard Bedars; 200 Telinga matchlockmen in Wandurg garrison; 150 cavalry; a few golandas. He could also rely upon 8-12 thousand Bedars and hundreds of mercenary Arabs. Surapur proper had natural strength. Wandurg was a strong fort. Honhalli, Ijeri, Katerah and 3 other villages had strong ghurries. Most Surapur villages had towers and houses constructed with a view to stiff defence.
74. Ibid., No. 196.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid., No. 201.
77. FPC, 14 Dec. 1842, No. 121.
78. FPC, 30 Nov. 1842, No. 217.

78. FPC, 30 Nov. 1842, No. 217. 79. FPC, 21 Dec. 1842, No. 80.
80. Gresley to Fraser, 17 Nov. 1842, HRC, Vol. 551.
81. FPC, 18 Jan. 1843, No. 51A and Gresley to Fraser, 27 Nov. 1842, HRC, Vol. 552.
82. Ibid., Nos. 50-1.
83. Story, p. 143.
84. Gresley to Fraser, 14 Aug. 1842, HRC, Vol. 551.
85. Minister to Resident, 13 Sep. 1842, FPC, 26 Oct. 1842, No. 49.
86. Gresley to Fraser, 14 Oct. 1842, HRC, Vol. 551.
87. Gresley to Fraser, 12 Oct. 1842, HRC, Vol. 551.
88. Ibid., Gresley to Fraser, 22 Oct. 1842.
89. FPC, 21 Dec. 1842, No. 74.
90. Ibid., No. 75.
91. Gresley to Fraser, 7 Nov. 1842, HRC, Vol. 551.
92. FPC, 14 Sept. 1842, No. 36; FPC, 21 Dec. 1842, No. 78.
93. FPC, 21 Dec. 1842, No. 77; FPC, 14 Sept. 1842, Nos. 36 and 39; FPC, 19 Oct. 1842, No. 133.
94. Gresley to Fraser, 15 Aug. 1842, para 7, HRC, Vol. 551.
95. FPC, 21 Dec. 1842, No. 31.

CHAPTER III

ESTABLISHMENT OF CAPT. MEADOWS TAYLOR'S AUTHORITY

Taylor Reduces the Rani

When Capt. Meadows Taylor replaced Gresley he received no specific instructions from the Resident except the expression of a pious hope that he would be able to support and establish Pid Naik as divan by his judicious conduct and 'moral influence', without recourse to extreme measure or coercion of parties opposed to the divan¹. We shall presently see whether this hope was sincere and whether Taylor's initial success was not more due to the presence of British bayonets than his supposed 'moral influence'.

Taylor arrived at Surapur with an armed escort on 10th December 1842. On the way he met Capt. Gresley at Gobbur, and took charge of all relevant papers. Gresley briefed him, exaggerating the defiance of the Rani.² On his arrival Taylor was pleasantly surprised that Pid Naik could arrange his meeting with the chiefs of the gibandi including Bedar leaders. He explained to them individually and at great length why they must submit to Pid Naik and they agreed with the exception of four of them. At any rate Taylor saw no danger of immediate confrontation between the Rani and Pid Naik.³ The following day in his interview with the Rani he found her preparing a long statement explaining the difficulties of the samathan⁴ and her own position right from the days when her husband was alive. She gave a verbal account of it to Taylor, conceded to Pid Naik's divani, and on her own agreed not to shield Chanbasappa. Taylor discerned her cleverness in turning points under discussion to her advantage and assured her that Pid Naik

would not either confiscate her jagirs or extort her alleged wealth. Though she appeared sincere in all she said Taylor did not believe that a woman of her energy, determination, cunning, keenness and cleverness would easily give up. Pid Naik himself was surprised at her submission. A couple of days later, she gave to Pid Naik Rs. 30,000 for current expenses of the sansathan and agreements to serve him signed by sibandi chiefs and Telinga piadas of Wandurg. Meanwhile the Resident returned the Rani's letter to him unopened and instructed Taylor that in answer to the minor Raja's request for being vested with full powers he should be told that the divan was the proper channel of communication and that a boy of his age could not be vested with full powers.

Having made sure of the services of armed men in Surapur and elsewhere in the sansathan to Pid Naik many of whom the Rani herself had made over, Taylor, with the approval of the Resident, now launched upon a series of high-handed measures to strip the Rani of all authority, and even punish her for her alleged resistance. Neither the Rani nor Chanbasappa had ever meant to defy and were wisely willing to bow down to superior force. Their actions indicated nothing else throughout. But, prejudiced against them by the maliciously false propaganda of Lakshnangir Gosain, who was even more active now that Pid Naik was established as divan, Taylor all along viewed them with suspicion. The Gosain had even greater success with Taylor; for Gresley had highly recommended him to Taylor and apparently he was only helping Pid Naik to secure the divani, which was the main task entrusted to Taylor.

The Rani and Chanbasappa were reported to be secretly recruiting Arabs and Rohillas at Hyderabad. On the contrary,

Chanbasappa had made an agreement much earlier to discharge the additional sibandi engaged during Hanamappa Naik's threatened disturbances. Presumably he was only waiting for enough collections in the treasury so that they could be discharged with their arrears.¹⁰ Taylor had proposed his seizure but he surrendered himself seeking nothing but a fair hearing.¹¹ Taluqdars, possibly earlier appointed at his suggestion, were now changed, but the new taluqdars found no difficulty in collecting revenue.¹² Taylor demanded from the Rani the agreement executed by Bedars to serve her. To his surprise she readily handed it over. Taylor enquired from the Resident whether he should not call her to account for her 'deceitful conduct' since she had assured Gresley, after taking the said mughalka, that administration had been transferred to Pid Naik.¹³ In the agreement her name was not mentioned at all,¹⁴ and she had taken it so that the Bedars should serve her son, the recognised Raja. She had dreaded that Pid's son somehow would supersede her own son.¹⁵ The Resident wisely restrained Taylor with a view to preventing immediate excitement or disturbances among the Rani's Bedar adherents and instructed that the diwan could remove her or take other measures if the Rani disturbed peace in future.¹⁶ Despite the fact that he had encountered no armed or unarmed resistance to his proceedings so far, Taylor requested for the continuance of the detachments guarding the ferries bordering Surapur.¹⁷ Fears of the Rani's defiance were so exaggeratedly reported that the Government of India permitted march of troops to Surapur if required, thus quashing their earlier caution.¹⁸

Pid was now well-settled in his position. At Pid's request Taylor undertook examination of treasury accounts. A rough abstract for Fasli 1251 indicated more than Rs.30,000 as due from the Rani. He now proceeded to act on the unwarranted presumption that the Rani was accountable for all monies in the treasury and that any lapses should be made good by her. Though her personal accountability was extremely limited she offered to pay Rs. 1½ lakhs which she had expected to be in the treasury, but which otherwise she would manage by raising a loan on her assets worth Rs. 75,000. Finding that she was prevented from raising the amount from bankers she agreed to pay Rs. 1 lakh and in return demanded Chanbasappa's release and a share in the administration. Taylor answered by securing a peremptory letter from Hyderabad Government threatening her with confiscation of her Jagirs if she interfered in the administration or refused to pay up. An imposing array of British forces under Brig. Tomkyns was ordered to Surapur to reduce the Rani to submission. She was no longer in a position to ask for any terms; she raised Rs. 75,000 by pledging her personal jewelry and pleaded for a week's time to raise the rest, but Taylor was not prepared to wait for more than 24 hours. The Rani thereupon managed to raise the remaining Rs. 25,000, presumably by selling her jewels. "Helpless as I am it is necessary to preserve your favour ... To provide for such a sum (viz. Rs. 1 lakh) as this is hard on my life and on my property and nothing will remain to me; therefore please to take care that there may be no further demand on me, and thus endure a good name". She wailed piteously in vain. Taylor demanded another Rs.70,000 from her on account of arrears of extra gibandi she was alleged to have employed, excessive tankehs during Fasli 1250-51

and so on and proceeded with immediate military occupation of her jagir villages under the pretext that she was evading enquiry into accounts²² ! His demands upon the Rani were based not upon any detailed examination of treasury accounts but were guesswork. While sending the abstract accounts to the Resident he himself admitted that they had not been checked with daftar accounts, that credit side in them was fair enough. "I send the estimate not as a correct account but to serve as a guide to the present state of my demand against the Rani" he confessed.²³ Meanwhile the Nizam's officials obligingly sent one Sonagir Gosain 'who could be used in any way Taylor wanted', obviously a professional witness who was prepared to testify to any charges of embasslement that Taylor might choose to prefer against Chanbasappa.²⁴ Chanbasappa had been removed to Lingsugur,²⁵ beyond the boundaries of Surapur. The Resident authorised Taylor to banish the Rani too if²⁶ necessary while restoration of a jagir earlier sequestered by Hyderabad to the Machiavellian Lakshmangir was recommended for his 'services'.²⁷

The Rani now pressed for a detailed examination of treasury accounts as she was sure that there were no dues on her side. "~~Sarkar~~ was angry because she assumed authority; she would never do so in future", she promised. It now began to dawn on Taylor that the Rani might not have been responsible for illegal exactions or irregularities during her husband's regime.²⁸ The Resident directed that she was accountable for whatever public revenue had been collected when she exercised supreme or principal power whether it was before or after her husband's death, but that it was useless to demand what she couldn't pay. Taylor was to restore her jagirs if she had

justly obtained them. The Resident reasonably instructed that past irregularities could be raked up only if it helped the principality's finances; the principle should be to regulate the future.²⁹ In any case Tayler was able to report that the Rani "by the entire loss of her power and the temporary sequestration of her jagirs is convinced of the futility of opposing the wishes of Government which can at any time reduce her still further".³⁰

Detailed examination of accounts took some time and till then, i.e. for 4 months the Rani's jagirs remained under British military occupation. When the accounts for Fasli 1250-51 were more thoroughly investigated Tayler found no error or overcharge in spite of minute checking. The Rani had not employed a single anna from the State treasury for herself. In fact she was not at all responsible for state expenditure so long as the late Raja was alive. Thereafter she was responsible for only payment of arrears to sibandi amounting to Rs. 10,577-2-3 and she signed up a formal agreement to pay that amount.³¹ Even then her jagirs worth only Rs. 18,000 were restored to her whereas their original value was Rs. 27,093. The Resident directed that if fortified places within them could be retained for the sansathan without offence it should be arranged; she was not to have any assignments on sindi and betel-leaf contract which she used to enjoy earlier nor any nagranas from namasthans.³² Similarly Chanbasappa was released when it was confirmed that he had not misappropriated any public funds;³³ in fact he had no share in state expenditure at all.

The grave injustice done to the Rani and Chanbasappa was realized by Tayler only after a couple of years. At the

time his actions were motivated not by malice but by suspicion seditiously tended by Lakshmangir Gosain. The banker's gross exaggeration of the couple's wealth which he alleged was hoarded through embezzlement, his mischievous propaganda that they were recruiting mercenaries, the false rumours of their illicit liaison, misrepresentation of their real motives for opposing Pid Naik - these were the basis³⁴ of Taylor's proceedings. The Resident was anxious to crush the Rani's resistance with a view to installing Pid in office and quite pleased that Taylor succeeded in it. The Government of India's appreciation of Taylor's, 'firmness, judgement and temper'³⁵ depended entirely on the Resident's reports who in turn believed in Taylor's letters who in his turn acted upon the Gosain's advice. There was none at the time to commend the couple's restraint, honesty, integrity, co-operation with Taylor despite ill-treatment and wisdom in submitting to superior force in the interest of the samsthan. The Court of Directors also approved Taylor's³⁶ treatment of the Rani.

Taylor's Other Immediate Measures

(1) Question of Refund of Impost Secured by Violent Methods

After a preliminary examination of accounts Taylor reported that a lakh of rupees had been violently extorted³⁷ from some villages in the samsthan in the past year. Accounts had not been kept properly; collections had been made carelessly and a scramble among servants of the samsthan to³⁸ grab whatever they could was discernible. The Resident³⁹ directed a thorough enquiry into the violent impost which on further checking up turned out to be actually about

Rs. 76,000. Tayler had at first suspected Chanbasappa and the Rani to be responsible for it. Investigation, however, revealed that the Rani had nothing to do with it and Chanbasappa was only one among many other officials of Raja Krishtappa who himself had authorized this forcible levy to meet the pressing demand from Hyderabad Government for kists which had fallen due. Normal revenues of the samsthan were inadequate to meet the Nizam's demands; so villages were secretly surrounded at night by the late Raja's troops, and money, gold etc. was extorted. It was not embezzled but credited to the State treasury.⁴⁰ The Government of India authorized Tayler to return such amount as was recoverable to concerned villagers.⁴¹ But the Resident raised doubts that as such extortions were common in Indian States, the British Government would have to intervene in all such cases, once such a principle was accepted in this instance.⁴² The Court of Directors directed that if reparations were inexpedient at least future revenue claims on the affected villagers should be lenient.⁴³

(11) Retrenchment of Sibandi

Taylor had suggested clearance of arrears of the State sibandi immediately after his first meeting with the Rani. This was necessary to divert their allegiance from the Rani to Pid Naik. He secured the initial amount for the purpose from Andola,⁴⁴ possibly because he was not yet sure of what was available at Surapur treasury. Later he proposed that the samsthan's armed force should be reduced by half, a measure much to the liking of the Resident.⁴⁵ It would reduce the nuisance value of not only the Rani but whosoever

ruled the sansathan and the resulting savings could be utilized for payment of the principality's dues. The measure could be carried out only after paying off the dues of the forces to be disbanded. The Government of India already having burnt their fingers in guarantees to the Gosain bankers strictly ordered Taylor not to stand guarantee to sahukars on this account. "On no account will the British Government engage in any further guarantees for the repayment of money that may be advanced by Sahukars to Native States" was the firm principle enunciated.⁴⁶ The arrears amounted to Rs.20,000 and⁴⁷ it was to be paid by the Diwan if and when he could.⁴⁸ The Resident though in favour of disbandment did not desire it to lead to disturbances.⁴⁹ However, he was particularly keen about dismissal of Rohillas and Arabs in state forces in keeping with his general policy of curbing the power of these mercenary trouble-makers throughout Hyderabad.⁵⁰ As huzurati Bedars and Telingas of Wandurg held lands for military service it was easy to send them back to agriculture and they were agreeable to it.⁵¹ Taylor's original idea was that the Rani⁵² should pay for the arrears.⁵³ She later agreed to do so. But in the meanwhile Pid Naik paid off from present receipts in the treasury. Taylor, with Pid's consent, now managed to⁵⁴ retrench more than half of the sansathan's forces. The measure was unnecessary so far as settling Pid Naik in office was concerned, and Taylor had no mandate for it. It was his own idea for which he must be given credit and which he cleverly carried through, thereby reducing chances of armed hostility by the sansathan against the British in future.

(iii) Arrangements to pay Nizam's Dues

Among other immediate tasks of Taylor, once Pid's authority was established, was the one relating to arrangements for paying off Hyderabad's dues. This had been all along the basis for British intervention. Taylor at first questioned the Hyderabad Government's claim to 5 lakh rupees as arrears from Surapur and eloquently pleaded that only 2 lakhs should be agreed, of which the Rani could pay one and ⁵⁵ Pid the other lakh of rupees. Finding the Resident adamant on the question he forwarded the lakh of rupees ⁵⁶ extorted from the Rani. He was also directed to see to it that Pid Naik paid the balance and gave security for Rs.40,000 on account of Andola-Nilogi. ⁵⁷ Taylor found that it would be impossible for Pid to pay as the estimated total revenues were only Rs. 1,30,000 with other claims to be settled besides ⁵⁸ the Nizam's. He was, however, permitted to restore iqardars ⁵⁹ in Nilogi and Pid was allowed to send Rs.40,000 (on Andola-Nilogi account) directly to Hyderabad instead of paying through the Nizam's naibs. Taylor held Nilogi revenue in deposit in Surapur treasury to be paid to Gosain bankers when ⁶⁰ the question was settled. He conveyed Pid Naik's reluctance to pay to the Nizam for the plunder of Hemnapur and seemed ⁶¹ to agree with him saying that Pid was not responsible for it. But the Resident did not ⁶² agree and the Court of Directors ⁶³ sided with the Resident. Taylor also sent the list of about 400 villages in the Nizam's dominions on which Surapur had rusun hang. These had been transferred to the Nizam for collection according to Gresley's settlement. A few Maratha gardars had assignments on them. The Resident directed that Surapur should arrange to pay them and the rusun hang be

transferred to Hyderabad ⁶⁴ in toto. Taylor had also to secure the Nizam's orders to his officials to apprehend some people of Andola-Nilogi who had taken refuge in the Nizam's domains after committing depredations. ⁶⁵

The Hyderabad Government also suggested cession of additional territory worth Rs. 1,20,000 from Surapur, as it complained that revenues from territory ceded by Gresley's arrangement (viz. Devadurg) did not amount to Gresley's estimate. Taylor strongly pointed out the inadmissibility of this further demand of the Nizam. "His excessive demands alone prevented Surapur from discharging its engagements punctually". As a matter of fact Budun Khan, Nizam's taluqdar of Devadurg, agreed to pay to Hyderabad only a small amount putting forth the excuse of decreasing revenues. In reality he had farmed it out at a much higher rate and wanted to pocket the difference. Hyderabad did not gain by transfer of Devadurg to it, thanks to its own officers. It could restore the district to Surapur, which would be most welcome to the royal family which always regretted the cession, and enter into a fresh agreement with Pid for modified tribute. The Resident, however, stuck to Gresley's settlement and did not countenance either Taylor's suggestion of retransfer of Devadurg or Hyderabad's additional demand. ⁶⁶

Plea for Permanent British Officer in Surapur

Taylor's initial mission of supporting and settling Pid Naik in the office of Diwan had now come more or less to an end. The Resident would have recalled him if he had reported total success. Under the circumstances, it was no wonder if he now diverted his attention to stabilising his own position after having taken such an active part in Surapur

affairs. He had sent for money from Andola in his own name to pay the sibandi to begin with and had issued tasids for sequestering the Rani's lagirs jointly in his and Pid's name. The Resident had frowned upon this and he had sent apologetic explanations.⁶⁷ Thereafter he had repeatedly emphasized his limited advisory role and reported how actual administration was carried on by Pid Naik. Hyderabad Government had conferred the title of Raja and a khilat upon Pid.⁶⁸ Taylor had no official position as such in state administration. He was only carrying out his task of strengthening Pid's hands. Taylor's first impression of Pid was that he did not lack resolution and could have established himself had the parties been balanced.⁶⁹ Shortly he reported that Pid was shaping out well as divan.⁷⁰ His having been able to bring Bedar headmen to meet Taylor, his estimate of revenues, seeking permission to transmit revenues directly to Hyderabad, refusal to pay for plunder of Hemnapur, drawing up a detailed list of what according to him was rightly due to the Rani as lagirs and perquisites - these were signs of his interest in administration. On the other hand he asked Taylor to check up accounts and agreed to reduction of armed forces without a second thought. He now himself approached Taylor to look after the administration and this offered the opportunity for which Taylor appears to have been waiting to plead the need for a British officer to be permanently associated with Surapur administration during the Raja's minority. Taylor argued that he had closely watched the divan for the past 4 months, supported him in every possible way but that Pid Naik had not really succeeded in administration owing to his lack of firmness, steadiness and influence. He was weak, timid, vacillating, and easily exploited by designing persons.⁷¹

There was none among his people trustworthy, influential or competent enough to assist him. They only indulged in low intrigues and nursed jealousies. Pid Naik himself had spent his life in sensual indulgence so far, had no experience of public business and was ignorant of accounts. Taylor did not discern the irony of emphasizing the inability of the man whom he was supporting.

Taylor in arguing for British management, had to refute arguments advanced by Gresley against such a measure. More enthusiastic and confident than his predecessor, he pointed out its many advantages; regular liquidation of the Nizam's dues, increase in revenues, abatement in crime, curbing the evil of sabukars upon whom Pid was sure to fall back soon if left to himself. While the previous Raja could do as he pleased so long as he fulfilled financial obligations, Pid having been settled in office by the British had to be continuously supported on account of his inability. Warming up, Taylor concluded that by looking after Surapur administration the British would make up for the injustice committed by them towards Surapur in the past ! He recommended that British management should not be fitful but unbroken till the end of the Raja's minority.

Resident Fraser would have welcomed some such arguments in favour of British management from Capt. Gresley himself. He had given enough indication of his inclination while informing the Government of India of Gresley's appointment. He had also informed them that services of a British officer would have to be retained to liquidate the loans of Motigir Gosain given under British guarantee. It is no surprise, therefore, if the Resident now lent his full support to Taylor's plea, adding that Gresley's former objections were overcome

with the late Raja's death.⁷⁴ Moreover, Taylor had strengthened his case by quoting concrete examples of Pid Naik's extravagance and mismanagement by forwarding past and present treasury accounts.⁷⁵

The Government of India agreed and 'most reluctantly' as they put it, transferred the administration^e authority in Surapur to the British Officer, but they directed that Pid Naik be put forward as the head of the State as far as possible during the minority of the Raja and undertook as a solemn pledge to hand back a prosperous, well-ordered State when the minor became a major. The British Officer was to act in concert not only with Pid Naik but conform to wishes of the most influential persons of Surapur. Taylor's services so far were warmly appreciated, but curiously enough the order did not specifically mention him as the British Officer in charge.⁷⁶ The wording in the Government of India's letter 'authorizing the Resident to adopt such measures as were necessary for fulfilling the above objects' appears to leave the appointment to the Resident's discretion. Taylor was on the spot, had been so far successful and was the obvious choice. But he became British Political Agent to Surapur during the Raja's minority by implication rather than by a direct order of the Government of India.

Conflict With Pid Naik

Although Taylor thus became associated with Surapur administration for the entire minority of the young Raja, his position was not as tenable as it ought to have been. The Government of India's letter did not either define his precise position nor demarcate his functions. It could be assumed that he was to have a prominent part in the government but

it was not so clearly stated. Particularly his position ⁷⁷
vis-a-vis Pid Naik remained vague and undefined. Friction
is inevitable among two administrators even if they are
working towards the same objects and even if their respective
positions and functions are clear and well-defined, when
such officials differ temperamentally. It now became all
the more so when British notions of administration were
sought to be grafted upon a Bedar raj which had carried on
in its own way for almost two centuries. Added to it were
the personal factors. Pid Naik had frankly admitted his
inability and could never be expected to match Taylor's zeal.
Taylor, therefore, expected him to remain a figurehead allow-
ing him virtual control over administration. But the Diwan's
private advisers, possibly to gain their own ends, were
making him believe that he was now supreme and responsible to
none. He now no longer cared to heed Taylor's advice as at
the beginning of his association.

⁷⁸ Taylor, therefore, took advantage of his visit to
Hyderabad to lay his complaints before the Resident, and got
from him a letter issued to the Diwan in which Taylor's
superior position in practical administration was made clear.
The Diwan was directed to act in conformity with Taylor's
advice, instructions and judgement. He was to obtain Taylor's
consent for all expenditure. He was to practise rigid economy
and in particular was not to increase establishments or armed
levies, without Taylor's concurrence. He was to present
all accounts and musters whenever called for by Taylor. There
was to be only one daftar for the entire revenue. Pid of
course, had always been agreeable to leave revenue settlement
to Taylor who was to sign the khows to be sealed by the Diwan.

The ryats had not enough confidence in the Divan to accept his kowls and Pid had neither the ability nor the inclination to undertake the troublesome task of iamabandi. What Taylor had found was waste and extravagance in disbursements by Pid Naik. Best villages had been set apart for iamarkhans or private treasury which was the main source of wasteful expenditure. Disbursements had to be brought under unified control so that they could be equitable on all establishments. Pid Naik was treating the treasury as his own and spending as he pleased. Taylor was seeking to control expenses so that if a balance was not left in the treasury at least it would equalise the receipts. The Government of India regretted that occasion had arisen to issue such instructions but "would be glad to hear that these had been attended to".⁷⁹

Soon after Taylor's return from Hyderabad to Surapur there was a quarrel between his chaprasi and a Bedar in the bazar leading to loss of a limb by the former. Pid Naik was out shooting. When he came back Taylor told him that the offending Bedar must be confined and answerable for murder if the chaprasi died. The other Bedars who sheltered the offender, however, surrendered him and he was put in irons. Taylor asked the troops which had come to relieve his escort to stay on for a while for protecting his person. At the moment he was only apprehensive of Bedar disturbances and Pid Naik promised to take agreements from Bedar chiefs for future peaceful conduct.⁸⁰ At a much later date Taylor reported that it was an attempt on his life engineered by one Krishnayya Namad with Pid's connivance which had, luckily for him,⁸¹ misfired.

Any way the Resident's instructions were of little avail. For, Taylor's administrative report for 1843 A.D. which he submitted on his own to the Resident is one long recital of complaints against Pid Naik. The ⁸²Diwan's advisers continued to mislead him with the notion that so long as he set apart some revenue to meet Government demands he could do as he pleased with the rest. Ready money contracts wholly and land revenue partly had been anticipated against his advice. At the same time dues of the gibandi, the stipendiaries and Rani Ishwaramma had remained unpaid. The treasury contained only a few hundred rupees. To give a fair trial to the Diwan Taylor was not insisting upon his consent to every item of expenditure. This was exploited and money was freely spent during his absence on janabandi tours. Peculation and corruption were rife among servants of the State and the Diwan gave no co-operation in checking them. He did not hold cutcherry to redress public grievances. Neither he nor daftardars would assist Taylor in ascertaining government's claims. They took whatever the corrupt naihs gave and relied on plunder for more. For expenditure they desired a blanket sanction from Taylor. Insistence upon itemised estimate produced a list swollen with obsolete claims. It only created discontent among the concerned as great partiality was shown and no principle was adopted. Customs and excise contracts had been farmed out at a low rate by accepting bribes. The Diwan agreed to measures of improving the revenues or the administration with irritating delay and indifference. Evil influence of conservative brahmin darbaris and mitsaddis was all-pervasive. Pid was made jealous of head magasdar Bhaskar Rao who was honest and competent.

When Pid prepared an estimate of expenses for 1844 A.D. it came to Rs. 2,18,887 including the remittances to the Nizam and Gosain bankers. The head daftardar's estimate, on the other hand, was more fair, amounting to Rs.1,53,832. Taylor proposed to cut down yearly expenses on establishment to Rs. 1 lakh by curtailing stipends by half and servants' allowances by one fourth. He solicited instructions whether he could retrench 50 Arabs employed by Pid to guard his house when Taylor was away at Hyderabad. The Resident agreed but not if they were absorbed in the population by intermarriage and were willing to submit to Government's authority and not exclusively to that of their jamadars. The Resident's answer to Taylor's grievances against the Divan, which Taylor said were 'not complaints but facts and revelation of character', was that he might be given a further trial before the Resident wrote to him. The Resident, of course, could see little proof of Pid's ability or energy.⁸³ Some daftardars, however, guardedly pledged support to Taylor⁸⁴ in checking the confusion created by Pid and his clique.

But the year 1844 was even worse for Taylor - Pid relations. Taylor's complaints against the Divan became more clamorous. The Divan was now completely under the thumb of low favourites who only indulged in intrigues and whom he refused to dismiss. He spent most of his time in the zenana or drinking bouts. At least on yugadi day he was expected to hold a darbar to bring forth the young Raja but did not care to do so. Taylor's verbal exhortations were as fruitless as his memo urging regular cutcherry, check on unauthorized private expenditure from public treasury, prevention of frequent changes in personnel or interference by favourites.

He thought that a stern letter from the Resident or Hyderabad Government might work. The Resident asked him to suggest another Diwan, and wanted to know possible reactions in Surapur to vesting Taylor with full authority. Taylor found no suitable substitute. In a middle course between Pid's retention and removal he proposed a set of articles binding on Pid which aimed at divesting him of all authority. Only then would Taylor be able to implement his schemes of improving state administration. The Resident observed that no set of articles, however judiciously drawn up, could permanently bind the contracting party without natural disposition to abide by them. In view of Pid's incapacity, obstinacy, total inattention to government, and the obstacles he threw in Taylor's way for smooth administration, the Resident submitted the question of exclusive British management of Surapur to the Government of India. The latter asked the Resident whether the Nizam would agree to it. The Resident repeated that Taylor could take over full responsibility, but the Government of India kept silent over the proposal. Meanwhile Taylor reported on the finances for Fasli 1253 in which estimated revenues were Rs. 2½ lakhs of which Pid had already recklessly spent away more than 1½ lakhs without providing for many claims upon the State. "It is to be deeply regretted that the result of Raja Pid Naik's management after all the assistance which has been rendered him should have proved so miserably defective", he lamented, "and I can see no hope for the future but in Government assuming a very firm and decided tone towards him if indeed it should be considered at all possible to continue him in his present situation". Since the Supreme Government had not decided

upon it, the Resident could only advise repetition of his earlier instructions to the Diwan. But the Diwan remained as evasive as ever.⁸⁶

Throughout 1844 Taylor had been hinting to the Resident about intrigues at Hyderabad by Pid Naik's agents against him with a view to securing exclusive authority for the Diwan. He now reported that during Dasra festival of that year an attempt on the young Raja's life and other violent disturbances were in the offing. He warned Pid Naik in advance and the festival passed smoothly due to timely precautions and proximity of British troops.⁸⁷ He had already submitted a long report on the misdeeds, mischief and intrigues of Lakshmangir Gosain from beginning to date who was currently active at Hyderabad. Taylor became aware of the ambitious and wicked nature of the banker now that his own authority appeared to be in danger of subversion.⁸⁸ He submitted another report on the intrigues of Krishnayya Namad⁸⁹ whom he had confined.⁹⁰ The Resident, however, ordered Namad's release for want of positive proof. He advised Taylor not to undertake minute enquiries into mean intrigues as it led nowhere and diverted attention from measures for improving the administration. Similarly, though he attended to Taylor's requisition for troops during the Dasra festival, he directed their quick withdrawal to headquarters. He moralized, "... it is less by force and intimidation that we should endeavour to regulate affairs than by ^{calm} claim, friendly and conciliatory system of management".⁹¹

While submitting made up accounts for Fasli 1253, (he had received none from Pid for the preceding year despite repeated requests) Taylor pointed out that the actual amount

spent by Pld was Rs.1,27,328, less than what he had estimated earlier as spent, but he also believed that he would be required to spend additionally about half a lakh on clearing arrears of establishment. Vouchers for the expenses were unsatisfactory, and Taylor sought to know whether Pld should be made to reimburse. On his personal account the Diwan had spent only Rs.5,396. He had now been sending all orders on the treasury for Taylor's sanction. His intrigues and daftardars' obstructions had stopped. He himself was requesting Taylor to regulate expenses which Taylor estimated for the following year to be around Rs.1,10,000. Assuming the receipts to be the same as last year viz. Rs.2,23,800 it was hoped to save about Rs.1,15,000. With better season the revenues could be more. With this fair prospect, indications that the Diwan would be abiding by Taylor's advice and looked like economising in future, the Resident⁹² ordered that Pld need not reimburse monies already spent.

In his general report for 1844 A.D. however, Taylor once again repeated his complaints against the Diwan, adding that he was now given to heavy drinking lying in alcoholic oblivion for days together. Taylor was now on the best of terms with him privately. But in two years of close acquaintance with him the Diwan had failed to rise in his esteem or that of the people by any single act or measure. Politically he was useless, but Taylor continued to hope and employ entreaty and persuasion. The Resident could only sympathize with Taylor, as the Diwan's removal was not possible without the Government of India's and the Nizam's⁹³ consent, neither of which was forthcoming.

Payment of Arrears to the Nizam and Taylor in Jeopardy

While Taylor was busy with his philippics against Pid Naik his own position came under a cloud in the first half of 1845. On 18 April 1845 the Government of India unanimously resolved to replace Taylor by another able, intelligent and experienced officer unconnected with Surapur in any way to superintend its administration in all branches during the minority of the young Raja. The reasoning behind the Government's resolution was a complete mystery to the Resident as well as to Taylor. Actually it was linked up with the payment of Rs. 5 lakhs by Surapur to the Nizam as arrears due to Hyderabad State.

As we have seen before, the Hyderabad Government had accepted Gresley's arrangement on condition of payment of these arrears. As it was, Surapur was in no position to pay such a huge amount. Raja Krishtappa's sudden death made it impossible for Capt. Gresley to make any arrangement regarding it. The Rani as regent had sought exemption on compassionate grounds. Pid Naik had agreed to pay in instalments mainly with a view to securing the divani and not because he was in a position to do so, but his authority itself had yet to be established. Gresley doubted the accuracy of the claim but more concerned with the immediate problem of settling Pid Naik in office, he merely demanded the amount from the Rani as directed by the Resident. It was left to Taylor to question the claim, point out the gross injustice perpetrated upon Surapur by Hyderabad with British aid, and to plead eloquently for settling the claim at 2 lakhs. Once again the Resident took the view that this would mean setting aside Gresley's arrangement which had been

accepted by all concerned. On his insistence Taylor had remitted Rs. 1 lakh extorted from the Rani. But the Court of Directors, appalled at continual extortions by the Hyderabad Government throughout on account of which Surapur itself had to use violence on its subjects to meet the Nizam's demands, repeatedly ordered that the Nizam should relinquish the claim to any arrears. ⁹⁷ They were surprised that the Resident should have supported the demand.

The Resident's stand was strictly legalistic and formal. It was open to the Government of India not to have approved Gresley's arrangement if they were not agreeable to the payment of arrears, sine qua non by the Nizam for acceptance. Once having accepted it the British Government could not arbitrarily cancel it without the Nizam's consent which was wanting. The claim had its basis in the huge amount of nasrana imposed by Hyderabad earlier. While demanding nasrana might be unjust in British eyes it was customary in Hyderabad. No appointments, high or low, were ever made without it. The nasrana in respect of Surapur had ceased with Gresley's arrangement but ^{at} ~~cession~~ ^{cession} could not be given retrospective effect. The Resident even dragged in principles. If this principle of retrospective effect was extended to other Indian States it would lead to a mass of inextricable difficulties, he said. Instead of treating the demand as cancelled by an ex parte decision of the British Government the Nizam's consent to it could be invited. But if he refused it could not be justly forced upon him. He could be asked to treat Gresley's arrangement as cancelled but in that case there would be increasing friction between Hyderabad and Surapur. The latter might revolt and the

former would seek armed aid from the British. The British were treaty-bound to support the Nizam. Refusing such aid would encourage disturbances not only in Surapur but in the entire Hyderabad domains. Granting it without investigation would mean further injustice upon Surapur, which the Court wished to avoid. The investigation had been made by Gresley and accepted by all. Now the Nizam's claim to arrears could not be set aside justly. It would suffice here to say that the Resident's arguments had, perhaps, law on his side, but not justice.

With the totally contrary views of the Resident and the Court of Directors the Government of India were compelled to take the subject of British relations with Surapur into consideration for the first time in its entirety right from the beginning to date. Governor-General Hardinge himself had to spare time out of his many preoccupations. It was not physically possible for him to go through all the papers so he relied upon the Under Secretary's memo which extracted important portions from past correspondence and recent letters. A study of these papers convinced him, as much as the Court of Directors, of the injustice inflicted upon Surapur by the Nizam through British agency. But he came to the conclusion that if the Government of India had acquiesced in these unjust proceedings it was mainly due to the misleading reports of the British agents concerned and their bungling the whole affair. Particularly Taylor himself had confessed that Gresley as well as he were imposed upon (by Lakshmangir Gosain). He, therefore, came to the resolution already referred to. As for the payment of arrears he endorsed the Court's views. Though he was against altering Gresley's arrangement he opined that the Nizam

ought not to be paid any arrears. The fears of consequences that would flow from such a decision were exaggerated by the Resident. The decision could be safely effected. F. Millet, another member of the Board, devoted his attention in depth, made his own calculations and suggested that the Nizam need be paid only Rs.80,000 as arrears. While the Governor General was agreeable to this proposal he felt that the Court's observations being decisive another reference to them was necessary. George Pollock, the third member of the Governor General's Council, studied only the Under Secretary's memo, and the minutes of the others. He agreed with the Governor General. If the Court of Directors needed further investigation for final decision besides all these papers which were being sent to them, the officer replacing Taylor could be entrusted with the enquiry.

The Court of Directors stuck to their view, were happy that the Governor General defended it and refuted those of the Resident. The Resident's fears were indeed exaggerated. The protected state of Hyderabad had to meekly abide by the decision of its mighty suzerain while maintaining the appearance of the 'faithful ally'. As a concession it was allowed to retain Rs. 1,66,000 already received relinquishing the rest.

As for Taylor, his position was saved on account of the mention of his meritorious services in the Court's despatch which arrived soon after the Government of India's resolution regarding removal. The resolution was, therefore, first suspended and then lapsed and Taylor was allowed to continue. Later on the Court of Directors clarified that they did not wish to fetter the Government of India in the

choice of their agent at Surapur. But by then Taylor was firmly in the saddle and continued to be so till the end of the Raja's minority.

The Government of India while trying to correct the injustice done to Surapur so far were ironically enough in the very course of their doing so committing another act of injustice in proposing to remove Taylor. It did not occur to them that the original sin was committed in the Treaty of 1800 itself by which the British Government agreed to help a far bigger State against a much & smaller State without any provocation on its part towards the British and ignoring its double tributary status. British officers subsequently helped to implement the provision in the Treaty with greater or lesser degree of competence. Resident Martin aggravated the sin by agreeing without enquiry to an impossibly large nazrana. It was not for the following officers to question it. When Gresley was asked to investigate he did point out in his report continual extortions by the Nizam with British aid. He did not hesitate to question the Nizam's claim to any arrears which was accepted by the Resident so that Gresley's settlement, approved by the Supreme Government, could be implemented. Gresley was later deceived in his notion of the Rani's character and competence. But he was not aware of the deceit. Taylor, too, became aware of it only after 2 years, but he honestly confessed it. And the strange reward for his honesty was his proposed removal ! Though the Governor General admitted that Taylor could write a good letter he found his reports conflicting and contradictory and his conduct in other matters far from satisfactory. Hardinge could not have read Taylor carefully before expressing such

an opinion. Had he done so he would have found Taylor consistent in his tirades against the Diwan and in his concern for the finances of the sansathan; he had already commenced many measures for improving them. Nor did the Governor General care to cite any instance of Taylor's 'unsatisfactory conduct'.

Taylor in Full Charge

Happily for Taylor, and for Resident Fraser as well who had every confidence in his agent and supported him throughout despite his differences on the question of arrears, the storm blew over. At the very time when the clouds had gathered Taylor had the opportunity to exercise full powers on account of Pid Naik's illness which later proved to be fatal. Taylor began to look after current business and when the Diwan's illness grew so severe that he lost his mind Taylor began to use his seal. He secured the consent to do so in one of the Diwan's rare, clear moments but restricted its use for routine transactions till the Government of India ordered the Diwan's removal altogether. Even while Pid was lying dangerously ill he complained against the Diwan's wasteful expenditure and sought orders whether he should be made to refund some monies spent ! It sheds curious light on Taylor's ambition for power disguised in the bureaucratic garb of sense of duty.¹¹¹ However, decorum did deter him from promulgating orders of Pid's removal during his last days. He did so after the Diwan's death on 8th August 1845. Since Taylor was already acting as virtual Diwan the change-over involved only a few formalities in connection with the daftar, the treasury and the cutcherry. He was extremely grateful to the Resident for entrusting him with the full

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charge of the principality. For the next eight years or so he indeed became the monarch of all he surveyed.

Diwan Pid Naik had left little by way of personal property. It shows that howsoever wasteful the Diwan's treasury management might have been he had not amassed a private fortune at public expense. His tax-free jagirs and other affairs were managed after his death by Taylor

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with the Resident's approval. By upbringing the Diwan had not been trained for administration nor had he any latent talent for it. He became Diwan by fortuitous circumstances but never coveted the gadi for himself or his sons though the Rani had been apprehensive about it. In fact he was as eager as other members of the family to place the young

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Raja formally upon the gadi. He occasionally displayed a little ability but on the whole remained under the influence of liquor, opium and self-seeking advisers who indulged in intrigue. Taylor has a few kindly words for him in his autobiography and private letters but none in official reports and despatches.

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Taylor's Later Relations with Rani Ishwaramma

Although Taylor's authority became firmly established with Pid's death till the end of the young Raja's minority he was never free from the fear that Rani Ishwaramma might succeed in subverting it some day. As we have seen before, after the restoration of her jagirs in the early half of 1843 Rani Ishwaramma was completely reconciled to the loss of her position as regent and consequent loss of power and authority. Her main anxiety in opposing Pid Naik's Diwani

* See also Appendix II.

was that he being her enemy might confiscate her jagirs and that he might attempt to upset the succession of her son to the gadi putting forth his own son. The restoration of her jagirs appears to have so pleased her that she expressed her gratitude to Taylor by sending him baskets¹¹⁵ of delicious mangoes. She must have been very happy with the formal accession ceremony of her son which took place¹¹⁶ shortly afterwards. Relations between her and Taylor must have improved considerably after Taylor's realization that he was deceived as to her character and competence by Lakshmangir Gosain's intrigues. He had already realized that the Rani had not amassed any private fortune during her short-lived management, but had on the contrary sold some of her jewels and pledged others, to meet the Nizam's dues. During his jamabandi tour in 1844 Taylor came to know how excellent her falsely alleged paramour Chanbasappa's revenue management had been of those parts which were under¹¹⁷ his charge. When the Rani, therefore, applied for public funds to redeem her jewels pledged to meet Hyderabad's demands¹¹⁸ in 1251 Fasli Taylor wholeheartedly supported her. There were no funds in the treasury for the purpose so the Resident initially asked him to wait but later on advanced money from the Residency treasury to be refunded by Surapur when its¹¹⁹ financial position improved. During his continual conflict with Pid Naik Taylor even told the Resident that there was no one in Surapur whom he could trust except perhaps the Rani¹²⁰ who was better than Pid. She might have troubled the Diwan¹²¹ and Taylor in some local matters too trifling to be reported but on the whole their relations appear to have been quite smooth otherwise.

After the death of Pid Naik, however, Taylor began to suspect that she was carrying on intrigues to regain power. Though he did not pay much attention to them he was quite disgusted with reports of her immoral conduct, Victorian moralist that he was. The possibility of her banishment to put a stop to both her moral and political indiscretions occurred to him then but he did not take up the matter officially with the Resident. In fact throughout 1846 Taylor made no reference to the Resident on the subject nor did he discuss it with the Rani. It was in his general report for 1846 submitted on 12th February 1847 that Taylor first broached the topic.¹²² Therein he admitted that the Rani professed interest in and affection for her son and pressed his attention to studies more in the past 6 months than previously. What he was worried about was the Rani's reported liaison with one Kasima, who was trying to gain ascendancy among the Sarnaubat Bedars of which he was a member, and its pernicious influence on the morals of the young Raja. The Rani was reportedly lavishing jagirs and presents on the Sarnaubats besides Kasima, so that they were becoming her firm adherents. She had been managing her dead sister's jagirs as well and promised but did not show its accounts to Taylor. Taylor toyed with the idea of taking the management of these jagirs in his own hands and proposed that her jewels which had yet to be redeemed be kept in the state treasury after redemption as strictly speaking it was not her private jewelry. He also suggested that her allowance could be partly resumed for this purpose. The Resident advised him to proceed cautiously regarding resumption of jagirs or allowances. In another 4 months Taylor was

convinced that the Rani ought to be temporarily banished to Ratnagiri, her father's place. He found the factious spirit among the various Bedar clans growing and he did not find it easy to control them. He believed Kasima and the Rani to be responsible for what he regarded as his weakening hold over the Bedars. He admitted, however, "The Ranee has committed no overt act. She does not now interfere or attempt to interfere with the administration of affairs and therefore it [her banishment] could be only on the ground of her vicious and disreputable connection with Kasima (in my opinion ample as being disgraceful to herself a reproach to the Sumsthan, and most injurious to her son), that she should be removed, and her mughalka formerly given, which I believe [is] in the possession of the Nizam's Govt. binds her to submit to any punishment directed in case of misbehaviour". He drafted a fresh mughalka to be executed by the Rani agreeing to surrender of Kasima, resumption of lagirs granted by her to him and other favourites, surrender of redeemed state jewels, and substitution of cash allowance in lieu of her own lagirs.¹²⁵ The Resident suggested that resumption of the latter be temporary, their restoration subject to her future discreet¹²⁶ conduct. The Government of India approved her removal but with due courtesy, and directed that she should be given an adequate cash allowance the continuance of which should be¹²⁷ dependent on her future conduct.

Taylor personally went to Hyderabad in the beginning of October 1847 to plead for a strong British detachment to effect the Rani's removal as it was likely to be opposed¹²⁸ by the Bedars, particularly the Sarnaubats. The Resident

was agreeable to provide only an armed escort to conduct the Rani to Ratnagiri but insisted that it had be effected quietly without exciting any provocation. How to accomplish it was left to Taylor's discretion. ¹²⁹ Taylor's return to Surapur was delayed by his illness. Meanwhile an attack on the government dak-runner, the culprits of which escaped, was attributed by Taylor to the Rani-Kasima party. Taylor's unavoidable continued stay at Hyderabad gave rise to all kinds of rumours in the principality. ¹³⁰ When Taylor showed to the Resident the young Raja's message in which danger to his own life, that of Taylor and some others, was conveyed the Resident agreed to employment of force ¹³¹ and decided to supervise the Rani's banishment personally by going to Surapur. Taylor, however, went in advance, surrounded the palace by trustworthy husurati Bedars and the Wandurg sibandi and cut it off from any possible attack by the large number of armed Bedars who had started gathering in the town. Taylor ordered their dispersal, which, however, took ¹³² another day and 25 Bedar leaders surrendered themselves. These were later on sent to Lingsugur for trial by a Commission of Enquiry. When the Resident arrived in Surapur he found the Rani not only reconciled to her banishment but already on her way to Ratnagiri. He attributed this 'favourable end to a very threatening affair entirely to Taylor's judgement and excellent management supported as he was by the rapid advance and near approach of British troops' ¹³³ which Taylor had been authorized to requisition.

The Rani preferred to go to Bangalore rather than Ratnagiri where she was apprehensive of her father's ¹³⁴ reproach. At Bangalore she was unable to live within the

small cash allowance of Rs.500 p.m. and contracted a huge
135 debt. Meanwhile the Commission of Enquiry after examining
56 witnesses, hundreds of depositions and documents in a
trial lasting from 13 September 1848 to 3 May 1849 absolved
the Rani and all the prisoners of any guilt. Many of the
documents proved to be forgeries, and a number of confessions
were extorted with violence by a daftardar to whom Taylor
had entrusted the preparation of preliminary documents for
the trial. Taylor admitted that he was entirely deceived
by the daftardar, but continued to differ from the Commission
of Enquiry which held that the assembling of Bedars at
Surapur on 4th and 5th February 1848 did not amount to an
136 insurrection. The Resident inquired from Taylor whether he
wanted a fresh trial of the prisoners on this charge, but
he did not pursue it saying that execution of agreements
137 by them for future good conduct would suffice.

Despite the Resident's defence that Taylor had only
been misled and deceived and his testimonial that 'no man
can be more eminently distinguished than he is for honourable
138 principles and the strictest probity' the Government of
India severely censured Taylor, when the voluminous proceed-
ings of the Commission of Enquiry reached them. They
ordered that the Rani be restored at Surapur with all due
respect and that those who had forged the documents and
brought undue pressure upon the prisoners and others to
139 give false testimonies be tried again. The forgers were
140 accordingly tried and punished.

After the Rani's return to Surapur a great deal of
correspondence ensued on the subject of her lagirs and the
liquidation of debts which she had contracted so far.
Taylor and Resident Fraser decided amongst themselves that

she should be paid a cash allowance of Rs. 1000 p.m. in lieu of lagira, only those debts which could be legitimately charged to the Surapur exchequer be liquidated and that her request to stay outside Surapur territory or to go on a pilgrimage to Tirupati be turned down, so that she would not get an opportunity to incur more debts and would remain under Taylor's control incapacitated for any mischief. The Government of India concurred in the Resident's views and even the Court of Directors withdrew their earlier sanction to her residence outside Surapur sans than thus merely agreeing to the arrangements approved by the Government of India. The Rani's debts remained unsettled as neither she nor her creditors were in a position to press their claims. ¹⁴¹ She died on 27 May 1853 just before the young Raja received his full powers and while Taylor ¹⁴² still continued at Surapur.

Notes and References:

1. FPC, 18 Jan. 1843, No. 51.
2. Taylor to Fraser, 10 Dec. 1842, FPC, 1 Feb. 1843, Nos. 51-7. Details of talk with Gresley narrated in Story (p.145) are not reported in the letter.
3. Ibid., T. to F., 12 Dec. 1842. In Story he says "Pid Naik stayed away, and I was glad he did not come" - (p.147). As Taylor did not know Kannada (Story, pp.148,219-20) it may be inferred that homily to Bedar chiefs must have been delivered through Pid Naik as interpreter.
4. Ibid., T. to F. 13 Dec. 1842. Cf. slanted version in Story (pp.147-8) stressing his triumph.
5. Ibid., T. to F., 15 Dec. 1842.
6. FPC, 15 Feb. 1843, Nos. 99-100.

7. FPC, 1 Feb. 1843, Nos. 51-7, T. to F. 16 Dec. 1842 and Ibid. No. 59. The contents of the latter fairly corroborate the Story, pp. 149-51.
8. Taylor realised this only a couple of years later and confessed to it in FPC, 23 May 1845, No. 116.
9. FPC, 1 Feb. 1843, No. 59.
10. FPC, 23 May 1845, No. 116, para. 15.
11. FPC, 1 Feb. 1843, No. 59. Chanbasappa's secret resistance to Taylor while in his custody reported in Story (p. 152) is not corroborated by any official letter.
12. Ibid., Nos. 59 and 63.
13. Ibid., No. 59.
14. Enclosure to above.
15. FPC, 23 May 1845, No. 116, para 15.
16. FPC, 1 Feb. 1843, No. 60.
17. Ibid., No. 63. The ferries were being guarded earlier not by Gresley (Story, p. 144) but by Fraser's explicit instructions (FPC, 30 Nov. 1842, No. 221).
18. FPC, 1 Feb. 1843, Nos. 51-7, T. Edwards to Fraser, 9 Jan. 1843. Taylor quotes in the Story (p. 152) only that part of the letter which commends him !
19. FPC, 22 Feb. 1843, Nos. 116-20. The forces mustered to 1300 bayonets in all. FPC, 19 Apr. 1843, No. 87.
20. FPC, 1 Mar. 1843, Nos. 72-3.
21. FPC, 8 Mar. 1843, Nos. 110-1.
22. FPC, 15 Mar. 1843, Nos. 66-7.
23. FPC, 22 Feb. 1843, No. 124.
24. Ibid., No. 123.
25. Idem. A cavalry detachment was provided by Hyderabad Govt. and the Resident directed his removal there (FPC, 1 Feb. 1843, No. 67). Cf. Story (p. 153) "I therefore determined to send Chan Basappa at once to Lingsugur ... One of my chanrassia or messengers knew the road perfectly".
26. Idem., No. 125.
27. FPC, 1 Mar. 1843, No. 74.
28. FPC, 15 Mar. 1843, No. 68.
29. Idem., No. 69.
30. FPC, 12 Apr. 1843, No. 67.
31. FPC, 14 June 1843, No. 426.
32. Idem., Nos. 425-6.
33. Idem. The documents contain only the Resident's query to Taylor whether Chanbasappa was to be released, but unfortunately Taylor's reply is missing. The Story (p. 179) says he was set free. But Taylor's remark therein that he was guilty of extravagance, if nothing else, is contradicted by Taylor's own letter dt. 24 Apr. 1843 to the Resid FPC, 14 June 1843, No. 426).

However, the Story has good words for Chanbasappa's later conduct for which documents are missing.

34. FPC, 23 May 1845, No. 116.
35. Lre to Fraser, 9 Jan. 1843, FPC, 1 Feb. 1843, Nos. 51-7.
36. PLFC, 6 Nov. 1844. 37. FPC, 8 Mar. 1843, No. 110.
38. FPC, 22 Feb. 1843, No. 124. 39. FPC, 12 Apr. 1843, No. 70.
40. FPC, 14 June 1843, No. 426.
41. FPC, 8 Mar. 1843, No. 114. 42. FPC, 14 June 1843, No. 424.
43. PLFC, 6 Nov. 1844. 44. FPC, 1 Feb. 1843, Nos. 51-7,
45. FPC, 22 Feb. 1843, T. to F., 15 Dec. 1842.
Nos. 124-5.
46. FPC, 1 Mar. 1843, No. 76. 47. Idem, No. 71.
48. Idem, No. 76. 49. Idem, No. 75.
50. FPC, 8 Mar. 1843, No. 111.
51. FPC, 15 Mar. 1843, No. 68.
52. Idem, No. 67. 53. FPC, 14 June 1843, No. 426.
54. FPC, 19 Apr. 1843, No. 89. 55. Idem, No. 88.
56. FPC, 8 Mar. 1843, No. 110. 57. FPC, 19 Apr. 1843, No. 90.
58. FPC, 12 Apr. 1843, No. 65. 59. Idem, No. 66.
60. Idem, Nos. 68 and 65 and FPC, 3 May 1843, Nos. 32, 34 and 36. The Resident's sanction on these points is wanting in the documents but may be presumed by his silence.
61. FPC, 14 June 1843, No. 427. 62. Idem, No. 425.
63. PLFC, 6 Nov. 1844.
64. FPC, 3 May 1843, Nos. 32, 34 and 36.
65. FPC, 8 Mar. 1843, No. 109.
66. FPC, 3 May 1843, Nos. 32, 35-6.
67. FPC, 1 Feb. 1843, No. 63; FPC, 15 Mar. 1843, No. 69; FPC, 12 Apr. 1843, No. 67.
68. FPC, 19 Apr. 1843, No. 90. Though this had taken place earlier Taylor mistakenly places it after his visit to Hyderabad (Story, pp. 166-7) which is fitting only artistically speaking. His footnote that 'Raja' meant 'Regent' is also not accurate.
69. FPC, 1 Feb. 1843, Nos. 51-7, T. to F., 12 Dec. 1842.

70. FPC, 12 Apr. 1843, No. 67. 71. FPC, 24 May 1843, No. 60, Appendix A.
72. FPC, 24 May 1843, No. 60.
73. FPC, 3 May 1843, No. 31, para 4.
74. FPC, 24 May 1843, No. 59. 75. Idem, No. 61.
76. Idem, No. 64. Story, pp. 161-2.
77. The Court of Directors were certainly more clear. They regarded Pid as the ostensible head and directed that the British officer must participate in managing every department. But as this directive was sent only towards the end of 1844 it could not serve any immediate purpose. PFLC, 6 Nov. 1844.
78. He was summoned as a witness in a trial. Story, p. 163. It did not turn out to be a court-martial as mentioned in the Story but a commission of enquiry. The accused was Capt. W.B. Jackson, former Commanding Officer at Matkhal and the charge was embezzlement while at Surapur. Though he was acquitted (Letters to Reeves, pp. 90-1, 93, 104, 105, 111) it throws lurid light on British relations with Surapur during Raja Krishtappa's regime.
79. FPC, 26 Aug. 1843, Nos. 62-5.
80. FPC, 7 Oct. 1843, Nos. 129-30, 132 and 135.
81. FPC, 23 May 1845, No. 139. This has been described vividly and in greater detail in Story, pp. 167-71, an amazing instance of Taylor's memory.
82. FPC, 9 Mar. 1844, Nos. 89-95, T. to F., 18 Jan. 1844.
83. Idem, F. to T., 1 Feb. 1844.
84. Idem, T. to F., 9 Mar. 1844, postscript.
85. FPC, 23 May 1845, Nos. 108-13, 117, 125.
86. Idem, Nos. 119-24.
87. Idem, Nos. 127-135. Taylor forgets in the Story (p. 189) that he himself had requisitioned additional troops from the Resident.
88. Idem, No. 116. 89. Idem, No. 139.
90. Idem, No. 136. 91. Idem, Nos. 137 and 141.
92. Idem, Nos. 140-1. 93. Idem, Nos. 144-5.
94. Idem, No. 151. 95. Story, p. 209.

96. "... my two last letters will have been full of all sorts of speculations on the probable cause of my projected removal, and I know you will have felt with me that it was anything but pleasant to be hustled out of one's appt., in a mysterious and unsatisfactory manner, without any sort of reason being given by Govt. ..." Letter No.41 to Reeve. Rumours were thick and Taylor had heard them. His own speculations, anxieties, fears and hopes are vividly reflected in this and other letters to his cousin (Nos. 39-43, 45-6) and Story pp.204-6. His unofficial efforts to retain the post have been frankly described. The Nizam's letter in favour of him mentioned therein, however, is not to be found among the records of either Hyderabad Residency or Foreign Dept.
97. PLFC, 15 Nov.1843, 27 Mar and 6 Nov.,1844.
98. FPC, 23 May 1845,Nos.108,122.
99. Idem., No. 146. 100. Idem., No. 147.
101. Idem., No. 148. 102. Idem., No. 149.
103. Idem., No. 150. 104. PLFC, 2 Jan.1846,paras 2-4.
105. FPC, 12 Sep.1845,No.81.
106. Taylor requested this too to be refunded. FPC, 22 Aug. 1846, No.97. His fear that the Nizam might revive the demand after British withdrawal was set at rest. Vide FPC,14 Apr.1849, No.56.
107. PLFC, 19 Mar.1845. It was received overland on 21 May 1845 and is substantially the same as given in Story, pp.210-1, with minor mistakes and wrong numbering of paragraphs. Para 66 has been only partly extracted on p.211, para 68 therein ought to have been para 69 while para 68 approving grant of tagavi advances to ryats has been deleted. John Stuart Mill, well-known philosopher and Pol.Secy at India House takes some credit for laudatory expressions therein and for Taylor's continuance. Story, pp.xxxviii-ix. Henry Bruce hints at secret forces at work against Taylor. His suggestion that Taylor's post was coveted by covenanted servants (Idem) was discounted by Taylor's own letters to Reeve (Nos.39, and 42).
108. PLFC, 2 Jan.1846, para 9.
109. Cf. " ... for I believe it not only the best but most necessary policy rather to acknowledge an error freely than to leave it to Govt. to find it out and rap one's knuckles for it". Letter to Reeve, No.45.
110. FPC, 23 May 1845, No.147.
111. FPC, 18 July 1845, Nos. 172-6, and 25 July Nos. 41-3.
112. FPC, 29 Aug.1845, Nos. 82-3, and 5 Sep. 1845, No. 90. The smooth change-over is also confirmed by letter to Reeve, No.41. But Cf. Story, p.213, "There was at first some difficulty with the heads of departments". These difficulties must have been trifling as none were reported officially.

113. FPC, 29 Aug.1845, No.86, and 29 Nov.1845, Nos.253-4.
114. FPC, 24 May 1843, No.61. Cf. Story, p.157, "he was very cool about the ceremony of placing the young Raja on his gadi. He made many excuses".
115. Letter to Reeve, No.20.
116. On 12 June 1843. FPC, 5 July 1843, No.23. The ceremony has been graphically described in Story, pp.158-9. The shawls mentioned therein had to be deposited in Residency toshakhana as the Company strictly forbade its servants from accepting presents by native chiefs. FPC, 5 July 1843, Nos.24-5.
117. FPC, 29 Nov.1845, No.249. Also confirmed by Story, pp.179-80.
118. FPC, 22 Aug.1846, No.97.
119. Idem, No.98, para 16 and 14 Apr.1849, No.48.
120. Letter to Reeve, No.30. 121. Idem, No.45.
122. Idem, No.43. 123. FPC, 31 Dec.1847, No.634, paras 28-36.
124. Originally the cavalry wing of Bedar army, UHSK.
125. FPC, 31 Dec.1847, No.624. 126. Idem, No.626.
127. Idem, No.644. 128. FPC, 7 Apr.1848, No.246.
129. Idem, No.247. 130. Story, pp.243-4.
131. FPC, 7 Apr.1848, Nos.254-6. The prince's letter was addressed not to him as mentioned in the Story(p.244) but to Ramrao, his tutor in English.
132. FPC, 7 Apr.1848, Nos.259,263,267. There is no reference in these to Rani-Kasima quarrel described in Story, (p.246).
133. Idem, No.261. 134. Idem, No.265.
135. FPC, 3 Nov.1849, Nos.98-100.
136. FPC, 25 Aug.1849, Nos.56-75. Taylor has not only not bothered to give their version but even what little has been mentioned is contrary to official proceedings. Cf. Story, p.253.
137. Idem, Nos.76-7. 138. Idem, No.55. 139. Idem, No.82.
140. FPC, 8 Dec.1849, No.118.
141. FPC, 3 Nov.1849, Nos.97-101; FPC, 1 Nov.1850, Nos.161-4; FPC, 30 May 1851, No.140; FPC, 20 Feb.1852, Nos.185-7; FPC, 18 Dec.1850 (paras 50-1), 5 Nov.1851 (paras 45-6) 24 Nov.1852, para 38.
142. Story, p.275, but not on the way to 'a pilgrimage to one of the great temples in the south of India' as mentioned therein which is contradicted by the foregoing.

CHAPTER IV

TAYLOR'S ADMINISTRATION OF SURAPUR

During the entire period of his deputation to Surapur (December 1842 - June 1853) Capt. Meadows Taylor was intimately concerned with the administration of the sansathan. Even with the initially limited objective of settling Pid Naik in the office of Diwan he had examined accounts and retrenched armed forces. Thereafter owing to Pid's incapacity the Diwan was treated as the ostensible head while the principality was managed by Taylor though he could exercise full control only after the Diwan's death. The raison d'être for British management of the principality was to ensure regular payment of the Nizam's dues, to free the sansathan of its financial obligations, to hand over a prosperous state back to the Raja when he attained majority. This had been clearly spelt out in the Government of India's despatch agreeing to the posting of a permanent British Officer during the Raja's minority. Taylor launched upon his duties with characteristic enthusiasm and did his best to justify British management. His administration turned out to be a glorious chapter in British relations with Surapur.

Revenue Administration

To pull the state out of the quagmire of heavy indebtedness it was necessary to increase the state's resources to the extent where it could pay off its debts and become a going concern. Right from the beginning Taylor endeavoured in every way to increase the revenues of the state from various sources. We shall examine his success in greater detail.

(a) ²
Land Revenue

The main source of the principality's revenue, as in the whole of India then, was the land-tax. Diwan Pid Naik was too indolent to undertake the strenuous work of jamabandi. He was also well aware that the ryats would not accept kowls from him having no confidence that he would keep his word. Taylor, therefore became fully responsible for revenue settlement at the very commencement of his association with Surapur, till his ten-year tenure was over. Even when part of the public business was transferred to the young Raja by way of preparing him for full powers Taylor retained revenue administration in his hands till the last.³

Taylor's task was not easy. Income from land-tax is greatly variable being entirely dependent upon the notoriously uncertain weather and water-resources. This fluctuation all the more affected the State's income as State share was partly collected in kind, its value again dependent on the prevailing price of grain. One way to increase the land revenue is to impose an arbitrary demand and enforce it without reference to the condition of the crops or the ryats' capacity to pay. This was the method followed by the previous Raja and the money-lenders to whom assignments on revenues had been given mainly to meet the Nizam's dues. This had resulted in oppression of the peasantry owing to which many of the cultivators had migrated to the adjoining regions. Taylor could have repeated the method, perhaps with efficiency, but with the same disastrous consequences. It would have nullified any justification for British management.

Another method would have been to increase the rate of assessment thereby adding to the State coffers after carrying out a thorough survey and settling the increased rate permanently. But the survey would have cost a great deal of initial expense of establishment, spread over a number of years going beyond the Raja's minority. Though in the first years of his revenue administration Taylor considered such a survey inadvisable⁴ he later did initiate the proposal by working out the cost with the assistance of revenue officials in Bombay Presidency. But he himself realized that it would not be completed during his own tenure nor was there any guarantee that the revenue settlement thus arrived at would be respected by the Raja after assuming full powers.⁵ The proposal was, therefore, not pursued.

The only means left to Taylor for increasing the revenues then was to streamline the machinery for revenue collection, to plug loopholes, to check false returns, to settle the revenue annually by personal tours, inspection of crops and local, on-the-spot enquiries, to encourage the cultivation of waste lands and to increase the number of rent-payers. He adopted these means with good results though his success was partly attenuated by successive bad seasons over which none can have control.

When he undertook his first iamabandi⁶ tour he found considerable confusion and entire neglect in revenue accounts. What was due from a particular peasant was neither known nor shown under a proper head. There were no records of cultivation or assessment on it. There was no check on private collections and peculation of village authorities,

amils, naibs or their deputies. Existing accounts were confusing. And the previous Rajas had never demanded proper maintenance of them. Taylor gradually introduced systematic accounts, which might not have made a substantial difference to the amount of revenue collection but which put a stop to oppression of the peasantry. Every village official was required to make each ryat's account separately including details of his cultivation, explain the state's demand to the cultivator by calling him to the cutcherry and to give individual receipts at each payment. He was to furnish the amil of the taluq a detailed statement of all collections along with the cash collections which had to tally with the receipts. The statements were finally submitted to the Resident. The ryat's payment was to be proportionate to his cultivation, assessment thereon, previous kowl or the prevailing system of tenure. A copy of the statement certified, signed by Taylor and sealed by the Raja's seal was given to the patwari. Private collections thereby became automatically prohibited. Since the demand from the peasant became certain he was saved from forced contributions, unseasonable, extra demands or solicitations of advances. Material irregularities in revenue collections declined and the receipts could reach the treasury without loss or embezzlement. Stocks of grain were not allowed to be removed till revenue instalments were paid. Village officials were directed to watch the fields. Defaulting officials were warned and punished whereas those patils and kulkarnis who helped increased cultivation and revenue were rewarded.⁷

During the very first year of Taylor's administration he could complete the jamabandi of only

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2 taluqs viz. Hunasgi and Kakker. In the former taluq merciless plunder by the munshis of Motigir Gosain had forced many peasants to migrate. He encouraged their return by giving quinquennial kowls at a gradually increasing rate (from 1 rupee in the first year to Rs. 7½ in the fifth for a kuru, i.e. 30 bighas). For better quality land he charged Rs.3 per year per kuru and gave six-yearly leases. Though the rates were low people had to build houses, break up new lands and could expect only a moderate return upon their inputs. By personal intervention he could also settle some land disputes. At Kakker he managed to reconcile the feuds between naib Sitarayamaya (a natural cousin of previous Raja) and the Bedars. Though the naib paid Rs.7 to 800 to the state only Rs. 300 were shown in the accounts; the rest was pocketed by daftardars as nazar to the Raja. Pidd Naik had imposed an arbitrary fine of Rs. 500 on the Bedars for alleged misconduct. Taylor returned the amount thus collected and directed the rest to be deducted from their dues. All told from Hunasgi he could expect Rs.1850 and around Rs.500 from Kakker.

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In the following year's janabandi (1844 A.D.) Taylor had a chance to give fresh kowls to peasants whose leases given earlier by Capt. Jackson were expiring and to gradually raise the former low rate. By personal inspection he detected cultivation which was concealed from the authorities. Remissions were given in cases of heavy exactions in the past. Such remissions became a regular feature in bad seasons later. He had to dismiss a couple of namlatdars, but found the village officials anxious to please. The best lands were held by them.

Taylor's iamabandi as described by himself was based on a kind of rough rayatwari. He had no authority to change the multiplicity of existing tenures howsoever complicated.¹⁰ His demand was naturally calculated on the basis of State's fixed share in each variety of tenure. If a village patil or a peasant held different lands under different tenures the total was computed and the demand fixed dependent upon the condition of the crops for a particular year. Though Taylor claims to have taken into consideration quality of the soil, market rate of the land, irrigation facilities etc. he could have done so only while giving kowls for waste lands or for those which were not bound by previous lease terms or fixed tenures. A large number of inam lands were also beyond the purview of his iamabandi. He suspected that some of these might not have rightfully belonged to the holders among whom were brahmin priests, Bedars, Raja's relations, hereditary servants of the state like mitsaddis and silladars, ioshis and iangams, firm adherents of the royal family like Muslim Dakhnis, and even dancing women and some agirdars. Some of the best irrigated lands had been given away in inam, but all inamdars¹² paid at a fixed rate of Rs.3 per kuru. Inamdars would have certainly opposed enhancement or refixation of rates, so Taylor had to accept whatever happened to be recorded in the village records. All he could do about such land-gifts was to prepare a register of them in the hope of resuming inams of those who could not produce a sanad or prove their occupancy for a sufficiently long period. However he could not complete it during the whole period of his own tenure of office.

Similarly jagir villages also did not fall within the scope of his revenue settlement. After the death of Pid Naik when Taylor assumed full powers, theoretically he could exercise on behalf of the Raja his sovereign right to resume jagirs. But aware that resumption might provoke the hostility of jagirdars Taylor generally chose not to invite trouble. He planned to resume only those given to the Gosain bankers and Siddappa sahukar in the past to secure loans from them. The Resident's sanction, however¹³ depended upon examination of original sanads¹⁴ which does not appear to have been completed during Taylor's tenure. He also used this power against Rani Ishwaramma after her return¹⁵ from Bangalore and substituted cash allowance for her jagirs. Instead of resumption he even restored jagirs of the Swami of Sankeshwar (which had been earlier resumed) in acquittance¹⁶ of the loan given by the Swami to the Surapur Raja. But when a jagirdar died issueless he took the opportunity to¹⁷ forfeit his jagir for the State. All the jagirs, however, were subject to dharapatti, a tax roughly equal to 1/3rd of the revenue from a jagir. Pid Naik had arbitrarily enhanced it to $\frac{1}{2}$ which Taylor reduced to the customary rate but applied it to all jagirdars without discrimination. The only exceptions were Pid Naik himself and Rani Ishwaramma so long as she continued to enjoy her jagirs and remain in Taylor's good books. Earlier those who were influential or powerful enough to resist it escaped from the levy but now even Rangappa Naik, the Diwan's own brother-in-law, could not¹⁸ evade.

Taylor's endeavours to increase revenue from the land, therefore, were limited by not only nature but also

by the prevailing system. Generally critical of the complicated tenures and systems of collection, at one time he appreciated it. "I think one vice of the Company's revenue settlement is that they are perpetually being subjected to the trials of theories of smart collectors and talented Assistants. The old Hindoos had as good an eye to their revenue as we have, and their systems were far from oppressive under just agents."¹⁹ This indeed is a perceptive observation for those who try to estimate Benthamite influence on British revenue work in India. Taylor himself proceeded with his pragmatic settlements but used the detailed descriptions of tenures to pad his reports when inclemency of the seasons brought less revenue.²⁰ Though he induced new cultivation of more than 7,50,000 ²¹ bighas which were arable but not taken up or were made cultivable, there was a natural limit to what could be brought under the plough. If he managed to increase the revenue in a favourable season the expenses of collection also increased consequently and the net increase could not be very substantial. When the revenues showed a decline due to bad seasons Taylor shifted his base year to indicate an increase!²² To impress the authorities he also always held out optimistic outlook for the ensuing year in his iansabandi reports.²³ It was not really necessary to resort to such subterfuges as his explanations for the decline were always found satisfactory not only by the Resident but also by the Court of Directors. The Government of India which did not usually have so much time to go through the voluminous revenue accounts and bother about the minutiae were only occasionally appreciative of his efforts to increase the

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revenue. But the Resident and the Court of Directors
repeatedly commended his zeal and industry in revenue
25
administration.

Despite many bad seasons Taylor did manage to
show increased land revenue when the entire period of
his management is taken into consideration as can be
seen by the figures below (without fractions):-

Fasli 1252	..	Rs 99,715
1253	..	Rs 1,52,984
1254	..	Rs 1,63,637
1255	..	Rs 1,85,401
1256	..	Rs 2,10,783
1257	..	Rs 2,29,018
1258	..	Rs 2,19,774
1259	..	Rs 1,82,137
1260	..	Rs 1,85,928
1261	..	Rs 1,83,298

He accomplished it by systematising the accounts and modes
of collection, by increased cultivation, and at times a
slightly increased rate of assessment from 11 as.5 pies
27
to 11 as. 6½ pies per bigha. But his greatest service
lay in the protection and security which he afforded to
the ryats. "Not a single ryat of the sunsthan has
absconded as a defaulter in payment", he could proudly
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proclaim, as much a tribute to his benevolent revenue
administration as to the ingrained honesty of the simple
folk under his charge. The personal jamabandi also
brought him closer to the people at large for whom he
began to develop affection, and people in turn came to
love him. He did not fleece them during bad seasons;

instead he got remissions sanctioned as unavoidable, made lacavi advances for increasing inputs and did all he could to promote agriculture.

(b) Agriculture and Irrigation

Tanks. - During his very second iamabandi which covered most of the principality Taylor became aware of the many irrigation tanks constructed by the former Rajas of Surapur. These existed in Rustapur, Devapur and Malgutta taluqs, the best one of them at Bonhal belonging to the Rani. Most of the lands irrigated by them were in inam. Many of the tanks had become broken or fallen into disuse.²⁹ It is a measure of Taylor's interest in agriculture that although repair of these tanks irrigating inam lands would not have increased state revenue he proposed to set aside a small amount of Rs. 3 to 4 thousand for this purpose. Rice was a comparatively scarce crop in Surapur. It could be increased by repairing the tanks which would provide the great amount of water necessary for its cultivation.³⁰ The allowance proposed by Pld to him probably as an inducement to accept his inflated estimate, could be thus used but the Resident disallowed it.³¹ Taylor at first undertook a survey of all the tanks.³² By repeatedly raising the topic and urging the Resident that "Tanks are the most profitable investment of money that can be devised for the state where there is so little local rice cultivation and where old ones can be repaired at comparatively little cost it appears advantageous to have them completed", he secured the Resident's sanction to spend small amounts at his discretion.³³ He thus spent Rs.3000 on raising the height of the bund of Bonhal tank so that it could contain more water and on doing other repairs³⁴

to it. Among other tanks which he got repaired were those at Kolkur (Andola taluq), Khanapur (Kembhavi taluq), Amravati (among Shahapur hills) and Goji. He constructed a small anicut at Gonhal (Dewapur taluq) and proposed construction of another at Narayanapur. Work on the Khanapur tank was completed but others including the one at Nirial (Kembhavi taluq) needed some more expense. He submitted those which required larger outlay of expense for consideration.³⁵ The one at Kachaknur from which he proposed to cut a canal upto Bonhal tank involved such expenditure, and presumably Taylor undertook its construction in 1260 Fasli report for which year is missing. In it Taylor must have sought a large advance to be refunded later. But in view of the temporary nature of British management the Government of India refused. While the Court of Directors were gratified by the progress in the construction of tanks they also approved this decision³⁶ to the dismay of Taylor and to the principality's detriment later.³⁷

A surprising aspect of these irrigation projects is that Taylor, a self-made man, himself prepared blue-prints for it, of course with some assistance from Capt. Buckle, Superintending Engineer in Hyderabad Subsidiary Force with whom he was in correspondence through the Resident.³⁸ The versatility of the man, however, is amazing.

Cotton Cultivation. - The cash crop of cotton was undoubtedly more profitable than jawar and inferior varieties of grain. Black soil in some parts of the principality was most suitable for it. But the peasantry afraid of exactions were not taking to its cultivation with any enthusiasm. During the course of his second iamabandi Taylor procured a

small quantity of New Orleans, Bourbon and See Islands varieties of cotton seed from the Company's adjoining district of Dharwar and distributed it among the peasantry. He could personally vouchsafe the good results of the first variety and received encouraging reports about the other kinds. Resident Fraser agreed to procure further supplies of the seed from the Bombay Government or Chamber³⁹ of Commerce there. Taylor secured 585 maunds of the New Orleans variety rather late in a bad season but distributed it all the same. George Vary, Superintendent of Cotton Experiments in Sholapur personally visited fields in Nilogi taluq sown with the new seeds and certified the crops to have been better than those in the British districts. Taylor was authorized to buy all the quantities of seed available⁴⁰ with the Bombay Government, but since this was his last iamabandi he could not have done so. Incidentally, detailed reports on cotton experiments gave Taylor an excuse to inflate his iamabandi reports in unfavourable seasons when he could not impress by better revenue returns !

Indigo. - was another remunerative cash crop which Taylor introduced into the principality. Besides local demand it had export potential as well. Red, granite soil in parts of the State was very suitable for its cultivation. A bad season ruined the second early crop. All the same⁴¹ with Taylor's encouragement farmers sowed it in 400 highas. These experiments were carried on during the last years of Taylor's tenure. Had he continued he would have proceeded with these experiments in promoting agriculture.

(c) Other Sources of Revenue

(1) Contracts. - Taylor's more spectacular success was in increasing the revenue from contracts. It was customary to farm out revenues from customs, sindi, oil, pan, arrack, tobacco, snuff, saltpetre etc. to contractors who paid a fixed amount to the State in advance and realized it with profit from the public by sale of the commodity concerned and by charging their own tariff duties in the case of customs. Of these contracts those of customs and sindi were the most substantial, the rest were minor. The customs contract called sayer⁴², fetched Rs. 16000 in Fasli 1252. Gradually Taylor increased the amount every year so that in Fasli 1260 it brought in Rs.29,700. The contractor had not to increase rates of transit dues to pay the higher amount. Increased trading activity on account of security and tranquillity prevailing in the principality automatically brought the contractor more revenue. Consequently Taylor could persuade him to revise, equalize and in some commodities even to lower the rates.⁴³ This in turn was a further impetus to trade and consequent increase in the profits of the contractor, who was ready to pay more to the State for securing the contract. Similarly the sindi contract which fetched Rs. 14000 in Fasli⁴⁴ 1252 was progressively increased to Rs. 27,001 in Fasli⁴⁵ 1260. The net revenue from all contracts rose from Rs. 44,875 in Fasli 1253 to Rs. 72,457 in Fasli 1260. This enabled Taylor to abolish the oil contract which was irksome to the people and to lower the amount of pan contract for their convenience. Instead of farming out the contract Taylor levied a nominal tax on oil shops. In all the other contracts there was progressive

⁴⁶ increase. His apprehension that retrenchment in sibandi
would limit the increase in sindi contract did not come ⁴⁷
true. After all it was not sibandi alone who drank sindi. ⁴⁸
Though Taylor appears to be a Victorian puritan in matters
of sex he was no prohibitionist. ⁴⁹ If more people drank more
sindi enabling the contractor to bid for higher amount and
adding to the State's resources he was quite pleased with
it. He auctioned all contracts to highest bidders and
stopped giving them for private considerations. At the
same time he saw to the soundness and previous record of the
contractor concerned thus preventing defalcation. He also
granted contracts to coincide with the Fasli year to
facilitate proper maintenance of all revenue accounts under
appropriate heads. Previously there must have been irregular-
ity and overlapping grant of contracts depending on the need
to raise money thereby causing wide fluctuations in prices
and hardship to the people.

(ii) Taxes. - Taxation was a comparatively much ²⁷
minor source of revenue. Taylor did not introduce any new
taxes. But while continuing to levy and realize the
customary taxes like mohtarfa, tax on baluti collections,
ganachari, taxes on builders, vegetables, salt pans and
drugs, he introduced regularity and strictness in collecting
and maintaining accounts of them. As a result he was able
to show an increase of more than Rs.8000 in the miscellaneous
items of revenue (Rs.30,253-9 in Fasli 1253, Rs. 38,306-0-3
in Fasli 1260). ⁵⁰

⁵¹
(iii) Bagewadi Ruzum. - To use a hackneyed phrase
Taylor left no stone unturned to increase the resources of

the samsthan. While going through old records and accounts as early as 1843 he had discovered that Surapur had sardesh-mukhi rusum claims on Bagewadi taluq amounting to Rs.2400 annually, accepted by the Peshwa in the past. Presumably in 1823 when the British Government as successor of the Peshwa surrendered mutual claims upon Surapur considering the amounts to have been equal the taluq was not included in the acquittance as it had been granted in jagir to the Pant Pratinidhi by the Chhatrapati of Satara. Unable to pursue the claim Surapur had abandoned it. But being in a better position as British agent to press it Taylor carried on correspondence with the successive Residents at Satara who accepted it.⁵² After annexation of Satara the taluq formed part of the British district of Sholapur and Taylor pursued it with its Collector who referred it to the Bombay Government. Taylor could also sue the Pant Pratinidhi in Satara adalat for realization of arrears on that account but did not consider it advisable as the Pratinidhi was now a British subject. He suggested that the Resident move the Government of India for payment. Meanwhile the Sholapur Collector's favourable noting induced the Bombay Government to accept the claim. Thereby in 1260 Fasli Taylor received Hyderabad Rs.22,099 - as.3 in arrears with assurance of regular yearly payment of Rs.2400 in future. This was quite a windfall.

(iv) Bijapur Rusums.⁵³ - Encouraged by the acceptance of claims on Bagewadi Taylor prepared a long memo in 1852 basing it on old records and accounts in Surapur daftar. According to it Surapur had ancient claims over regions

which now formed part of the British territories mainly in Bijapur region. The surrender of mutual claims by Surapur and the Bombay Government in 1823 were not equivalent in actual amount. This being so the British Government now owed Rs.30,000 annually, and another Rs.15,000 from Satara to Surapur. If this was accepted the arrears would amount to nearly Rs.7 lakhs ! The Resident, unable by himself to support or refute the claim, submitted it to the Government of India though he wondered whether it would now like to decide upon a claim lying dormant for the past 35 years. The Government of India after pondering over it vehemently denied that the British Government had succeeded to any liabilities of the Peshwa towards other powers. "If the British Government conquered Nepal, would it become tributary to China?" (on the ground that Nepal had been earlier paying tribute to China) parried Lord Dalhousie. The Government of India firmly declared the claim to be "wholly untenable on the grounds not merely of expediency or prescription but on those of substantial justice and international law". Moreover Taylor's plea was entirely based on Surapur records. He was snubbed for "unnecessarily reviving consideration of a financial arrangement between two native states to which the course of events virtually put on end at a very distant period".

Considering the Government of India's dissenting verdict Taylor must be considered lucky that the Bombay Government accepted the claim on Bagewadi taluq without further reference to the Government of India.

(d) ⁵⁵
Registry of Bedar Lands

In the beginning of 1847 Taylor became quite alarmed at the growing factious spirit among the Bedars on account of which the Bedar panchayat itself was becoming virtually ineffective. Besides family disputes and local rivalries and jealousies the main reason for violent outbursts among them was disputes over lands. The Gurakar (Raja's representative on Bedar panchayat) was a weak man entirely guided by his hereditary clerk who held the land records in his possession. ⁵⁶ Disputes could not be settled as the Bedars had no confidence in either of them nor did they trust Sabnis Srinivasrao, hereditary registrar of Bedar lands. Taylor used to send his own clerk to attend their meetings but found that it was getting difficult to calm down the excited Bedars. Disputes were inevitable but difficult to settle as Taylor suspected that many of them had usurped their lands in the past of which there had been no suitable registry. Landed property divisions over the generations added to the dissensions. The only remedy to check them was to prepare a complete registry of their lands. The Bedars could be required to furnish sansads or some other proof of occupancy for a given period from village records. Disputes then could be settled by reference to a copy of the complete register to be maintained in the Daftar; and lands without proper title could be resumed by the State thus enhancing its revenues. However, Bedars being an armed body and jealous about even the most trivial points regarding their lands and rights would oppose the measure which would have to be carried out through force if required. The Resident supported the proposal as a check upon the military power

of the Bedars, advised conciliation and persuasion in implementing it, nevertheless demanded to know the extent and advisability of coercion which would be necessary, and⁵⁷ the Government of India agreed. Meanwhile Taylor warmed up to his subject. He estimated that 2 regiments of infantry and proportionate artillery and cavalry would be needed to crush possible Bedar opposition. He was equivocal on which class of Bedars might or might not support the measure, but after the alleged insurrection against him in 1848 he became quite firm that persuasion would not work. He pointed out the disadvantages of the scheme as well: it would not be easy to resume Bedar lands without titles; the ousted ones would become lawless; the Raja on attaining majority might not respect the resumptions; separate rules for royal connections would have to be framed. The Resident considered that advantages outweighed disadvantages and submitted the proposal for final orders by the Government of India. Resort to force was not authorized by the Government of India which considered the information furnished by Taylor incomplete for such purpose but they were willing for its implementation by persuasion and peaceful means. Ultimately the proposal proved as abortive as the one regarding complete revenue survey and settlement. As Taylor had initiated it more with a view to maintaining law and order than as a solution to a problem of revenue administration he came to consider that the muchalkas executed by Bedar leaders after the so-called insurrection of 1848 answered that purpose.

(e) Net Revenue Increase

By vigilant administration of land revenue, progressive increase in contract amounts, regular collection of taxes and success in reclaiming sardeshmukhi rusums from Bagewadi Taylor was able to show an impressive increase in the net amount of state revenue from year to year as indicated in the table below:-⁵⁸

<u>Fasli</u>	Total Net Revenue in Rs. (without fractions)
1252	Rs. 1,98,851 (only estimated)
1253	Rs. 2,20,913
1254	Rs. 2,33,507
1255	Rs. 2,75,952
1256	Rs. 3,25,066
1257	Rs. 3,46,550
1258	Rs. 3,35,882
1259	Rs. 2,98,715
1260	Rs. 3,20,792

The declining trend from Fasli 1257 onwards is explained by successive unfavourable seasons about which Taylor could do little. The Court of Directors rightly bestowed lavish praise upon Taylor: "The increase of revenue and cultivation in this sumsthan since it has been under British management, notwithstanding four successive unfavourable seasons, is truly surprising, and reflects the greatest credit on Capt. Taylor, whose intelligence and assiduity have effected a complete reform in a most vicious system of administration".⁵⁹

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Expenditure and Treasury

With all the increase in the revenues of the principality Taylor could not have had a surplus in the

treasury so long as state expenditure was not brought down. During Pid Naik's divani he had no control over treasury disbursements and as we have seen earlier all he could do was to complain to the Resident, in vain against the Divan's reckless and wasteful expenditure. He got complete control over the treasury only during Pid Naik's illness ending in death. Even after Taylor assumed full management he found that he could not effect any drastic reduction or retrenchment in State expenses. It was all very well for Taylor to have criticized Pid Naik almost in irritating monotone. But he himself could not bring down net expenses to less than Rs. 1,90,000 in a specific year during his entire exclusive management. Every year in his estimate of expenses he held out hopes of reduction in the following year. That year would find him ready with excuses of unexpected contingencies. It must be said in his defence, however, that the excuses were not idle pretexts. There were real, unavoidable but unforeseen expenses.

For one thing, Taylor was bound down by a largely unnecessary establishment of hereditary servants engaged at a time when the principality was in a more prosperous condition. He had no authority to dismiss them nor could he have done so without creating serious disturbances. It was also necessary for him to secure their co-operation in running the administration. At best he could persuade them to accept pay for 9 months as full annual allowances in view of the bankruptcy of the treasury. They agreed on the promise of restoration of full amount when the finances would improve. With increasing revenue and minor cuts in expenditure the position did improve and Taylor had to keep

his promise. Thus no permanent reduction was effected, but it helped Taylor to tide over the crisis. The state servants used to enjoy certain perquisites such as commission on revenues. As these were uncertain the Resident suggested fixed cash commission in lieu. ⁶¹ While this might have helped account-keeping and better adherence to the British notions against corruption and bribery it did not necessarily curtail expenditure.

Equally binding and unavoidable were the expenses in connection with the royal household. Long-established by custom and tradition these could be severely cut down only at the cost of simmering discontent in the royal family and sully the British name exposing their management to justified criticism. Large amounts had to be spent in customary ceremonies when the Raja was seated upon the gadi, his hair was cut and he recovered from serious illness. When his wife attained puberty it had to be celebrated. Hindu festivals like Dasra, Yugadi (new year), holi and Bedar festivals like grandevata puja had to be celebrated and subsidised with liberal grants. All deaths, births and marriages not only in the royal family proper but also among those closely connected with it were attended with gifts, in cash and kind. Sarapur Rajas for long enjoyed a reputation for liberality and charities. Itinerant brahmins and royal guests were lavishly treated; the traditional charities to temples and priests had to be continued. All these expenses of the royal household could not be met out of fixed allowances. The samathan's budget of expenses was as much a royal family budget. Taylor could effect a cut here and there by purchasing less cloth,



stocking grain for the royal granary and forage for royal horses in advance when the prices were low, discontinuing the practice of distributing free meat daily to the iagirdars, and sticking strictly to previous recorded expenses in connection with the Gopalswami temple. The Resident refused stipends to the minor Raja's maternal uncles who had lost in the cession of Devadurg, saying⁶² that Raja's own allowances should provide for them too. But that is about all. Taylor himself began to develop an attachment to the Prince so that he spent public funds for buying a carriage, horses and camels, constructing and furnishing a new residence for him.

Many were the items of increased recurring and non-recurring expenses: Taylor's own civil pay of Rs.500 and establishment charge of Rs.276 began to be charged to Surapur treasury from Fasli 1259 onwards;⁶³ the granary had to be repaired and worn out horse furniture replaced; grain had to be freely given for relief of the poor during scarcity; incentive in the form of additional allowances had to be given to village officials for showing honesty and better results. There were unforeseen expenses as on the outbreak of the cholera. Remissions in revenue payments or advances to the ryats had to be made and even written off in bad seasons. Even more revenue meant more collection expenses. The very fact of faithfully recording expenditure meant that it would show increased expenses gone unnoticed before.

All in all Taylor estimated that permanent gross annual expenditure of the principality could not be⁶⁴ brought down below Rs. 2,56,131. Even then it indicated a

sure surplus for the treasury as annual net revenue normally exceeded Rs. 3 lakhs. By carefully husbanding the resources of the State it could be made a profitable administration, though it could never be very wealthy. Taylor saw no advantage in uselessly hoarding money in the treasury either. It was better to invest some of the surplus in useful public works and thus keep the money in circulation. Whatever savings Taylor could effect were therefore directed towards that end, thus giving a welfare dimension to public expenditure diverting it from traditional charities.

When Taylor arrived on the scene the sansthan was burdened with liabilities to the tune of nearly Rs.20 lakhs at least on paper in addition to normal state expenditure. His plea was primarily responsible for relinquishment by the Hyderabad Government of its claim to 5 lakhs arrears. The Gosain bankers' debt was heavily reduced by investigation and orders of the Court of Directors. The doubtful claims of Siddappa sahukar and Raja Balaprasad were not pressed and finally abandoned. The Swami of Sankeshwar was given back jagirs in acquittance of his loan. Taylor also cleared off all arrears of the gibandi and hereditary state servants from the sansthan's own resources, arranged to pay them fully and regularly and left more than enough cash balance in the treasury to pay off the Gosains' debt as computed by the Court of Directors. He began to show a gradually increasing surplus in the accounts from Fasli 1255 onwards, so that in Fasli 1260 there was in the treasury a cash balance of Rs. 2,15,515-8-0; with outstanding claims the surplus amounted to Rs.3,05,095. He thus raised the principality from financial bankruptcy to a level where its income exceeded expenditure, the royal household could be

maintained comfortably, all claims upon the State met
with enough to spare for useful public works.⁶⁵

Just as Taylor streamlined revenue accounts he also
organised the treasury and introduced regular book-keeping.⁶⁶
All collections and disbursements were centralised and the
method of giving harats on revenue officials, contractors
or others who were to pay to the State were stopped.⁶⁷

Vouchers and receipts for all payments and collections were
given, taken and entered into books instead of maintaining
vague memo of certain transactions on slips of paper.⁶⁸ The
books were checked and balanced at stated periods and
statements submitted to the Resident. Defaulting daftardars
were compelled to make good the amounts and dishonest ones
transferred. Taylor's treasury accounts for all the years
during his exclusive management are not available, Such as
are extant may be deemed to be accurate, but Taylor's
letters forwarding them are not as clear as one wishes them
to be. On one occasion the Resident himself complained,
"I have endeavoured to frame a comparative statement of
receipts and disbursements of Shorapore Sumsthan for every
year during the period it has been under our charge, but
in consequence of your annual accounts having been made out
in a different form during successive years I have not
succeeded in making an intelligible general statement on
this subject".⁶⁹ Even though he later stuck to one form
Taylor displays a tendency towards jugglery in the lengthy
forwarding letters, creating confusion by mixing up all kinds
of details and figures. For instance, in net revenue for a
particular year he adds up previous year's cash balance and
outstanding claims; the former cannot surely come under

revenue for the given years; the latter might have been later struck off. Minute investigation, for which neither the Resident, nor the Government of India, nor the Court of Directors had time enough, would reveal further flaws. They were contented so long as Taylor showed a surplus and so must be the reader of these accounts. In spite of it the Resident was ungrudging in his commendation. "Capt. Taylor has had a difficult task to perform in introducing order and regularity into the accounts of a state like that of Sherapore where nothing but confusion has hitherto prevailed; but I have no doubt he will succeed ... in the meantime .. I am perfectly satisfied with the ability, discretion and unremitting zeal, with which he continues to discharge the duties of his office".⁷⁰ And the reader of available accounts as they are is ultimately inclined to agree with the Resident.

Trade and Industry

Taylor's efforts to promote trade and industry were no less strenuous than his endeavours to encourage agriculture. The ryats got little in return for their produce as there were no well-established markets in the principality. Nearly 300 weaver-cultivators of Hunasgi had migrated owing to oppressive exactions. During his very first iamahandi tour Taylor induced the return of some families by giving them gradually increasing quinquennial kowls (Rs. 1 per loom in 1st year to Rs. 5 in the fifth). The rate was low, but the weavers had to rehabilitate themselves. He expected more families to return to their⁷¹ ancestral occupation. He gave similar kowls at Kembhavi; but there the migrated families were not likely to return as the tax on weavers in the adjoining Company's districts

had been altogether abolished.⁷² Yet the very protection afforded to the peasantry and the assurance of tranquillity in the region was conducive to the promotion of trade. Traders of merchandize for the Gadwal fair had abandoned the old, convenient route through Surapur; now they resumed⁷³ it. Grain merchants at Hyderabad revived their purchasing agencies in Andola taluq which produced five qualities of⁷⁴ the iswar. Taylor set up bazars at Nilogi and Jeratgi and gave kowl⁷⁵ for another one at Wadageri. Merchants from Sholapur began to frequent Nilogi for purchase of cotton. Taylor had induced the customs contractors to lower his transit duties. This also encouraged traders who now preferred to pass through Surapur having an advantage over those in the Nizam's districts. Taylor gave kowls to brass and copper merchants of Sholapur to carry on their profession⁷⁶ at Surapur. Trade was also resumed with Narayanpet.⁷⁶ Construction of pukka roads leading to Surapur township also increased trading activity.

Taylor set up a couple of small factories for processing indigo, cultivation of which was being introduced and encouraged by him. Indigo worth Rs. 500 produced at these factories was of a quality equalling that of the imports from the Nizam's ceded districts.⁷⁷ He had also bought a cotton ginning press with 7 saws. His plan to buy another larger one with 14 saws from Bombay Government to be set up in a deserted mausoleum at Kembhavi was not implemented as Taylor left the principality shortly afterwards.⁷⁸ The Industrial Revolution had yet to make any impact on the medieval principality. Taylor, therefore, should be judged not by the success he could achieve but by the earnest efforts made to promote trade and industry.

Laws and Order

The maintenance of law and order did not pose much of a problem to Taylor during his entire first administration partly on account of the high moral character of Surapur Bedars in all respects.⁷⁹ He admitted "... if I have succeeded in repressing their inclination to plunder it has been entirely by appealing to their better feelings, and by assuring them that their former conduct brought disgrace and bad reports upon their Rajahs and the Sumsthan (of both of which they are very proud) ... I will say this for them that whenever they have pledged their word to be peaceable and to assist my endeavours to preserve order or⁸⁰ repress outrage they have very faithfully kept it". Bedar ~~piadas~~ in villages used to be vigilant, helped to trace robberies and gave up casual offenders at once. If a theft was not traced they could be asked to make good the loss of⁸¹ property.

But besides Bedars, there were Brahmins, Lingayats, Muslims, and other castes, tribes and communities among whom too the incidence of crime was very low as will be evinced by the adjoining table:

Crime	1843	1844	1845	1846	1849
1. Border Raids	4	1	-	Nil	-
2. Murder	3	1	2	Nil	-
3. Accidental Homicide	-	Nil	-	1	1
4. Rape	1	-	Nil	-	-
5. Highway Robbery	1	2	-	Nil	-
6. Armed Gang Assault	Nil	1	Nil	1	Nil
7. Individual Assault	Nil	1	-	Nil	-
8. Burglary	5	2	4	5	2
9. Cattle-Lifting	Nil	4	4	6	Nil

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This table compiled from Taylor's annual reports is

sufficiently indicative of the years for which such reports are missing. In addition to these a murder case each in 1847 and 1848 was reported and trial proceedings sent to the Resident for confirmation. There were border depredations from the lawless people in the Nizam's dominions into Surapur territory. In 1844 Taylor broke up such a gang and in 1852 claimed damages from Hyderabad Government for armed assault on a Surapur village. While a few cases of theft might have gone unnoticed and Taylor suspected in 1843 that while he was away at Hyderabad a thief escaped punishment by bribery, on the whole petty theft as a crime was rare. Only the wandering tribes of Korwas (basket-weavers) or Banjaras (selling grain and salt), not residents of Surapur, dared to commit thefts. Some Banjaras from Sholapur who stole cattle-heads in Surapur were apprehended and sent back to Sholapur. A case of theft by the Korwas was reported in 1845 and Taylor thought of expelling them. The following year he sentenced some of them to hard labour on the roads from 6 to 9 months for a burglary. The stolen property used to be mostly recovered and restored.

Cattle-lifting was not really a crime in the true sense of the term. Driving away cattle beyond the rivers or to other villages was only a customary way of registering grievances. When the grievance was redressed the cattle used to be restored. It was also customary to post threatening letters to draw public attention. As Taylor arranged for ready redress of grievances the practice of cattle-lifting as a means of airing complaints declined. It was widely prevalent though, in adjoining Devadurg and Taylor could not get co-operation from the Nizam's authorities in checking it so far as Surapur was concerned in it.

However, there was good understanding between them and Taylor otherwise, so that border raids could be checked and criminals in either region could not take shelter in the adjoining territories. Taylor himself gave full co-operation in apprehending criminals who passed through the principality after having committed crimes in the Company's or the Nizam's territories.⁹⁰ He, however, claimed charges for maintaining them till further orders but was not always⁹¹ listened to. In 1845 for want of evidence he had to release the criminal Dharikari horsemen when they came to Surapur but persuaded authorities in adjoining regions to have them bound down by securities. In that year the notorious criminal Sewa Chumar was caught by the Company's police. Taylor secured two convincing depositions from eye-witnesses which were passed on by Pid Naik to the shastris at Surapur. They passed death sentence and the criminal was executed⁹² at Naribole in March 1845.

As for the police, in addition to the Bedar piadas there used to be shetsandies who held lands and claimed shares in baluti collections for police duties. There were no jails at all. Robbers were usually fined and flogged while adulterers were required to pay to the aggrieved party damages equivalent to marriage expenses. All had to pay for their own subsistence if they ever happened to be⁹³ confined. Imprisonment as punishment was, however not customary. Taylor saw no need to set up regular penitentiaries and housed offenders in guard rooms. He reported towards the end of 1851 that there were 25 prisoners but that this number was rarely, if ever, exceeded in any year of his⁹⁴ administration.

Taylor takes undue credit for maintaining law and order in the principality. "On my arrival in the district I found the utmost lawlessness prevailing among the lower orders of Bedars, Colees etc. The whole of the borders of both rivers were in a disturbed state, and constant retaliations going on from one side and the other, accompanied by loss of life and property. This was reduced in a great measure by the end of the first year. Persons who had complaints, found they would be attended to, and gradually ceased to resort to insolent means to obtain redress. Since then I have been able with much satisfaction to report to you from year to year, that the district has been singularly free from crime, considering its population and the previously long continued lawlessness of the people unchecked, if not directly encouraged by that Rajah, and I can confidently appeal to the testimony of His Highness the Nizam's Civil Officers on all sides of the Sumthan, and to that of the British Civil Officers on the western frontier, that all previous irregularities have been checked and subdued⁹⁵".

This is somewhat exaggerated as Taylor is given to occasional boasting. All the more so when he was to draw up a memo designed to prove the benefits of British management of Surapur. There are limits to an administrator's ability, howsoever competent he might be, in checking inherent criminal tendencies and activities among the people he governs. Foreknowledge that crime will not pay and that it will be punished and suppressed is not enough of a deterrent as modern societies have discovered to their dismay. Possibly the prevalent structure of Surapur society left little room for the expression of criminality. The low incidence of crime in the principality is something for the sociologists

to ponder over. In the maintenance of law and order Taylor was more lucky than efficient.

Judicial Administration

As there was little crime and not much spirit⁹⁶ of litigation among the general populace Taylor was required to do little in the administration of justice. Moreover, during Pid Naik's divani he was engrossed in revenue settlement and attempts to control public expenditure. The time-honoured system of judicial administration by self-governing panchayats prevalent in⁹⁷ the principality continued during the entire period of Taylor's first administration. Right from the beginning he was against introducing regular courts of justice as panchayats served the purpose in an effective, economical manner perfectly suited to the people at large. The Court of Directors, however, had suggested the establishment of a⁹⁸ 'tolerably constituted' court of criminal justice if possible. It is not understood why Taylor took this directive to mean setting up of civil adalats as well. He submitted a longish report on panchayats particularly that of the Bedars at⁹⁹ Surapur. Though all the different caste and other panchayats had been functioning efficiently and their decisions used to be generally fair and acceptable, of late, however, there used to be prolonged disputes in the Bedar panchayat at Surapur and the panchayat verdicts did not find ready acceptance owing to factious spirit among that community. All the same Taylor was certain that Bedar populations concentrated at Surapur, Kakkeri, Mudhole and Hemnur would oppose any other kind of tribunal. In view of their apprehended opposition and the competent functioning of

other panchayats Taylor considered innovation of any other courts of justice as inexpedient, though he was prepared to carry out the measure if ordered. When the Court of Directors found the Resident and the Government of India agreeing with him they dropped their suggestion. However, in Surapur town, Taylor took credit for re-establishing town panchayat composed of mirasdars, banias and merchants for trial of petty causes. Taylor countersigned its decisions though this appears to have been redundant; nor can it be believed that the town panchayat was so moribund that Taylor had to revive it. If the volume of civil litigation was not much as Taylor keeps on reporting repeatedly it is not understood why he considered it necessary to set up a small civil court, besides the town panchayat, around 1850-51. A Brahmin well-versed in Hindu law presided over it but the court's jurisdiction was confined to small suits involving inheritance, division of property, debts and the like. The Brahmin's decisions were found satisfactory and the Court of Directors regarded the innovation as an important improvement.

Resident Fraser had suggested in view of the directive from the Court of Directors qazis' courts for the Muslims though panchayats could deal with the Hindus. The qazi at Shahapur (Nizam's enclave in Surapur sansathan) had theoretical jurisdiction over the Muslim community at Sagara and Surapur, but at the latter place he had no occasion to exercise it as there was little litigation and no crime at all in that community at Surapur. Moreover the qazi was not very knowledgeable. He only occasionally visited Surapur. An illiterate mulla

deputised for him to carry out simple ceremonies. Taylor proposed to strengthen the qasi's authority by sending him the Urdu translation of MacNaghten's Muslim Civil Law. The Hyderabad Government too could help by either issuing a proclamation regarding the qasi's authority or by deputing a suitable person from the Sadr Adalat at ¹⁰⁶ Hyderabad. The Resident considered any interference by the Nizam in Surapur's internal administration, let alone ¹⁰⁷ judicial, as highly objectionable.

With special reference to the Court's suggestion of a faujdari adalat Taylor sought the Resident's opinion whether his own authority was not enough. He could take down depositions in simple form, pass sentences and ¹⁰⁸ transmit the proceedings to the Resident for confirmation. To begin with the Resident considered it desirable that Taylor himself should confirm heavy punishment, particularly ¹⁰⁹ death sentence, awarded in criminal cases by panchayats. But while submitting this point to the Government of India he expressed his doubts. As Taylor was exercising the powers of the former Rajas during the present minority he could be deemed to have the authority to confirm and execute death sentences but he preferred confirmation either by himself or by the Government of India. The latter ordered that Taylor should not carry out death sentences ¹¹⁰ unless these were confirmed by the Resident.

Distrust of the simple but usually effective and inexpensive judicial machinery and procedures in the smaller Indian States led the Government of India, particularly after 1858, to vest the Resident or Political Agent concerned with supreme judicial authority. It was a mark of assertion of British paramountcy vis-a-vis Indian States.

But to a layman it would certainly appear strange that despite the local official's certifying the effectiveness of indigenous institutions a British Resident with no special legal qualifications or training nor any knowledge of local usages, customs or traditions should have been permitted to exercise the supreme power of life and death. Luckily for Surapur heinous crime itself was rare and hence this almost casual and anomalous grant of such power to the Resident did not result in grave injustice. All the same anomalies could be noticed in a couple of cases. For instance, in one case the panchayat did not specifically mention death sentence. It simply said 'the circar is all powerful'; from which Taylor appears to have inferred it to mean award of death sentence. Was the panchayat awed by the presence of the British officer and therefore left him to spell out the sentence? In another case one Monappa carpenter got the husband of his mistress murdered by hiring a couple of goondas. The panchayat awarded death sentence to the three men involved and the adulteress was to be seated with shaven head on an ass and banished from the samsthan. The Officiating Resident Col. Low referred the case to the adalat at Hyderabad which recommended life imprisonment for Monappa and whipping for the adulteress. When Resident Fraser resumed duty he did not accept the adalat's decision, rightly so, as it was based on Muslim law not applicable in this case and confirmed the panchayat's verdict. He observed, however, that had the panchayat awarded death sentence or life sentence to the adulteress he would have been glad to confirm it. Corporal punishment was inadequate to this crime. Taylor taking a

due from this observation informed that henceforth in similar cases he would direct the panchayat not to exempt a woman from full penalty for her crime on account of her sex alone.¹¹² Such a directive looks like undue interference by Taylor. Presumably the panchayats were customarily lenient to female criminals, particularly if they were partly and not fully responsible for the crime. The Court of Directors themselves pointed out anomalies in the exercise of judicial powers by the Resident. While the panchayat had awarded death sentence to the offender in a double murder case the Resident had commuted it to life imprisonment. This appeared extremely lenient to them in striking contrast with another case where death was caused by an accidental blow in a drunken brawl and the Resident had confirmed the sentence of 2 years rigorous imprisonment¹¹³ for the perpetrator of this culpable homicide.

The little amount of civil litigation mostly involving settlement of debts, mercantile transactions and disputes over inheritance and property continued to be dealt with in a competent manner by the panchayats. There was rarely any appeal to him from their decisions and even¹¹⁴ in such few cases he found no reason to alter them. Taylor however, fails to mention any actual instance in any of his reports of appeals made to him. When he reports, 'I employ, panchayat for civil justice'¹¹⁵ or that "in cases of murder, the system I established of panchayats has not¹¹⁶ disappointed me" he talks boastfully and loosely. He only possibly attended some panchayat meetings, which were self-governing bodies which functioned and could function with or without him. Similarly Taylor's boast that he¹¹⁷ endeavoured to make panchayats respectable and independent

is also self-contradictory with his repeated reports of their efficient functioning. At best panchayats from outside were assembled at the request of the parties concerned and he might have helped them in arranging them. What can be believed is that whereas earlier losing parties could manage to stay panchayat decisions by means of bribes or influential connections, now, he as an executive authority, saw to it that these were implemented and executed without exception. It would appear that besides panchayats some civil cases were also decided by mamlatdars (at taluqa places) aided¹¹⁸ by village officials and influential persons. To evade payment of debts people used ingenious devices, one of them being making third parties responsible for settlement. By taking no cognizance of any such agreements except between the debtor and creditor direct, Taylor appears to have helped in making settlement of disputes easier and such subterfuges¹¹⁹ untenable.

Taylor's judicial administration, therefore, was confined to assembling panchayats in criminal cases, translating and transmitting their proceedings to the Resident, and after his confirmation carrying out death and other sentences in his executive capacity. In administration of civil justice he merely helped to arrange panchayats and implemented their decisions. He also repaired the traditional chabutra of the Bedar panchayat at Surapur at their request, as it had broken down.

Attitude towards Religion

Taylor had no occasion to adopt any particular policy towards the various religious practices prevailing¹²⁰ in the principality. However, in a couple of instances he

was required to take a definite stand. In the beginning of August 1845, when the cholera epidemic subsided Bedar chiefs solicited his permission to hold their traditional ceremony of sacrificing sheep and buffaloes as a mark of their homage and gratitude towards their gods. Diwan Pid Naik was then on his death-bed. Presumably they would have approached him for permission had he been functioning. Other servants of the samsthan were against it as the ceremony had been attended with much violence in the past. But Taylor sanctioned it when the Bedar chiefs gave their word that peace would not be disturbed. The ceremony passed off smoothly and Taylor proudly reported it to the Resident who was also gratified at this proof of mutual confidence between the Bedars and Taylor. But strangely enough the Government of India instead of appreciating Taylor's personal triumph quibbled over his 'sanction'. Taylor had to plead that as a servant of a christian Government and as a christian gentleman he had neither suggested, nor advocated nor ordered this pagan pooja. He had only allowed it just as, for instance, a European commander of a native regiment would let his sepoy perform their religious ceremonies when approached. The Resident supported him by explaining that "permitted" would have been a better word.

On another occasion, in October 1847, the Udipi Math requested Taylor to prevent an unauthorized sannyasi from performing mudradharan at Surapur. The Math had already obtained such a ban on the sannyasi in the past through the decisions of Sir Thomas Munro as Collector of Bellary, his successor Bruce and even the Sadr Diwani Adalat at Madras. Raja Pid Naik (III) too had banned the sannyasi's religious activities at Surapur but this had not been strictly enforced.

The sannyasi had managed to gain quite a few adherents among the brahmin daftardars at Surapur. Perpetual disputes among his disciples were quite embarrassing but Taylor wondered whether he should go so far as to seize the sannyasi's mudras and banish him. The Resident advocated non-interference but the Government of India instructed him to stick to past decisions. ¹²² In this instance it may not be wrong to infer that the esteem in which Sir Mauro was held by them affected the Government of India's usual secular policy.

Measures of Welfare

Roads. - During Pid Naik's divani there was hardly any spare money in the state exchequer for any measures of public welfare. All the same Taylor managed to have a few streets in Surapur town cleared of rocks and obstructions to enable wheeled carriages to pass. He also undertook the construction of a 7-mile long road leading to Bonhal tank. ¹²³ During his whole tenure of office he appears to have been able to lay about 30 miles of roads spreading out from ¹²⁴ Surapur in various directions.

Public Buildings. - The same lack of funds was responsible for Taylor's inability to undertake the construction of any impressive public buildings when Pid Naik was alive. Only some very essential public works had to be completed such as the rebuilding of a dilapidated ¹²⁵ bazar, a chawdi and a small, near building for the daftar. After the Diwan's death, with a gradually increasing surplus in the treasury, Taylor sought and got the Resident's permission to spend more money on public works. Guard houses for the sibandi and repair of the chabutras

for the Bedar panchayat, were completed at small cost. But about Rs.2,000 were necessary to widen the entrance to the Durbar palace which used to be thronged by the people. Taylor built an impressive gateway to the palace.¹²⁶ The palace building itself was also repaired.¹²⁷ But when the banished Rani Ishwaramma returned to Surapur the young Raja shifted from the palace to a building where his grandfather used to stay. The repairs done to this old residence were washed away in heavy rains, so it was pulled down and a new 3-storeyed palace was built at a cost of about Rs.20,000. Good building materials were brought from distant places. The rooms were made airy and large and furnished with Victorian furniture. A small garden was added, ugly structures and some stables nearby were cleared. An adjoining building was altered into a diwankhana which could be used for public business as well as entertainment and on ceremonial occasions. Among minor public works may be mentioned the repair of the broken down steps and terrace of Gopalswami temple (cost, Rs.650), a durable cutcherry building at the young Raja's request and barracks with mud-¹²⁸ roofs for infantry detachments.

Plantations. - Another measure of public welfare by Taylor was the planting of mango and tamarin^d groves around Surapur. During 10 years of Taylor's management more than¹²⁹ a thousand trees appear to have been thriving.

Dispensary. - Taylor also set up a small public dispensary at Surapur. Though he says that it was desired by all classes of people it is doubtful considering the general apathy of Indians of the time towards western medicine. The dispensary cost Rs. 1250 yearly which

included the cost of medicines imported from Bombay, and establishment charges. Indigenous preparations also appear to have been in use. The dispensary was managed at first by 2nd dresser Murray and later by Dr. Sellers for 1½ years when he was attached to Taylor's escort. It proved useful during the cholera epidemics which were quite a frequent occurrence in the principality. From 20 December 1849 to 30 November 1850 about 300 patients were treated for ailments ranging from toothache to filaria and venereal disease, of which 241 got cured. Dr. Sellers appears to have done considerable surgery too. Among other prevailing diseases on which the doctor submitted detailed reports were fevers of various kinds, syphilis, rheumatism, leprosy and dropsy.

We have already referred to the construction and repair of irrigation tanks and works. Taylor had put himself heart and soul into administering and improving the small, medieval principality. With admiring approval and appreciation from the authorities he succeeded considerably in bringing it on a par with the adjoining Company's districts. Meanwhile minor Raja Venkatappa IV was growing to manhood and time had now arrived, first to transfer a part of public business and later to vest him with full powers.

Notes and References:

1. FPC, 24 May 1843, No.64.
2. FPC, 9 Mar.1844, Nos.89-95; 29 Nov.1845, No.249; 16 Sept.1848, No.79; 10 Nov.1849, No.191; 27 Dec.1850, No.202; 10 Jan.1853, No.83. Jamabandi reports or accounts for Fasli 1255-6 and 1260 are missing but supplemented by corresponding general reports in FPC, 31 Dec.1847, No.634, 9 May 1851, No.54 and a survey of administration upto 1851 in FPC, 23 Jan. 1852, No.165.

3. FPC, 23 Jan. 1852, No. 164, and 19 Mar. 1852, No. 109.
4. FPC, 29 Nov. 1845, No. 249.
5. FPC, 31 Dec. 1847, No. 634, paras 47-58.
6. FPC, 9 Mar. 1844, Nos. 89-95, T. to F., 30 Dec. 1843.
7. FPC, 23 Jan. 1852, No. 165.
8. FPC, 9 Mar. 1844, Nos. 89-94, T. to F., 30 Dec. 1843.
9. FPC, 29 Nov. 1845, No. 249.
10. Chali, Kutgoota, Orki Kowli, Bhagnal, Bakshish Inam, Jood Inam, Bhut Manai, and other types of vatandari ^{holdings}.
11. Their descendants still continue at Surapur and were of great help in collecting local information.
12. FPC, 29 Nov. 1845, No. 249.
13. FPC, 22 Aug. 1846, No. 97 and 14 Apr. 1849, No. 48.
14. Idem, No. 98, and Idem, No. 56.
15. FPC, 1 Nov. 1850, No. 161.
16. FPC, 23 Jan. 1852, No. 165, para. 15.
17. FPC, 10 June 1853, No. 83.
18. FPC, 9 Mar. 1844, Nos. 89-95, T. to F. 18 Jan. 1844, and F. to T., 1 Feb. 1844.
19. Letter to Reeve, No. 38. 20. ^{For instance,} FPC, 10 June 1853, No. 83.
21. Idem.
22. For instance, Idem in which Taylor shows that the net revenue had increased if compared to Fasli 1252 though the revenue for 1261 Fasli was less than for 1260 Fasli. His other iamabandi reports are similarly drawn up.
23. e.g. he held out as usual the hopes of better prospect in FPC, 27 Dec. 1850, No. 202, and to be on the safe side corrected himself the very following day with a weather short which indicated that rains that season were so unusually heavy as to damage the crops for next year too. Idem, No. 204.
24. e.g. FPC, 29 Nov. 1845, No. 266.
25. e.g. FPC, 29 Nov. 1845, No. 260, 24 Dec. 1847, No. 121, 27 Dec. 1850, No. 205; PLFC, 19 Mar. 1845, 13 Feb., 31 July and 18 Dec., 1850 and 31 Dec. 1852.
26. FPC, 27 Dec. 1850, No. 203, 23 Jan. 1852, No. 165 and 10 June 1853, No. 83.

27. FPC, 16 Sept. 1848, No. 79.
28. FPC, 31 Dec. 1847, No. 634, paras. 2-8.
29. FPC, 29 Nov. 1845, No. 249. 30. FPC, 23 May 1845, No. 144.
31. FPC, 9 Mar. 1844, Nos. 89-95. T. to F., 18 Jan. 1844, post-script.
32. Idem, F. to T., 1 Feb. 1844.
33. FPC, 31 Dec. 1847, No. 634.
34. FPC, 14 Apr. 1849, Nos. 48 and 56.
35. FPC, 9 May 1851, No. 54. 36. PLFC, 31 Dec. 1852.
37. Cf. Hyderabad Affairs, Vol. VII in which relief measures for the great famine of 1877 are recounted.
38. Papers on the Construction of Tanks for Irrigation by Capt. M. Taylor and Capt. Buckle.
39. FPC, 23 May 1845, Nos. 144-5.
40. FPC, 10 June 1853, No. 83. 41. FPC, 9 May 1851, No. 54.
42. FPC, 9 Mar. 1844, Nos. 89-95, T. to F., 18 Jan. 1844, para 16.
43. FPC, 23 Jan. 1852, No. 165, para 41. Cf. Story, p. 197, "I lowered the duties" etc.
44. FPC, 9 Mar. 1844, Nos. 89-95, T. to F., 18 Jan. 1844, para 17.
45. FPC, 23 Jan. 1852, No. 165, para 41. 46. Idem.
47. FPC, 23 May 1845, No. 144.
48. According to Taylor the Bedars rarely touched it. (Story, p. 283); but it must have been the chief solace of the cultivating class.
49. Cf. Letter to Reeve, No. 41. "I am no teetotaler nor do I belong to the Temperance Society, yet I never touch wine or Beer. This plan I have followed for a year and never had such perfect health before and never could stand so much labour". He thought sindi was very exciting. Story, p. 283.
50. FPC, 23 Jan. 1852, No. 165, para 41. The figure has been arrived at by deducting arrears of Bagewadi rusum.
51. FPC, 9 May 1851, No. 54, and FPC, 23 Jan. 1852, No. 165, para 41.
52. Of these Maj. James Outram had been his special friend. Letters to Reeve, Nos. 15-6, 18, 37.
53. FPC, 15 Oct. 1852, Nos. 38-41, 52.
54. But if the Govt. of India had so chosen they could have investigated the claim by looking into records in the possession of Bombay Govt.

55. FPC, 31 Dec.1847, Nos.634, 643-4,646-8; FPC, 7 Apr. 1848, Nos.245-8, 276.
56. Contrast Story (p.283) "They were grateful to me for respecting their former privileges, and elected me gurekar, or head executive over all the clans" !
57. Contrast Story(p.242) "... the Resident agreed with me on several material points. ... to delay also the proposed inquiry into the Beydur lands of which they were very jealous, and it would be like thrusting one's hand into a hornet's nest".
58. FPC, 23 Jan.1852, No.165. 59. PLFC, 12 Apr.1854, para 29.
60. Pid Naik's estimate of expenses for 1844, FPC, 9 Mar. 1844, Nos.89-95. T. to F., 18 Jan. 1844; Dafatar accounts for 1254 Fasli, FPC.10 Jan.1846, Nos.103-4; estimates for Fasli 1255-6, FPC, 22 Aug. 1846, Nos.100-1; treasury accounts for Fasli 1256, FPC, 24 Dec.1847, No.110-20; earlier accounts, FPC, 31 Dec.1847, Nos. 627-32, 635, 638-40; accounts for Fasli 1257, FPC, 14 Apr.1849, Nos. 48-55; expenses for Fasli 1259, FPC, 9 May 1851, No.54; general survey, FPC, 23 Jan.1852, No.165.
61. FPC, 22 Aug.1846, No.100, F. to T., 27 Apr.1846.
62. Idem, No. 98. 63. FPC, 10 Feb.1849, Nos.40-3.
64. Average of Fasli 1256-8, FPC, 23 Jan.1852, No.165.
65. FPC, 23 Jan.1852, No.165. Figures in the Story, p.252, are not corroborated by official accounts.
66. This is what Taylor obviously meant when he wrote to his father that he had established a treasury with some difficulty. Story, p.172. The treasury was already there before his time.
67. FPC, 22 Aug.1846, No.97.
68. A large number of such slips of paper are available in about 120 bundles at the State Central Archives, Hyderabad.
69. FPC, 31 Dec.1847, No.631. 70. Idem, No.627.
71. FPC, 9 Mar.1844, Nos.89-95, T. to F., 30 Dec.1843.
72. FPC, 29 Nov.1845, No. 249. 76. FPC, 5 Sep.1845, No.90.
73. FPC, 22 Aug. 1846, No. 97. 77. FPC, 9 May 1851, No.54.
74. FPC, 23 May 1845, No. 144. 78. FPC, 10 June 1853, No.83.
75. FPC, 29 Nov. 1845, No.249. 79. Story, pp.282,284.
80. FPC, 23 May 1845, No.144.
81. FPC, 9 Mar.1844, Nos.89-95, T.to F., 13 Jan.1844.

82. Idem, FPC, 23 May 1845, No.144; FPC, 22 Aug.1846, No.97; FPC, 31 Dec. 1847, No.634; FPC, 9 May 1851, No.54.
83. FPC, 8 Sep.1849, Nos.93-8; FPC, 7 Oct.1848, Nos.161-3.
84. FPC, 23 May 1845, No.144.
85. FPC, 19 Mar. 1852, No. 105.
86. FPC, 9 Mar.1844, Nos.89-95, T. to F., 13 Jan.1844.
87. FPC, 31 Dec.1847, No.634.
88. FPC, 22 Aug.1846, No.97; and 31 Dec. 1847, No.634.
89. Idem. In the Story, p.281, Taylor calls cattle-lifting a crime, though.
90. Idem, Story, pp. 241-2.
91. FPC, 9 May 1851, No.54, 6 June 1851, Nos.215-6, and 25 July 1851, Nos. 135-7. The Govt. of India agreed with Capt. Sleeman that it had a "right to demand from its allies and tributaries full co-operation in efforts to suppress predatory hordes who are dangerous to all in common and naturally expects that these states in which they find a refuge should share the expense of their apprehension and conviction".
92. FPC, 22 Aug.1846, No.97. 93. Idem.
94. FPC, 23 Jan.1852, No.165, para 60. 95. Idem.
96. FPC, 31 Dec.1847, No.634. 97. Idem.
98. PLFC, 19 Mar.1845, para 70.
99. FPC, 26 Dec.1846, No.404.
100. PLTC, 7 Aug.1848, para 73; 8 May 1849, para 52.
101. FPC, 26 Dec. 1846, No.403.
102. FPC, 26 Dec.1846, No.404.
103. FPC, 23 Jan. 1852, No. 165, para 62.
104. PLFC, 31 Dec. 1852, para 34.
105. FPC, 22 Aug. 1846, No.98.
106. FPC, 26 Dec.1846, No.404. 107. Idem.
108. Idem. 109. Idem, No.405.
110. FPC, 11 June 1858, No.82.
111. FPC, 8 Sep.1849, Nos.93-8.
112. FPC, 7 Oct.1848, Nos. 161-3.

113. PLFC, 31 Dec.1852, paras 36-7.
114. FPC, 9 May 1851, No.54.
115. g.g. FPC, 31 Dec.1847, No.634.
116. FPC, 23 Jan.1852, No. 165, para 61.
117. FPC, 9 Mar.1844, Nos.89-95, T. to F., 18 Jan.1844, para 28.
118. FPC, 23 May 1845, No.144.
119. Idem.
120. In addition to the two instances officially noticed Taylor privately reported to Reeve, "I had set aside today [25 April 1844] for several letters when a vile Panchayat regarding some Brahminical precedence had to be settled; and this took me the whole forenoon, a plaguey job. Priests are perhaps of more tenacity regarding rank than any other classes of persons, and these Brahmins are fighting as to whether one sect should beat little drums and wave fans before a holy man who has come here to beg, or not. A Plague on them all say I..." No.28. The tenor of the letter and the fact that it was not reported officially indicates that both the dispute and the decision alike were trifling.
121. FPC, 15 Aug. 1845, Nos.87-8 and 13 Dec.1845, Nos.187-8. This is one of those few instances where the version in the Story (p.208) is precisely the same as the official one. But even here Taylor passes over Govt. of India's quibbling.
122. FPC, 7 Apr. 1848, Nos. 242-4.
123. FPC, 23 May 1845, No.144; also Letter No. 34 to Reeve "My roads are splendid and people come from a distance to see them. I have sent for a Phaston of the newest Victoria pattern for the little fellow; perhaps riding in a carriage, which his ancestors never did, over good roads, may help him to form gentlemanly ideas. The roads are a blessing to all and people wonder how they did without them before !" According to the Story (pp.195-6), road construction was at Pid Naik's request, which appears rather unlikely and an afterthought for the autobiography.
124. FPC, 22 Aug.1846, No.97. It is not understood why Taylor did not report it officially if as he says in the Story (p.288) one of the roads extended 36 miles unto Lingsugur. The same official silence regarding schools (Idem) raises doubts if Taylor is not confusing them with those set up in his second spell.
125. FPC, 22 Aug. 1846, No. 97.

126. FPC, 31 Dec.1847, No.634.
127. FPC, 14 Apr.1849, No.48.
128. FPC, 9 May 1851, No. 54. Also Taylor's own, private house was bought at his departure by the Raja but not paid for at the time. Taylor took more than Rs.16,000 towards it from the public treasury during his second spell when he cleared the Raja's debts. (FDP, Part A, Apr.1860, No.27 and FPP, A, Dec.1860, Nos.597-8). Taylor had built it for about Rs.2,000 in 1843-4 (Story, pp.173-4) and yet complains of 1635 (of interest on the money invested (Idem, p. 442). Popularly called Taylor Manzil it was adopted as a state guest house by the Hyderabad State. At present it has been converted into a traveller's bungalow leaving no trace of Taylor's original residence. Henry Bruce's footnote that it is the 'New Darbar' (Idem) is obviously wrong.
129. FPC, 9 May 1851, No.54; Story, pp.288-9.
130. Idem, FPC, 14 Apr. 1849, No.48.

CHAPTER V

RAJA VENKATAPPA IV AND THE BRITISH

A - Childhood, Transfer of Power and Maladministration

(a) Childhood and Education

Raja Venkatappa IV, the one and only son of Raja Krishtappa and Rani Ishwaramma, was born in 1834¹. As we have noticed before, he was immediately declared Raja on the death of his father in August 1842, and his mother Rani Ishwaramma acted as regent for him till she was forcibly removed from power. Though a few translations of his letters during this period are extant they were written by the Rani for him, merely bear his seal, and as such furnish no information about him. The Rani loved her son and one of her reasons for not accepting Pid Naik as Diwan was the apprehension that the Diwan might harm the Prince's life and security². On the accession of the Raja the Governor General directed Resident Fraser to convey to the minor Raja who was ascending the gadi in such difficult circumstances, his paternal but friendly sentiments and good wishes. The Resident was to "extend his care to him in the spirit of friendship and good will"³. Later the Governor General emphasized that the young Raja be given such good practical education as would enable him to carry on his administration properly when he attained majority⁴. It became Taylor's duty to carry out this instruction.

From Taylor's official reports⁵ it appears that the Raja's training programme consisted in the main of learning various languages. Taylor himself, 2nd dresser

Murray in his escort, Assistant Surgeon Dr. Sellers, and one Ramrao, a Brahmin official who had retired from the Company's service, taught him English. He learnt enough to read and understand easy books, picked up writing but probably could not speak it well enough. As Surapur's official language was Marathi, mastery over English was not essential though desirable. He learnt to read any document in Marathi and could write it tolerably well. Kannada and Telugu being his mother tongue and next household language it was no wonder if he became well-versed in them. He also picked up some Persian and learnt to speak Urdu very well. The subject he failed to study was arithmetic. Over-indulgence by instructors, several of whom had to be dismissed for gross misconduct or embezzlement, and the Raja's own delicate health hampered his studies and slackened his progress. When he came of age his companions and attendants began to tell him that a Raja had no use for studies and this proved another obstacle.

Another measure taken by Taylor for the Raja's training was to initiate him to public business as an observer. Taylor used to hold a durbar or cutcherry every Monday and sometimes on other days as well in which all State papers were read before the Raja, explained to him, signed and sealed in his presence. The young lad exhibited natural curiosity, asked pertinent questions and took interest in public business. "It was satisfactory to observe his increasing interest in regard to these subjects". He had strong, natural ability and intelligence and Taylor considered him a boy of much promise. When Resident Fraser visited Surapur the boy was showed off before him. The Resident was favourably impressed, found the lad

affectionately attached to Taylor and docile to his⁶ instructions. The young Prince was mild, affectionate by temperament, amiable and well-disposed, neither petulant nor irascible. Taylor did not notice in him any trait of unruly passion or untruthfulness that needed correction. When the boy grew up Taylor remarked the same honesty which would not conceal irregularities or falsehoods of others either.

The great events of the young Raja's childhood were ceremonial ascending of the gadi on 12 June 1843,⁷ the Dasra festival on 21 October 1844 which passed peace-⁸ fully but at which his murder was feared and ritual removal of his hair in his 11th year i.e. 1845.⁹

The young Raja's health was delicate and always caused anxiety. He was subject to repeated fevers, one of them nearly fatal; the boy also survived an attack of cholera. Taylor encouraged the boy to take up excursions into the countryside which improved his health. However, the irregular habits induced by his attendants and companions compelled Taylor to restrain the boy. He himself would have taken the lad along during his janabandi tours and the boy too was quite enthusiastic about it. It would have proved the best administrative training for the Raja. But unfortunately the boy's delicate health stood in the way. Taylor had ordered camping tents suitable for the Raja but unfortunately¹⁰ these arrived too late to be put to use. When in good health the boy exhibited active habits, learnt horse-riding¹¹ well and used to be indifferent to fatigue.

When the boy attained the age of 16 Taylor appears to have had some misgivings about him. While repeatedly

admitting that the Rani took great interest in her son's education he had also felt that the Prince had to be prevented from the pernicious, immoral influence of her alleged love affair with Kasima.¹⁹ It was difficult to have a competent guardian for the boy. His own mother was unsteady and capricious. After her banishment he tried several guardian-tutors, found them unsuitable and placed him under one Timmappa, uneducated but firm in checking clandestine evils which harmed the Raja morally and physically. Taylor vaguely tells us that the Raja was fully aware of the low standard of people in Surapur (excepting Brahmins), that he readily acknowledged his irregularities, that his repeated errors were instigated by others and not because he was disposed to commit them. Taylor often used to exhort the Raja to avoid the weaknesses of his father who came to grief on that account. Like an indulgent guardian Taylor also saw the good side of his ward - how he was considerate, kind and charitable, could discern well who could be better servants of the State, clearly perceived what was just and right, and was capable of showing firmness and confidence though easy-going and undecided by nature.

It was when the Raja completed his 16th year that Taylor proposed a simple test of his qualifications. Resident Fraser or any other competent persons could examine him. It would stimulate the Raja to greater endeavour if he were told that the termination of his minority depended upon this test. To prepare him for it an intelligent but firm Kannada - knowing instructor could be sent. When the Raja would assume full powers over his principality there was none of rank or standing who was capable of assisting him. Taylor

had trained the hereditary servants of the State in routine business; but they indulged in low intrigue and the Raja would have to exercise firm control over them.¹³

(b) Partial Transfer of Power

It speaks volumes for Taylor's honesty and integrity that much in advance of the Raja's approaching majority he took up the question of allowing the young boy a share in administration whereas he could have deferred it conveniently to his own personal advantage. He overlooked his own earlier suggestion of a qualifying test for the Raja, with sad results later on, and straightway proposed that the boy should look after his treasury and submit periodical statements of accounts. In actual practice this did not involve much responsibility as the items of expenditure were settled and the treasury officials well-trained. All that the Raja was required to do was to check the accounts, control household expenditure on festivals, donations, purchases etc. and curb possible extravagance of the royal family. Initially he might commit mistakes but gradually he would learn to judge and decide independently. It might prove a stimulus for interest in sources of State revenue and build up his confidence. There was much less danger in this experiment than in ignoring the Raja's growing love of ease and irresponsibility. Besides, Taylor was there to guide the boy at every stage and apprise him of revenue and other aspects of administration as well. He had been often telling the Raja about the need for economy in State expenditure.¹⁴

Instead of commenting on this proposal the Resident asked the opinion of Surapur people as to when did they expect the Raja to receive full powers?¹⁵ Since Taylor had never discussed this with anyone, not even with the Raja so far, nor would anyone have given his honest opinion for fear of consequences he could only offer his own opinion. He felt that the Bedars could get excited if transfer of power were deferred and the members of the Raja's family, particularly the Rani, would be looking forward to it with a view to acquiring influence. The peasantry and small merchants might be happy with prolonged British management but their opinion did not matter. Of the populace only the daftardars had expressed their apprehension of irregularities but Taylor himself used to allay these fears¹⁶ by assuring them that the Raja would learn by experience.

The Resident forbade Taylor from discussing cessation of Raja's minority with anyone.¹⁷ To the Government of India, he recommended the Raja's immediate participation in public business, adding that British management could continue beyond the Raja's attaining majority, if considered expedient. He proposed retention of Taylor as permanent Political Agent at Surapur, his advice^{to} be binding on the Raja and Taylor's salary to be paid by Surapur. Of course, retaining the British Agent could be made dependent upon the Raja's future conduct and management. In any case the Resident saw no potential ruling abilities in the Raja and feared that Surapur would relapse into chaos if the British officer were¹⁸ permanently and absolutely withdrawn.

The Governor General, Lord Dalhousie, agreed that "the young Rajah should be permitted and encouraged to



exercise a considerable share of authority in government during the period that will elapse before he attains his full majority. Then he shall have completed his 18th year. I apprehend that in accordance with usual practice the full authority over his state must be given to him". The Raja's consent to a British political agent's continuance, which was "in the highest degree desirable" could be invited. But if his State were orderly, his means adequate to his expenditure and he chose not to have a British political agent it could not be forced upon him. This however, was¹⁹ to be referred to the Court of Directors.

On receipt of Dalhousie's orders, Taylor who was then finalizing jamabandi, informed that as soon as the Raja met him at his camp he would transfer to him general control over expenditure and whatever other departments the Raja might desire reserving to himself only revenue settlement. He enclosed a draft letter to the Raja to be signed by the Resident. In this draft the Raja was informed that associating him in administration was a mark of the British Government's favour and confidence in him; that he must take his duties seriously, practise economy, continue public works, and not allow evil-minded persons to interfere. Taylor, of course, would assist him, but he must check his²⁰ own daftar accounts. The Raja's partial participation dated from 1st Jamadiul-awwal, A.H. 1268 (22 Feb. 1852). He sent a grateful letter to the Resident informing that he had prepared a statement of expenditure from A.H. 1268 to date (evidently as an exercise), and making all the demanded promises. Though the reply was in Persian and Marathi it was obviously dictated and translated into English by Taylor²¹ for the Resident's benefit.

(c) Full Transfer of Power

Finding the Raja's age of majority approaching fast Taylor opined that it was now too late to set any qualifying test for vesting the Raja with full authority as had been suggested by him much earlier. Despite Taylor's advice the teenager was neglecting studies for which he had neither inclination nor talent and he could not have passed any test. As a matter of fact it was too late for Taylor himself to refer to such a test at this stage. He himself had failed to follow up his initial proposal and consequently none of the superior authorities (the Resident, the Governor-General in-Council or the Court of Directors) ever took it into consideration. The Resident pointed out that the Court of Directors only wished to be sure of the Raja's capacity to govern on which Taylor could send periodical reports. He emphasized that while 18 was the customary age of majority there was neither British regulation nor Hindu law that at that age a Raja must necessarily be vested with full authority, nor had the Raja been so assured the subject being under the consideration of the supreme authorities. While submitting these papers to the Governor General in Council Under Secretary W. Seton-Carr merely paraphrased these ideas pointing out that if the Raja was given full powers a little later than 18 it caused no great inconvenience. The Governor General in Council reiterated to the Resident that Court's orders were awaited and that neither precise time for full transfer of power nor any qualifications for the Raja could be prescribed at present. This reply was based on Lord Dalhousie's noting: "I adhere fully to the opinion expressed before. Though the

Government of India may have the power to withhold
succession for the lad it has no reason for doing so; and
I do not consider that we can at this late stage establish
any standard of capacity beyond the assurance that he is
not absolutely incapable."²²

²³
Taylor's report on the Raja's ability to govern,
was not very encouraging. The young Raja had given up
checking accounts after initial enthusiasm was spent out.
Though he might not be unduly extravagant having become
aware of his unnecessary expenditure he was procrastinating
in preparing a schedule of State expenses. He paid little
attention to practical administration though quite keen to
have full management. He had appointed some favourites in
place of experienced hands. He was surrounded by unworthy
companions who exercised a pernicious influence though his
recent marriages had curbed his promiscuity. Taylor
wondered whether his subjects could look forward to protection
and unrestricted access to the Raja for redress of grievances.
The Raja used be out on hunting expeditions for days together.
He was full of apparent sincere assurances, though. But the
proof of the pudding was in the eating. Taylor's exhortations
and remonstrations irritated him. Taylor felt that the
second pattabhisheka, therefore, could be delayed by four
more years. But he dared not suggest it frankly. He
guardedly wrote, "It rests with Government to decide whether
it is not more expedient to continue supervision till his
good management warranted entire withdrawal". But if
political considerations and policy in respect of other
native states justified complete withdrawal one had to abide
by its results. Moreover delay in complete transfer of power

would deeply hurt the Raja. The Resident agreed with him, though as a matter of fact it was futile to discuss the question on which Lord Dalhousie had already expressed his firm opinion and which was under submission to the Court for final decision. Taylor did so on demand from the Resident and presumably because the Governor General in Council's latest instructions were not yet conveyed to him.

On completing 18 years on 5th Zilhaj 1268 (20 Sep. 1852) the Raja applied to Taylor as well as to the Resident for being vested with full authority, and sent Yenkappa Jellapalli to Hyderabad to plead his case. His humble petition provoked the Resident as an attempt to hustle the Government into decision. Besides, it referred to the Resident's promise of transfer of power which he strongly denied as having been made. Taylor himself was then at Hyderabad for medical treatment having left Jellapalli to look after the administration. Taylor did not like Jellapalli's minor mission and punished him by taking away his sansads for 24 2 jagir villages for his son. The Raja tried to shift the blame to Jellapalli but took Taylor's remonstrances in good spirit.²⁵ Informed of the Raja's petition the Government of India ruled that present arrangement was to continue till the receipt of the Court's orders.²⁶ The Court of Directors concurred with Dalhousie regarding the partial transfer to the Raja of public business not compelling him to have a British agent but added, "you will not fail to press on the young Rajah the necessity of maintaining the excellent system of administration now established and warn him of the consequences of falling into their former disorder".²⁷ Before the Court's orders could reach Taylor he submitted another confidential report on the Raja.²⁸ It contained a chhaprasi's

(obviously Taylor's spy) account of how the Raja's companions were exhorting him to create disturbances to gain gadi, how he continued to neglect administration, entertain bad characters, and sulked at expostulations and admonitions. What really scandalized Taylor was the Raja's reported acts of sodomy. "I really do not know what to do with him, to save him or keep him even tolerably straight, or how to report on him to Government. I must tell the truth if there is no improvement and he must take his chance".

Nevertheless, when Col.Low took charge as Resident at Hyderabad, in accordance with Government's previous orders he invited the Raja's consent to Taylor's appointment as Political Agent.²⁹ The Raja asked its meaning from Taylor who, while explaining it,³⁰ added that it was a mark of distinction conferred by the British Government on important Indian states ! As Taylor had not made clear whether his advice would be binding either in theory or in practice the Raja in reply with matching vagueness solicited British protection. It is interesting to see Col.Low follow Gen. Fraser's footsteps in this direction when he regarded the Raja's uncertain reply as sufficient for Taylor's appointment and spelt out the actual amount to be paid by the Raja towards Taylor's allowances.³¹ When this became clear to the Raja he refused the agency on the ground of expense. Surapur could not afford it. Dalhousie considered the Raja's reply to be presumptuous but stuck to his original stand that British political agency could not be forced upon the Raja. He is of full age, and has a claim to his independence; nor can I recognize any right on our part to thrust upon him an adviser who is to take part in his administration. The Government of India might of course require the Raja to

receive Capt. Taylor as a political agent at his Court. But Shorapore is not of sufficient importance to justify this expense. The Raj should be made over fully to the Raja. He should be enjoined at the same time to bear in mind the good advice he has received and should be warned that his future prosperity will depend upon his own conduct. Dalhousie suggested that in any case Taylor, who was being considered for appointment in one of the newly ceded districts of the Nizam, adjoining Surapur, could keep an eye on the Raja's administration.³²

The Court of Directors, as usual, endorsed the Governor General's opinion. Besides, their letter containing it arrived too late.³³ Meanwhile on 30th June 1853 Taylor handed over full charge to the Raja in a brief investiture ceremony.³⁴ The Raja had been directed to enforce judicial decisions made during Taylor's time, protect officials trained by him, continue stipends to his relations and peshkash to the Nizam and abide by advice given by Taylor. The Raja was full of assurances and promises in person to Taylor and on paper to the Resident. Taylor handed over all revenue records and necessary English correspondence.³⁵ And thus the British management of the principality came to an end. Later events proved it to be an interval rather than an end, but Dalhousie had not intended it. He withstood the pressure of local officials favouring continuance of direct British supervision. Despite the recommendations of the Resident and unfavourable reports from Taylor he did not flinch from what he considered as a principle of justice. As we have noted above Surapur in his eyes did not possess such political significance as would compel him to modify that principle. All the same in this instance he stands

This is not unusual
but typical of
Dalhousie - and a
prelude to annexation
for misrule.

in unusual light which should clear the vision of students
of his Governor-Generalship.

(d) Maladministration

The Court of Directors in their letter dated 12th April 1854 had specifically stated that it would be the duty of the British officer in charge of Raichur Doab bordering on Surapur to watch, advise, remonstrate or assist the Raja, of course through the Resident at Hyderabad. The Court had urged that the Raja must observe Taylor's engagements in respect of revenue and other matters, and that he must be warned, if necessary, of permanent forfeiture of the ³⁶ principality to the British if there was maladministration. The centre of British control over Surapur had shifted in the past from Matkhal to Surapur itself. Now it thus changed to Raichur. But the Officer in charge of Eastern division of Raichur Doab was not Taylor but Maj. Hampton. Later Capt. Ivie Campbell officiated for him. It is they who submitted ³⁷ reports on the Raja's maladministration. One also gathers similar bits of information on it through Taylor's later ³⁸ report which, however, is inferential in nature.

As soon as complete power was transferred to the Raja, his private attendants, in addition to other parties, began to plunder the wealthy with impunity. This led to the migration of substantial cultivators, traders, bankers and industrious classes to the Nizam's or the Company's adjoining territories. Warning of diwan Bhimrao that this would invite British intervention put a stop to it. Though the Raja held darbar for an hour every day he only transacted routine business and took no interest in actual administration. He

indulged in his hobby of hunting, carried on a homosexual affair with the son of a dancing girl and got into the hands of vulgar companions who exercised unbounded influence over him. He resumed many jagirs worth more than a lakh of rupees only to lavish them on these favourites.³⁹ Induced by one of them he opened the sluices of Bonhal tank merely to catch the fish easily; it resulted in loss of cultivation under it in a year of famine. Work on the Kachaknur tank was left incomplete and the dispensary established by Taylor disbanded.

Though immediate plunder was stopped law and order broke down to an extent where offenders went unpunished. Bhimrao divan settled private scores and oppressed his enemies. One Huchappa Desai who had plundered Sagar Shahpur (an enclave in Surapur belonging to the Nizam) was reported to have received the Raja's protection. Creditors tortured debtors to realize their dues, but went unnoticed. Cattle-lifting, particularly in border areas, which had been suppressed by Taylor, and plundering of ripe fields, received encouragement from the Raja and his creatures as proof of spirit and enterprise. Extortion often accompanied by torture was either ordered by the Raja or perpetrated by his companions. The Raja's confidants themselves indulged in criminal activities, received stolen property, and assisted criminals in every way. None, not even Brahmins, could afford not to bear arms in self-protection.

No one dared to complain, and even if one did, one had no chance of being heard. Officials connected with the civil court set up by Taylor at Surapur became notoriously venal. Profits were supposed to be so large that officers were ^{made} for farming the judgeship! Consequently the court

fell into disrepute and eventually ceased to exist.

Such lack of protection to the ryats and oppression was bound to affect cultivation resulting in loss of revenue to the State. It was no wonder if Taylor found no trace of New Orleans variety of cotton cultivation later which he had been encouraging earlier. Sugarcane, fruits and similar garden produce used to be taken away without payment by the Raja's servants and companions during their frequent countryside excursions. But this pales into insignificance when compared to the indiscriminate grant of inam lands by forcibly dispossessing previous tenants. The Raja's companions procured blank orders to village officers and filled them up as they pleased. There was a scramble among the new inamdars, the village vatandars and those with local power and interest for best lands. Waste lands brought under the plough by encouragement were taken away by them depriving the original cultivators of the fruits of their labour.

Lax and oppressive revenue administration, without any check on accounts coupled with bad seasons and scanty rains on account of which several cattle perished brought only Rs. 1½ lakhs as revenue in 1853-54. To raise the revenue the Raja began to impose irregular cesses and increase his demands. The treasury was exhausted soon enough and arrears of payment running into nearly 2 lakhs of rupees to the sibandi and hereditary officials, servants of the state, stipendiaries and annuity-holders accumulated. It was apprehended that the Raja would fail to pay the Hyderabad kists but he managed by raising loans. The Raja borrowed right and left, from local sahukars and seths, near and distant relations, friends and even a money-lender at

Bangalore. His creditors numbered 55, and amounts of loans ranged from Rs.8 to Rs. 32,000. Cloth worth Rs.18000 and a necklace costing nearly Rs.8,000 was bought on credit but never paid for. To raise funds he went to the extent of occasionally pawning the jewelry donated by himself to the ⁴⁰Gopalswami temple at Surapur.

Such ruinous maladministration would have called forth not merely remonstrances but threats of annexation by the British. However, the immediate cause of severe protests by the British officials was the reported maltreatment by the Raja of his cousins yig. the sons of late Raja Pid Naik. The quarrel between the two was instigated and fomented by diwan Bhimrao who bore private enmity towards them. The cousins karkun was so ill-treated that he escaped to Hyderabad. The cousins themselves fled and finally took asylum at Devadurg. Their half-sister, daughter of Pid Naik's concubine, was ravished by a favourite of the Raja and returned to her grandmother. Their families were forced to leave their ancestral houses which were pulled ⁴¹down and their jagirs were confiscated. Driven to destitution and despair the cousins conveyed to the British authorities their intention of creating disturbances on account of which they were kept under surveillance. The Raja's yakil, when taxed, vehemently denied and said that this and other instances of maladministration were inventions ⁴²of enemies. He might have been justified to an extent as relations between a raja and his jagirdars who often tend to be independent of him are frequently full of friction. However, his explanation was considered unsatisfactory and the Raja was threatened and exhorted to treat his cousins

properly and to provide for them. He offered to pay them Rs.500 per month in lieu of jagirs on condition that they settled their creditors who used to annoy him; he would not allow the cousins to return to Surapur. The Resident did not press for restoration of jagirs if their income was applied to liquidating their debts. ⁴³ Campbell, the Officiating Commissioner was against it, as there was no ⁴⁴ guarantee of punctual payment of cash stipend. The Court of Directors too doubted the wisdom of the Resident in agreeing to such an inadequate amount and urged mediation. ⁴⁵ In the Resident's opinion the cousins had to acknowledge the authority of the Raja as the head of their clan before restoration of jagirs . ⁴⁶ However, he persuaded the Raja to increase the stipend to Rs. 900 p.m. and considered the ⁴⁷ subject as closed. ⁴⁸ Though the Court urged further mediation the subject was dropped for the time being and revived only during Capt. Taylor's second spell.

Although the picture of the Raja's administration as emerging through the British reports and correspondence appears to be so uniformly dismal it must be observed that ⁴⁹ it is exaggerated and coloured. Neither Maj. Hampton nor Capt. Campbell had firsthand information of the Raja's maladministration though they were quite assertive about it. Taylor suffered from the very human tendency to shine in contrast by painting a dark picture of his predecessor. Many other attenuating circumstances also must not be ignored. As noticed before, during the whole period of the Raja's regime natural calamities like famine, scarcity, and scanty rains beyond his control were in part responsible for dwindling revenues. The Raja was, after all, young and

inexperienced. It was the duty of mamlatdars trained by Taylor to stick on and help. Instead, foreseeing disorders they resigned, en bloc at the commencement of his reign, and fled to the adjoining regions. At least Yenkappa Jellapalli, who was the most respectable, experienced, elderly relation of the Raja and to whom Taylor himself had entrusted local administration during his first spell⁵⁰ should have continued to advise and support the Raja. But he was among the first to resign and get employment under the Company forsaking even his guaranteed lagira.⁵¹ The Raja's conduct was certainly not such as could inspire confidence amongst them but if they had any mettle in them they would have chosen to face the odds in the interest of the State instead of following the line of least resistance. In their absence the Raja came completely under the influence of coarse companions and self-seeking men. The Raja's actions were more those of his advisers than his own, he being weak, yielding, ease-loving and easily influenced. His frequent change of divans⁵² may be as much an indication of his endeavour to find a suitable administrator as of his fickle-minded nature. His proposed employment of Bapuji Vikaji, a reputable Parsi administrator, to manage his revenues,⁵³ though we do not know if it came about, is a pointer in that direction. If one could examine the personal record of many servants of the State, of whom Taylor himself had not much opinion,⁵⁴ it is possible that the dismissals and replacements may be found to have been justified. Although the Raja had many other personal weaknesses he was not addicted to liquor or opium unlike his uncle or father and is not reported to have seduced women indiscriminately.⁵⁵ As for the migration of

many people owing to oppression only defaulters had left according to the Raja. In fact even Campbell admitted that many watandars did feel secure enough to return.⁵⁶ The Raja was gradually learning by experience. For instance, when he personally concluded jamabandi, cultivators in 200 villages threatened to desert on account of high assessment and he was obliged to make satisfactory promises to them. There was certainly reason for hope in the latter part of the Raja's rule when the Resident ceased to have any complaints about him. The assurances of the Raja's yakil that he was managing his own affairs, was inclined to do all that was reasonably required of him and desired to do well, in which the Resident also placed some reliance⁵⁷ may not be taken at their face value; but the fact that such a convincing pleader of the Raja's cause continued to be in Surapur despite all the maladministration was a harbinger of hope.

^{57a} B - The Revolt

After the outbreak of the mutiny at Meerut on 10 May 1857 many native chiefs in India began to be viewed with suspicion by the British. Rumours began to thicken and the whole political atmosphere became charged with distrust. The Surapur Raja too began to be enveloped in the hazy mist of mistrust.

First Reports

There was no dearth of informers and interested parties who began to circulate stories of the Raja's disaffection. Indian officials at Muddebihal near the borders of Surapur on the Bijapur side, reported on the Raja's usual hunting expedition with a large retinue, as if it were a most

⁵⁸
alarming occasion. One Bhimrao in Surapur service alleged that the Raja was recruiting Arabs from Hyderabad and planning aggression on withdrawal of British troops to the north.⁵⁹
A Sitaram Bawa at Bangalore mentioned Surapur Raja as one among other Indian princes plotting the Mutiny.⁶⁰ More important was the statement of one Mahipal Sing, son of Jawahar Sing, recently discharged from the Thagi Department who had been arrested for attempting to spread sedition in the 29th Regiment stationed at Belgaum and was executed on that charge. Mahipal Sing alleged that the Surapur Raja had sent him to incite the troops at Belgaum on the promise of some territory and reported that the Raja had informed him of his enlistment of Rehillas and Arabs. Mahipal Sing's statement was recorded on 14th August 1857.⁶¹ The Bombay Government itself did not place much reliance in the statement by a person who was hoping for mercy by large disclosures, but considered it worth investigation.⁶² Although Resident Davidson did not anticipate any overt act of hostility from the Raja he regarded him as a weak character, completely under the control of ill-disposed people and asked Lt. R.N.Taylor, acting Deputy Commissioner of Raichore Doab to keep a close watch on the Raja. He proposed to summon the Raja at a convenient time to Hyderabad for explanation.⁶³ The Government of India approved of this plan obviously as the Resident stories of Raja's disaffection⁶⁴ with a pinch of salt.

⁶⁵
R.N. Taylor's Report on the Raja

On 29th September Taylor informed the Residency of the warnings he had issued to the Raja against creating any sort of disturbance. He had not been able to obtain any positive proof about the orders of Surapur Chief to Mahipal Singh.

But he had advised the Raja to disband his newly raised mercenaries and to appoint a proper new Divan. In reply the Raja denied Mahipal Sing's allegations, proclaimed his fidelity to the British and applied for a pass across the Krishna River for horsemen whom he had discharged. The passes were probably not issued before Taylor could ascertain of the strength and destination of the horsemen. Taylor also reported that spies from Surapur had been sent to cantonments in Raichur with a view to finding out any aggressive intentions on the part of the British. But although Dasra was supposed to be the day for some disturbance it passed off peacefully and Taylor did not expect any trouble till the monsoon was fully over.

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Capt. Campbell Deputed for Enquiry

However, alarms continued to be spread about the intended revolt at Surapur. In October 1857 Lt. Kerr, commandant of Southern Maratha Horse forwarded two seditious letters allegedly written by one Anandrao of Surapur. It was also believed that Nanasaheb of Kanpur had deputed to the Raja a brahmin envoy named Nana Sankeshwar. The Raja continued to be charged with strengthening his troops and collecting ammunition. Besides, he was also alleged to have organised dacoities in his own country (!) with a view to raising more money for greater adventures beyond his borders. In view of such vague but repeated reports about the Raja's hostility Resident Davidson decided to depute his 2nd Assistant Capt. W.R.Campbell for an on-the-spot enquiry into all the charges and to demand satisfaction from the Raja. A letter was accordingly issued to Campbell on the 27th December 1857.

Capt. Campbell in Surapur

Capt. Campbell arrived at Surapur on the 11th January 1858, with an escort of about 60 men. The Raja who had already been informed about this deputation received Campbell with all due courtesies. Campbell at once started his enquiries, held several interviews with the Raja who stoutly denied any hostile designs, and had talks with the newly appointed diwan Bhimrao. He could not gather any satisfactory information about Raja's complicity either with Mahipal Sing or despatch of any envoy to Nana Saheb. In his opinion the seditious letters of Anandarao were forgeries. On reports of military preparations at the forts of Rainpalla and Waghingera, the Raja invited inspection and Campbell found not only these forts but even the one at Wandurg quite unprepared, containing only some old, useless guns while the gunpowder was enough only for pyrotechnical display. The Raja promised compensation to the parties who were alleged to have plundered with his connivance. A couple of horsemen in disguise who had gone for espionage at Rainpalla were fired at but only with a view to warning the neighbourhood to be on the alert. On the 21st of January Campbell reported that he did not apprehend any intended revolt on the part of the Bedars, who were, however, upset at the posting of British troops at the frontier. In fact even after a fortnight after his arrival Campbell could not arrive at any conclusive proof of the Raja's hostility. However, during all this period he noticed small bands of mercenaries entering into Surapur and some of them taking shelter in a mosque.

Salar Jang's Report

Meanwhile, Salar Jang, the Nizam's Prime Minister, learnt through his intelligence service that the Surapur Chief had sent a couple of agents to Hyderabad for the purpose of enlisting Arab mercenaries. The Arabs refused because they found no guarantee about the period for which they would be required to serve and also presumably because they were afraid that they may be asked to fight against the British forces. The Minister issued orders for the arrest of the Surapur emissaries, promised apprehension of Arab janadars and passed on the information to Resident Davidson for necessary action. The Raja of Wanparti too informed the Resident of the current rumours about the employment of Arabs for the Surapur Chief.

Capt. Campbell Secures Proof

In the meantime Campbell also pursued his enquiries relentlessly as a result of which on 27th January he reliably came to learn through Diwan Bhimrao that the Raja had issued notes of hand ordering five Arab and Rohilla chiefs named Tusduk Husain, Mir Arif Ali, Sidi Suleman, Sidi Nasib and Izzat Khan to raise 500 men each for a period of six months at a salary of Rs. 35 p.m. for a horseman and Rs. 15 p.m. for a foot soldier. The following day the Raja himself acknowledge it and stated that he so acted on account of many reports regarding the apprehended annexation of his territory, purely for self-defence. He agreed to discharge about 360 men he had managed to enrol but he had neither the force to expel them nor the money to pay them off.

Resident Davidson orders movement of troops towards
Surapur 70

As soon as Resident Davidson came to know from Campbell of some tangible proof of the Raja's hostility he at once ordered Capt. Wyndham of the Lingsugur Field Force (which was nearest the frontier of Surapur) with all available guns and troops to Surapur, who thereupon commenced to move with 2 12-pounder guns, 40 cavalrymen and 400 infantry. The Bombay and Madras governments were also requested for reinforcement so the Kurnool Movable Column under Maj. Hughes, left on 2nd February with two heavy guns manned by a half of European Company, 1 squadron native cavalry, 2 companies of native infantry and 2 companies of Highlanders. From Bolarum an artillery train under Capt. Biden with 4 light guns was to march. The Bombay Government ordered its field force at Kalladgi and Gen. Lester at Dharwar to co-operate in a combined attack on Surapur. This mobilisation of forces was in keeping with Davidson's policy of nipping in the bud the nucleus of even a possible revolt. He advocated a strong line, was against any attempt at conciliation and was keen on inducing among the people the fear of being crushed and suppressed by actual force in case of hostile designs. He requested Salar Jang to apprehend armed parties escaping from Surapur and to proclaim that it was an act of hostility to join Surapur Rajah.

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Capt. Campbell Shifts his Camp

All remained quiet at Surapur, however, till the 31st of January, though Campbell sensed a strong feeling against him in the town. He also received reports of an intended

rising of Bedars at Devadurg. Presumably to investigate it and also to ensure his own safety Campbell left Surapur, crossed the frontier river and reached Devadurg. The Raja provided him carriage and suitable escort for this purpose.

What Happened On 7th February '58?

Meanwhile the mercenaries continued to collect at Surapur and the Raja was quite unable to get rid of them. By 7th of February Capt. Wyndham of the Lingsugur Field Force had already reached Surapur and camped there. But on the afternoon of that day he noticed hostile preparations in the bastions on the hillocks near Surapur $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles away. So he ordered the camp to be struck and while it was in the process of shifting to more open ground, on a small hill on the left flank more Arabs and Rohillas continued to assemble. At about this time Capt. Campbell too had returned to Surapur finding safety in the presence of the armed detachment of Capt. Wyndham. The Raja presumably afraid of the belligerent activities of the Arabs and Rohillas whom he was unable to control, sent an envoy named Balwant Rao to Campbell to assure him of friendship and submission to the British. While this envoy was returning from Campbell he saw Tusduk Husain, one of the Rohilla Chiefs with his men going towards the British camp. A little later at about 5 O'clock the Rohilla chiefs started firing at the British detachment. Active hostilities had commenced and continued till midnight. The Raja's troops consisting of Arabs, Rohillas and Bedars were estimated to be 5000 strong. The Raja who was at his palace at the time tried to stop it but was powerless to do so.



Capt. Newberry Killed

The following morning, on 8th February Capt. Wyndham received reinforcements from the Kurnool Movable Column which marched through Devadurg to Surapur. The terrain was rocky and difficult. Capt. Newberry of the 8th Madras cavalry (which formed part of the Kurnool Column) led the attack on the Raja's forces which had been firing upon them and in the course of the action was killed. His subaltern Lt.R.C. Steward was severely wounded.

Capture of Surapur

Capt. Wyndham did not feel confident enough to attack the fort and capture the town yet. He decided to await Col. Malcolm of the Southern Maratha Horse who was to arrive from Kalladgi (in Bijapur District of Mysore State). Action continued, but luckily for Wyndham protracted siege of the town was found unnecessary. A Muslim shopkeeper showed the way to the town, the British forces captured and plundered it. The Raja's seraglio which had taken shelter in a neighbouring village on the Raja's advice returned on the promise of safety.

⁷² The Raja's Flight⁷³

Where was the Raja while his capital was being plundered? Ever since the hostilities had commenced the Raja had tried to restrain his forces. But finding the situation getting worse than he feared he planned to flee the township on 7th night itself. He could not do so, however, as the Rehilla jamadars demanded payment of their wages and additional rewards, specially for killing Capt. Newberry.

The Raja became particularly agitated over the latter's death and confirmed his plan to leave the town secretly. He stalled the jamadars by promises of gold, told the inhabitants to leave the town but that he intended to remain to fight and secretly fled from it on 8th night, taking with him only a couple of retainers, a little cash and some jewelry. With Rohillas on one side and the British on the other he had no hope, he said to his divan.

The Raja's Surrender and Confession Statement

The Raja managed to reach Hyderabad and tried to meet the Resident. But before he could do so he was apprehended by the Nizam's agents and was handed over to the Residency. There he was kept imprisoned in a room at Secunderabad and arrangements were made for his trial. Before that he made a statement in which he vehemently denied ever having had any intentions to rise against the British and disavowed all responsibility for the attack on the British troops. His excuse for trying to raise the Rohillas was that he apprehended an attempt by Krishnappa Naik (a cousin of the Raja) to capture the throne.

Raja's Confessions to Taylor

The Resident naturally did not believe him and sent Capt. Meadows Taylor to dig out the truth from the Raja, expecting the Raja to be more truthful and communicative with his former guardian. The Resident's expectations were not belied. The Raja was much excited and therefore incoherent at the beginning. So Taylor had to interview him thrice, on 23rd, 25th and 27th March. In these interviews the Raja

came out with the plot to murder Campbell while at Surapur, messages sent by rulers of Southern Maratha states (Kolhapur, Akalkot, Jamkhandi, Mudhol, Juth, Miraj, Tasgaon) inciting him to rebel, the part played by Arab jamadars. He furnished Taylor with a list of about 86 persons who were active agents and conspirators according to the Raja. The list included not only Arab and Rohilla jamadars, but Raja's own relations and servants, former divans of Surapur, Gosain agents and Bedar chiefs. He admitted having got into the hands of such evil advisers, but repeatedly emphasized how he found it difficult to shake them off or to restrain them. He pleaded innocence and took credit for saving the life of Campbell.⁷⁵

The Trial

Even before Taylor was sent to secure confessional disclosures from the Raja the Resident with the approval of the Government of India had decided to try the Raja under a military commission, treating him as dependent of the British and not of the Nizam.⁷⁶ Accordingly on 28th April 1858 a Military Court constituted under the authority of the Resident commenced its proceedings against the Raja. The Court comprised Brigadier William Hill, commandant of Hyderabad Contingent as President, Maj. Charles Burton as Judge Advocate conducting the proceedings, Lt. H.C.Wright as Interpreter and four other military officers. It examined five prosecution witnesses, viz. Capt. Campbell, Divan Bhimrao, Chainsing, a chhaprazi with Capt. Campbell, Balwantrao a jamadar sent by the Raja to Campbell and Mankoji Monar, a jamadar of Mysore Horse which arrived with Capt. Newberry. The Raja was allowed to examine Capt. Campbell, Divan Bhimrao

and Lengappa daftardar (who actually wrote the notes of hand for raising Rohilla and Arab troops). The Raja submitted his own defence. The trial ended on 7th May 1858, when the Court delivered its judgement holding the Raja guilty of the charge of revolting against the British Government and sentencing him to transportation for life.⁷⁷

The Suicide

While the Raja was being conducted to Chingleput (in Madras Presidency) to serve his sentence at the first camp itself during the journey, on 11th May 1858, the Raja found an opportunity to put an end to his life. Lt. Picket, the officer in charge, had hung his belt with its loaded revolver over a chair and was sleeping in his bungalow. He came running on hearing a shot, found the Raja lying on the ground quite dead. The bullet had entered his stomach and passed through the spine. Lt. Picket was courtmartialled for his carelessness but sentenced only to be reprimanded.⁷⁸

The Raja's role in the 'Revolt'

The above is a bare narration of events as they took place. It is possible to embellish it and present the account as a struggle for freedom by the Surapur Raja. But one might do so only after ascertaining the Raja's motives and determining the true nature of his actions. At the outset it is quite clear that the only allegation which the Military Court could prove convincingly against the Raja was that between 29th December 1857 and 7th February 1858 he had collected a number of mercenaries. His own notes of hand and his confession were there to prove it. The Raja's defence was that the Rohilla Chiefs had managed to procure

the notes while he was in a drunken state. His plea was not, accepted, since for purposes of law it made no difference and also because he had not disclosed these facts to Campbell till it became absolutely necessary. In his talks with Meadows Taylor the Raja had confessed that he had been exhorted by the various native chiefs in Southern Maharashtra and northern Karnatak to join their general plan of rebellion against the British. But then he also persistently pleaded that he was misled by evil-minded people and had no hostile designs against the British. He repeatedly stated that in collecting the troops he acted from the fear of possible annexation of his state. If one were to judge the Raja's motives from his actions his defence seems acceptable. When Lt. R.N. Taylor, Deputy Commissioner of Raichur Doab asked him to dismiss his troops, he requested passes for them. He was instructed to dismiss his diwan Keshav Rao and appoint another; he did so and appointed Bhimrao in his place. His fort had no military preparations whatsoever. Campbell could not connect him with either Mahipal Sing or any deputy to Nana-saheb. Throughout he expressed an anxiety for Campbell's safety and saw to it as far as he could. He tried to dismiss his mercenaries but had no money to pay them off. He shed tears before Campbell while confessing to collection of troops. He was in his palace when hostilities commenced and refused to go out to the place of action despite the exhortations of his people. He trembled like a leaf when he heard of Capt. Newberry's death, decided to flee from his town and ultimately surrendered himself to the British. Throughout his trial he repeatedly and vehemently denied the charges brought against him. None

of these actions appear to be those of a person hatching a plan to free himself from British domination. And most of these actions were testified to by the prosecution witnesses themselves. Neither his conduct, ever since Campbell was deputed for enquiry, nor his proclamations were ever those of a man who had deliberately tried to rise against the British. Was the Raja then playing a game of duplicity, outwardly professing allegiance to the British while secretly encouraging his people to rise against them? If that were so, the Raja would not have fled from his capital and surrendered himself at Hyderabad. He possessed neither the shrewdness nor the ability to play such a difficult game. All in all, the Raja appears to have been ^{more} a victim of circumstances, than anything else. Powerless to control his people and utterly incapable of leading them, ultimately he was willy-nilly carried away by the strong tide of events. It may be noticed that the Judge Advocate, Maj. Charles, Burton himself admitted that, "it is in evidence that the Raja did what he could to keep under control the elements of mischief he had brought together and there is little doubt that his efforts restrained them from earlier action, and very probably saved the life of Capt. Campbell ... the Raja's youth ... renders him an easier prey to the designing and seditious spirits which have now so long been sowing the seeds of rebellion broadcast through the land". ^{78a} Another court, at other times, might have given the benefit of doubt and acquitted the Raja. But under the violently disturbed condition of India then the British were determined to crush with a heavy hand anyone even remotely suspected of hostility against them. The military court's verdict was in keeping with what Resident Davidson had urged upon

the Supreme Government in his letter dated 3 February 1858:

"A severe example is absolutely necessary in the existing state of the country as the insolence and avowed hatred of these races to our power and country are openly proclaimed, and it will be seen by the present instance that they are ever ready to form the nucleus of the rebellion against the British Government. I have no hesitation in saying that conciliation and a temporizing policy hitherto adopted towards those lawless mercenaries will not have the same good result as the employment of coercion, and the fear of being crushed and suppressed by actual force, whenever they dare even to show a sign of rebellion towards British supremacy."⁷⁹ The Resident did not agree that the Raja acted from fear alone; he was sure that the Raja was all along hostile and was only watching his opportunity to openly⁸⁰ declare himself against the British. If this were true are we to presume that such an opportunity was lacking? Those Indian chiefs who had planned to proclaim themselves against the British did so, openly and at the earliest, even when they were inadequately prepared. If the Surapur chief was merely looking for an occasion to declare his belligerence, then Capt. Campbell's arrival, or Capt. Wyndham's march were sufficient provocation. We must, therefore, conclude that the Resident's opinion was influenced more by the temper of the times than by an objective view of the situation. He was a party to the then British policy of dealing with rebels in India.

Surapur Raja and the Karnatak historians

While the British Government dealt with the Raja as a rebel, there have been attempts to depict him as a hero

in the struggle for Indian independence. If late V.D. Savarkar assigned such a role to the Surapur Raja it is not only understandable but justifiable as well. Savarkar's avowed purpose was to use history as a handmaid for political aims. His object in narrating the events of 1857-8 was to incite Indian youth to free themselves from British rule through armed struggle, not to present an objective account of the Great Revolt. More sober and dispassionate history could be expected after independence. And yet Dr. M.V. Krishna Rao and Prof. G.S. Halappa, editors of the first volume of History of Freedom Movement in Karnataka choose to write about the Surapur Raja ... "his heart was filled with a longing to extricate his country from the clutches of the foreigners. He became aware of the widespread and growing discontent among the people against the foreign intruder all over India, and he decided to stake his all for the freedom of his own land. So he began to enlist Arabs, Rohillas and others in his army. ... An envoy came from Nana Sahib for confabulations, and envoys from Surapur went to the Nana ... all these things roused the young prince to action, for he was now sure of succeeding in his attempt". In their haste to endow the Raja with the halo of a hero, the learned historians have conveniently brushed aside all the evidence quoted by themselves towards the end of the volume, where they state, "Meadows Taylor tried to make out that Venkatappa Naik remained loyal to the British to the end and that he had been sadly misguided by evil-minded advisers. Many of these papers tend to confirm that impression but it is very difficult to believe this version of his character, especially in view of the fact that he told Taylor plainly

during an interview that he would never betray his comrades in the insurrection; and he preferred to kill himself rather than suffer the humiliation of four years in prison".⁸³ As a matter of fact whatever papers have been quoted by them leads one to the conclusion that the Raja was an unfortunate victim of circumstances beyond his control. But the editors have not quoted all the papers bearing continuous numbers. The documents ignored by them further denude of the Raja of any desire for freedom. Had the editors cared to look into the remaining connected papers they would have come across Capt. Campbell's report that the Raja was more interested in his male and female senana and in shikar than⁸⁴ in the management of his affairs; Capt. Meadows Taylor's reports wherein the Raja had given a long list of persons⁸⁵ who were inciting him to revolt; the results of Campbell's enquiry which showed that the Raja never sent any envoy to⁸⁶ Nana Saheb, nor received one from him. Of course it is possible to discredit the entire materials on the ground that they are from British sources. But it would not be fair to do so since they were the results of minute enquiries conducted on the spot and submitted to the government for necessary action. Contemporary recorded evidence cannot be brushed aside in such a cavalier manner. Not only the editors have ignored these papers without any valid ground; they have also given their own version which does not conform to the documents consulted by them and bristles with in-⁸⁷accuracies, besides being full of quotations irrelevant to the point at issue, viz. the Raja's role. Most surprising of all, while continuously harping on the Raja's intense desire for freedom, which in reality was non-existent, the learned historians infer that the Raja would have easily

given up that desire had Meadows Taylor been sent for
negotiations ! ⁸⁸ These contradictions and inaccuracies
further detract from whatever merit there might be in
their attempt to dress up the Raja with a mantle of
martyrdom which does not fit him at all. As we have seen
before, like Louis, XVI at Paris or Bahadur Shah Zafar at
Delhi, Raja Venkatappa was more a victim of circumstances
beyond his control than an ardent fighter for freedom.

Significance of Surapur Events

While the Surapur Raja never seriously meant to
overthrow the British allegiance, the same cannot be said
of the people of Surapur. The mutiny at Meerut and the
rising of Nana Sahib at Kanpur certainly sent its
reverberations through the Southern Maratha and northern
Karnatak country. Juth, Jamkhindi, Jambgi, Koppal,
Mundargi, Margund, Kolhapur, Miraj - in fact, a number of
southern Maratha states as they were called had a general
plan of insurrection into which fitted the events at
Surapur. However vague and ill-organised there is no
doubt that in many of these places plots and schemes were
being hatched either with or without the knowledge of their
chiefs and Surapur figured in many of them. ⁸⁹ The rebels
took the Surapur Raja for granted though he was un-
willingly dragged into their schemes. But the brave Bedars
were determined to stand by their chief. When Capt. Campbell
was sent for enquiry they felt certain that he had come
for annexation, and prepared or not, they decided to
oppose him. As we have seen before the Arabs and
Rohillas in the Nizam's domains were always ready to

join up any disturbances. With their help the Bedars resolved to rise in support of their lukewarm chief. Probably they were more inspired by their feudal loyalties than by patriotic fervour as it is understood now. Unfortunately these brave people had no proper leader nor were they adequately prepared for a clash of arms with the disciplined and mighty British forces. In spite of this, the events at Surapur kept the British in a state of alarm throughout 1858. Capt. Meadows Taylor reviewed and realized their true import better than Karnatak historians when he reported: "The Bedars had been actively engaged in insurrection and corrupted by the lawless spirit which infested the country. Many of their petty leaders were bold, unscrupulous men who on any pretext or provocation would have risen in arms again to their own destruction; and had this occurred there is little doubt that such an insurrection would not only have proved locally embarrassing but would have spread to the Raichur Doab, south Maharashtra and Nizam's frontiers on the Bhima where some of the Surapur Bedars had already fled and were sending taunting messages to their friends in Surapur on their quiescence. From April 1858 to the end of the year chiefs and sections of the Bedars were solicited to take up arms by Bedars of south Maharashtra and those in Hyderabad in league with the Rohillas and locally when in November 1858 a rising was projected a few⁹⁰ men actually assembled in arms". Luckily for the British there was no stir among the main body of Bedars in Surapur and Capt. Taylor could easily disarm them, literally as well as figuratively, by taking pledges for maintaining peace when the principality was sequestered by the British.

Notes and References:

1. 6th day in brighter fortnight in Ashwin, Fasli 1244. FPC, 9 May 1851, No.54. Raja Kristappa's second wife Lachehamma also gave birth to a son later but Rani Ishwaramma had no other issues. FPC, 22 Sep.1849, No.102.
2. She told so to Gresley (FPC, 30 Nov.1842, No.197) and Taylor privately believed that her fear was justified. Letter to Reeve, No.27.
3. FPC, 14 Sept.1842, No.48.
4. FPC, 24 May 1843, No.59.
5. FPC, 9 Mar.1844, Nos.89-95, T. to F. 18 Jan.1844, para 32; FPC, 23 May 1845, No.144; FPC, 22 Aug.1846, Nos.97-8; FPC, 31 Dec.1847, No.634, paras 27-8; FPC, 9 May 1851, No.54, paras 73-88.
6. FPC, 7 Apr.1848, No.262.
7. FPC, 5 July 1843, No.23.
8. FPC, 23 May 1845, Nos.127 and 135.
9. Idem, No.144. All the ceremonies at which large amounts were spent from public treasury have been briefly mentioned in official letters. Detailed and graphic descriptions are available in Story (pp.158-9, 192, 202-3).
10. Taylor was trying to get them from the industrial school run at Jabalpur by Thagi-Dacoity Dept. in return for maintenance charges of some criminals. FPC, 6 June 1851, No.216.
11. From the depositions of some witnesses, during the trial of an imposter we learn that an athlete used to teach the Raja physical exercises and that he was very fond of hog-hunting. Shikar was, of course, in his blood. It would appear that he knew something of precious stones too. FPP, A, Dec.1869, Nos.11-3.
12. FPC, 22 Aug.1846, No.97, and 31 Dec.1847, No.634. The dramatic scene in Story (pp.238-41) describing the Rani's dislike of her son on account of his bad horoscope appears to belong to the realm of historical romance. Taylor had a weakness for astrology. Other references to the young Raja till that point in the Story appear to be reliable.
13. FPC, 9 May 1851, No.54, paras 73-88.
14. FPC, 23 Jan.1852, No.164, T. to F. Oct. 1851.
15. Idem., F. to T., 7 Oct. 1851.
16. Idem., T. to F., Oct. 1851.

17. Idem., F.to T., 23 Oct.1851.
18. Idem., No. 163. 19. Idem., No.168.
20. FPC, 19 Mar.1852, No.109.
21. FPC, 30 Apr.1852, No.174.
22. FPC, 20 Aug.1852, Nos.72-4 and K.W. (Underlining mine).
23. FPC, 8 Oct.1852, Nos.88-90.
24. FPC, 7 Dec.1852, Nos.104-11.
25. Idem., Nos.112-4. 26. Idem., Nos.104-11.
27. PLFC, 24 Nov.1852, paras 36-7.
28. FPC, 4 Mar.1853, Nos. 195-7.
29. It must be noted, however, that neither the Court nor the Govt. of India had specifically mentioned Taylor though he was the obvious choice.
30. "The Office of Political Agent is one of embassy and agency. He conducts necessary negotiations between that State and the British Government. He affords assistance, protection and advice when necessary". FPC, 15 Apr.1853, Nos.57-8.
31. Idem., Taylor's allowances would be Hyderabad Rs.1815. The Raja was also required to pay escort and establishment charges.of the agency. All told he would have had to pay more than half a lakh.
32. Idem., Nos.59-60; FPC, 10 June 1853, Nos.108-11.
33. PLFC, 12 April 1854, paras 30-31.
34. Story, pp.279-81.
35. FPC, 12 Aug.1853, Nos. 88-91. Taylor was offered a jagir worth Rs.1,000 p.a., by the Raja but was forbidden from acceptance by the Company's strict rules reiterated by Lord Dalhousie. Even a pair of shawls presented by the Raja to him were auctioned by the Residency and the amount credited to the Company's treasury. Idem., FPC, 12 Aug.1853, Nos.88-91 and 16 Sep.1853, No.56.
36. Paras 10-11
37. Hampton to Capt. Thornhill, 9 Sept. 1854; Campbell to Davidson, 11 Jan., 27 Jan., 16 Feb., 24 Mar., 1855. FPC, 22 June 1855, Nos.77-9.
38. FPP, A, June 1860, No.420.
39. The actual revenue from these jagirs was Hyd.Rs.70,350. FPP, Part A, July 1860, No.556, para 9.

40. FPP, A, Dec.1860, Nos.597-8; Finance,A, Progs. Oct.1862, Nos.10-12.
41. Actually only the woodwork of the house was removed. The house itself was dilapidated. Taylor to Thornhill, 2 June 1858, FPP, Part A, July 1860, Nos. 556-69.
42. Campbell entirely disbelieved the Raja's or yakil's defence. Campbell to Davidson, 27 Jan., 16 Feb., 1855. FPC, 22 June 1855, Nos.77-9.
43. Davidson to Campbell, 12 April 1855, FPC, 22 June 1855, Nos.77-9.
44. Idem., Campbell to Davidson, 24 Mar.1855.
45. PLFC, 20 Feb.1856, paras 45.
46. FPC, 4 July 1856, No. 64 & K.W.
47. FPC, 28 Aug.1857, No.82. 48. PLFC, 20 May 1857.
49. Perhaps the other side of the story might be available in a Kanada chronicle by one Keshvayya Purushakari. I have not been able to check it up. Moreover: contemporary correspondence is more reliable than a courtier's poetic composition.
50. FPC, 9 May 1851, No.54 and FPC, 7 Dec.1852, Nos.104-11.
51. Maj.Hampton's Report, FPC, 22 June 1855, Nos.77-9.
52. Yenkappa Jellapalli, Bhimrao, Ramraj, Keshavrao Khasanchi, all in a period of about 1½ years. It appears that Bhimrao ultimately regained his office.
53. Idem., Resdt. Bushby to Govt. of India, 12 April 1855.
54. FPC, 9 May 1851, No.54.
55. Maj.Hampton's report, FPC, 22 June 1855, Nos.77-9.
56. Idem., Campbell to Davidson, 16 Feb. 1855.
57. FPC, 4 July 1856, No.64 & K.W.
- 57a. FPSP, 30 Dec.1859, Nos.135-215. These contain most of the relevant documents on the rising in Surapur. Some of these have been printed or quoted in extenso in HFMK, Vol.I, but without any reference numbers. It is surprising that the editors of the volume should have spent considerable amount of foreign exchange to procure only a minor portion of them in microfilm from the India Office Library, London and a good deal of labour on transcription when all the papers were readily available at the National Archives of India, New Delhi.

58. W.A.Goldfinch, Sholapore Magistrate to Hyderabad Resdt., 22 Aug. 1857 and Hyd. Resdt. to Bombay Govt., 25 Sept. 1857, FPC, 20 Oct.1857, Nos.137-46.
59. R.N.Taylor to Thornhill, 9 Sept.1857, Idem.
60. FSC, 28 May 1858, Nos.344-6. Dr. S.N.Sen has dismissed the entire statement of the Bawa as a cock and bull sto "Eighteen Fifty Seven," p. 401.
61. FPC, 2 Oct.1857, Nos.137-46.
62. Idem. Bombay Govt. to Hyd. Resdt., 25 Aug.1857.
63. Idem. Davidson to Govt. of India, 12 Sept.1857. The date has been wrongly given as 12th Aug. in HFMK.Vol.I. p.235.
64. Idem. Govt. of India to Hyd. Resdt., 30 Sept.1857.
65. HFMK.Vol.I., pp.236-8.
66. ^{Idem.} ~~HFMK.Vol.I.~~, pp.238-9.
67. Idem., pp.240-2; FPSP, 30 Dec.1859, Nos.145-6, 149, 151-2.
68. HFMK, Vol.I. p.242; FPSP. 30 Dec.1859, Nos.155, 157.
69. HFMK. Vol.I, p.242; FPSP, 30 Dec.1859, No.153.
70. HFMK. Vol.I. pp.242-5; FPSP, 30 Dec.1859, Nos.156, 158, 160; FSC, 26 Feb. 1858, Nos.212, 254 and 26 Mar.1858, Nos. 195-6.
71. HFMK. Vol.I. p. 243; FPSP, 30 Dec.1859, No.167.
72. FPSP, 30 Dec.1859, Nos.166, 168-71; FPC, 16 Apr.1858, No.86 The brief account in HFMK.I, p.247, contains many errors. There was no surprise attack at night, nor did it continue till morning. Capt. Wyndham was aware of hostile preparations, the attack started in the evening, and ceased at midnight. Betrayal by Waghingheri Bhimrao and ill-treatment of Rani Rangamma are figments of editorial imagination.
73. FPSP, 30 Dec.1859, Nos.174, 176. Contrast HFMK,I, pp.247-8, in which the editors state that the Raja left for Maldurg with diwan Bhimrao and a party of Bedars.
74. Idem. No.176; FSC, 26 Feb.1858, Nos.198-200; FSC, 26 Mar. 1858, No.269. Contrast the statement in HFMK,I, p.248 that the Raja went to Hyderabad to recruit Arabs and Rehillas.
75. Idem. Nos.182-4. The editors of HFMK,I, have altogether overlooked these papers and are misled by the people but entirely false speech put into the Raja's mouth in Story, pp.403-5.
76. Idem., Nos. 178, 180.

77. Idem. Nos. 187-9; HFMK, I, pp. 484-520. On the same page (254) after having quoted the Military Court's sentence of transportation of life the editors state that the Resident reduced the sentence of death (!) to transportation for life and that the Viceroy commuted it to 4 years imprisonment. The trial papers reached the Governor-General on the day the Raja committed suicide viz. 11th May 1858 and hence there could be no such commutation as is imagined by the editors or wrongly reported by Taylor in Story (p. 414). Nor did the Resident have any powers in that respect.
78. ^FPLSS, 24 June 1861, No. 83A. 78a. HFMK, I, p. 506.
79. Idem, p. 245. 80. Idem, p. 244.
81. Athrashe Sattavanache Swantrivasamar (History of War of Independence in 1857), pp. 396-7. This history, originally in Marathi, was translated into English owing to printing difficulties while Savarkar was in Europe. The original Marathi version could be published only in 1965.
82. HFMK, I, p. 235. 83. Idem, p. 485.
84. FPSP, 30 Dec. 1859, No. 149. 85. Idem, Nos. 182-4.
86. Idem, No. 149.
87. Some of these have already been printed in earlier notes.
88. HFMK, I, p. 246.
89. Accounts of these are now available in Sources for History of Freedom Movement, Vol. I (published by Bombay Government). In view of these one cannot agree with Col. Malleeson that the rising in Surapur was "the only serious attempt made to disturb the tranquillity of the Deccan". History of the Indian Mutiny, Kaye and Malleeson, Vol. V, p. 88.
90. FDP, A, June 1860, No. 420.

CHAPTER VI

SURAPUR UNDER SEQUESTRATION



The Nizam's Claim Refuted

As the Raja of Surapur was found guilty of having risen in rebellion his principality was confiscated by the British in consequence. What is noteworthy is that the Government of India did not wait for the legal nicety of a formal verdict by the military court to convey their decision on Surapur. While the verdict was intimated to them on 11th May 1858 they had already ordered on 1st April 1858 that the principality should revert to the Nizam and that the British Government should have in it only such share or claim as agreed to by the Nizam in 1842 in accordance with the settlement effected by Capt. Gresley. They believed the claim to be worth Rs.3½ lakhs; the Nizam could either cede equivalent territory or add the amount in their accounts with him.¹ However, their instructions were based not on Gresley's report, of the details of which they were not yet fully aware but on the faulty memo of Capt. Thornhill (1st Assistant to the Resident at Hyderabad).² They imagined that the British claim to Surapur emanated from their being representative of the Peshwa and that the Nizam had agreed as such to this claim in 1842. In normal conditions it would be hard to understand how any government could claim to represent another de facto government extinguished by themselves 40 years before. At best the British Government could regard itself as the successor government of the Peshwa. But busy as they were in suppressing mutinies and



revolts in several parts of India they could not have had time enough to be punctilious in their language or precise in their understanding. It would appear that the Hyderabad Government was better informed of their position and hence advanced no claims to Surapur, at least officially.

It is not surprising if Resident Davidson misinterpreted such vaguely worded instructions. He construed them to mean that the Nizam had an equal share in Surapur and advanced several arguments for not admitting such a claim. He pointed out that by accepting Gresley's arrangement the Nizam had limited his claim on Surapur to annual payment of Rs. 40,000 in lieu of Andola-Nilogi to be paid through the British treasury. He had also thereby acknowledged British right of arbitration between Surapur and his State, and by implication British supremacy so far as Surapur was concerned. With the accession of Venkatappa IV in August 1842 the Nizam had ceased to levy nasrana from Surapur, the definite mark of vassalage, nor had he interfered with the management of the principality ever since. Besides this theoretical inadmissibility of the Nizam's claim, there were practical considerations. The Bedars had never accepted the Nizam's authority in the past without coercive measures. If the territory were transferred to the Nizam, they were likely to create disturbances, not only in Hyderabad's domains but in the adjoining British regions as well. On the other hand they had quietly accepted British management since 1842 and were doing so even now. To maintain peace it was advisable to exercise the now legitimately acquired right to annex Surapur. Lastly the Arab mercenaries in Hyderabad had aided the Raja in his revolt and though the Hyderabad Government had proscribed

their recruitment it was powerless to enforce its orders. If in spite of all this the Nizam's claim was to be admitted it was more advantageous to pay him annually Rs.3³/₄ lakhs for it than to partition Surapur.

The Government of India took nearly 2 years to look into the Resident's arguments, Gresley's report and the connected correspondence in 1842; after having seen it, it accepted the Resident's views and added some of its own arguments to assert its exclusive supremacy over Surapur. Though by the 17th article of the Treaty of 1800 the British had acknowledged Surapur to be Nizam's tributary at the time the fact that it was also a feudatory of the Peshwa was overlooked by them. By succeeding to the rights of the Peshwa the British had acquired joint supremacy over the principality in 1823.⁴ After 1842 it had exercised exclusive de facto supremacy which the Nizam had accepted and tacitly confirmed of late by letting the British try the Raja for treason. Moreover the Court of Directors by threatening the Raja with permanent British annexation in case of⁵ maladministration had implicitly asserted the same right.

All this argumentation and assertions were merely of academic value. It helped the Government of India to modify its own immediate instructions. But in reality the Nizam advanced no claim and the forfeited principality remained in exclusive British possession till it was gifted away to the Nizam. It must be noted that the Secretary of State entirely agreed with the Government of India but remarked that delay of 2 years in announcing the decision⁶ was excessive and unexplained.

Surapur under Military Occupation and the Question of
Prize Property

On 9th February 1858 the combined British forces occupied Surapur town without any resistance as it had already been evacuated by the Raja, the mercenaries as well as his other armed forces. Thereupon Capt. Campbell was immediately directed to assume temporary administration of the principality with aid from Yenkappa Jellapalli and ⁷diwan Bhimrao who agreed to help. Capt. Meadows Taylor, who had been just relieved from the charge of North Berar was called to Hyderabad so that he could take over regular ⁸administration of Surapur as soon as possible. Pending his arrival the town and principality remained under British military occupation with Capt. Campbell in charge. People gradually began to return to the town. On 3rd March Campbell was ordered to issue a proclamation inviting the populace to follow their peaceful occupations and to declare general ⁹amnesty.

Meanwhile the deserted town was ruthlessly plundered by the occupation army. Not a house escaped; all valuables, and any article that merely gave the appearance of being precious was seized. Household property was indiscriminately looted and even children's toy guns or daggers were not spared. Not only the ornaments and articles used in worship but even the very idols at the Gopalswami temple at Surapur were taken away. A number of State records got either ¹⁰destroyed or scattered. Everything that was seized or returned by soldiers was declared as prize. A prize committee was formed with Capt. A. Wyndham as its President. Lt. Col. Malcolm immediately informed the Resident that all

property seized at Surapur would be regarded as prize.¹¹
When the Resident sought clarification from the Government of India he was informed that in the Governor General's opinion all property seized in Surapur 'fort' should be regarded as prize but the decision rested with the Crown.¹²
As the property seized was not from Surapur 'fort' as such this opinion was of not real practical use.

The cupidity of the Prize Committee knew no bounds. Lt. Col. Malcolm demanded that Capt. Taylor should be directed to hand over all personal property of the Raja. It must be noted that the British army had met with no resistance after it occupied Surapur and started sacking it. On Taylor's arrival on 1st April 1858 he and Capt. Wyndham agreed that property recovered or brought to each should be held in their respective charge, but that Taylor should supply lists and later the articles themselves if they were declared as prize. Claims of the Prize Committee extended to arms, jewels, horses, elephants, cattle, chandeliers and mirrors in Surapur palace, in short every movable item that was supposed to belong to the Raja. His personal jewellery which was taken away from him while he was confined at Hyderabad was also included in the list. The Committee went so far as to claim the jewels of the Ranis saying that the Ranis were allowed to keep them on condition that they would surrender them if declared as prize. Lt. Col. Malcolm's plea was that the jewels of the ladies of Amirs of Sind had been taken as prize on British conquest of that province, whereas Capt. Wyndham claimed temple jewellery on the ground that it used to be pledged by the Raja for long periods for the secular purpose of raising money.¹³ However, the idols in the Gopalswami temple were returned with some

silver chains etc. to the brahmin priests in charge.

When Resident Davidson sought clarification whether the Raja of Wanparti had a share in the horses of the Surapur Raja seized in Hyderabad region with his help, the Government of India ignored his specific question but gave a general ruling as to what was 'prize'. All horses and other property of the Surapur principality even if captured after the Raja's flight was prize. The jewels of the Ranis, temple idols and their ornaments, grain etc. either belonging to individuals or religious trusts was not prize. Similarly property of private individuals taken after the declaration of amnesty was to be returned to them. In spite of this ruling it was not easy to categorize the numerous articles. The Ranis got back their private jewellery and were also allowed to retain a few articles as souvenirs of the Raja. The Resident felt that horses and other property captured beyond the boundary of Surapur principality were not prize but the Government of India disagreed and stated that if these belonged to the State they were so. In fact except the temple property all the other disputed items were declared by the Government of India as prize. The Prize Committee took a long time to cash the articles seized by it and its accounts could not be closed during the period¹⁴ when Surapur remained under British rule.

Taylor's Second Administration

Taylor assumed the civil administration of the principality as Deputy Commissioner (2nd class) on 1st April 1858.¹⁵ It would be unfair to compare his second administration with his first one which had proved so

beneficent to the principality. Then he was in the pink of health and at the peak of his powers. It was not now possible for him physically to achieve results similar to those accomplished in the first flush of youthful vigour and enthusiasm. He had then a long spell in which he could work out his schemes and ideas. Now the fate of the principality itself was uncertain. The time at his disposal was too short to achieve anything substantial. He could at best commence some measures of improvement leaving the future to take care of itself. His second administration thus suffers in comparison for which he must not be blamed.

Restoration of Law and Order

One of the urgent tasks before him was to restore law and order. It had already been facilitated by the declaration of amnesty. The inhabitants were rapidly settling down to their legitimate occupations. "We need anticipate no serious difficulty in ensuring the peace of the country", wrote the Resident.¹⁶ Immediately on arrival, Taylor repeated his former measure during his first administration of securing written agreements regarding future good behaviour from the Bedar headmen who executed them without the slightest demur.¹⁷ The entire population was disarmed; it was notified that anyone bearing arms publicly would be fined or otherwise punished and the arms confiscated in future. All the guns were broken up, the metal sold by the Prize Committee and sale proceeds credited to its account. The manufacture and sale of gunpowder and brimstone even for fireworks was banned. Saltpetre could be exported only under license from Taylor. Nightly vigil by villages was already in existence. This was now insisted upon particularly in villages bordering the Nizam's territory on the Bhima, which

was lawless. Twelve persons accused of having aided the Raja in his so-called rebellion were tried and convicted.¹⁸ Taylor suggested permanent stationing of an exclusive European Company (hundred men), 50 cavalry and 200 native infantry under European command and 2 guns with proportionate¹⁹ artillerymen. The suggestion appears to have been accepted.

Civil Administration

The Resident's immediate instructions to Taylor were to follow the same administrative system as during²⁰ his former management making as few changes as possible. Taylor's original proposals for civil establishment were considered as too high by the Resident and he severely limited his expenses on salary of the staff to 1/10th of the estimated net land revenue, the norm laid down by the Government of India for the Assigned Districts. Taylor was repeatedly required to revise his proposed schedules of establishment so that the final amount to be spent on staff for collecting revenue, keeping accounts, and maintaining law and order was reduced to Rs.17,256, the estimated net land revenue being Rs. 1,74,378. Taylor's justification for increased establishment was on the basis of revenue from lagirs which the Resident saw no reason to include as these were not to be attached till the Government of India's orders were received. He was however, permitted to spend Rs.2,328 per year on the personnel of the medical, education and public works departments in addition to the civil establishment. Including Taylor's own monthly salary of Rs. 1200 + Rs.500 deputation allowance and Rs. 250 of that²¹ of his Extra Assistant Deputy Commissioner, Sitaram Rao,

the percentage on net land revenue worked out to 18 $\frac{1}{4}$ %²².
A reason, though not so mentioned, for the Resident's rigidity in cutting down the establishment, might be that Taylor found the Surapur treasury empty on assuming administration. The Resident had to borrow a lakh of rupees at 5% interest from a Hyderabad banker for current expenses. Out of these he paid off Rs. 40,000 annually due to the Nizam's Government on account of Andola-Nilogi, so that only Rs. 60,000 were available to Taylor to run the administration till revenue collections could be²³ started.

The Government of India took long to sanction even this small establishment. Meanwhile Taylor had divided the principality into 2 taluqs and put Extra Assistant Deputy Commissioner Sitaram Rao in charge of one of them viz. Surapur. The other taluq headquarter was at Ijeri (in Andola taluq) but Taylor was not permitted to spend any money for building it. Instead, he was asked to utilize any available structure temporarily. His establishment charges were also temporarily sanctioned and he was allowed to engage a few more policemen than proposed in the final²⁴ schedule of establishment. While according final sanction the Government of India observed that staff for policing a²⁵ region comprising 3200 square miles and collecting revenue thereof appeared to be so inadequate as to be inefficient. They would agree to more personnel if asked for. The Government of India also pointed out that though the lagirdars might be enjoying revenue from their lagirs the charge of managing the whole region fell on the Government²⁶ and thus increased the cost of establishment. But this liberal attitude on their part was made known to the Resident

so late as not to be of much use except for the few last months during the British administration of Surapur.

Revenue Administration and Expenditure

Taylor was not empowered to make any change in the basic structure of revenue administration. He could increase the state revenues only by systematising the administration, keeping regular accounts, removing laxity in collections by patwaris and in remittances to the State treasury. His report for 1858-59 shows a gross revenue of Company's Rs. 5,63,989.3.10 and a gross expenditure on all heads of Rs. 509,708.2.3. Thus he could show a surplus of Rs. 54,281.1.7 which was partly applied for returning the loan advanced by the Residency and the rest retained for current expenditure. He encouraged the cultivation of oilseeds and continued his experiments with cotton commenced during his previous administration. He obtained fresh cottonseed from Berar and Dharwar and produce from this New Orleans variety of seed was highly commended by Messrs Robert Strong & Co., prominent cotton exporters of Bombay. He offered 10 years kowl at lower rates for ryats who proposed to repair old wells and even 20 years kowl to those who would dig new ones. But as the ryats were not sure that British administration would continue not many persons came forward to cultivate waste lands. Almost half the khalsa lands though arable remained fallow. Even with the inadequate staff he managed to register in the Revenue Department all the holdings of the ryats but was not sure of the returns. "None of the returns obtainable in Shorapore represent the actual holdings and it is notorious that all ryats and especially all enamdars hold land,

largely in excess of what they own or are entitled to". Within the brief period of his administration he was neither empowered nor was it possible to carry out any regular, detailed survey or settlement. The bewildering varieties of land tenure continued as before and though he considered that the rate of assessment was lower than in Raichur Doab despite the better quality of soil and products in Surapur it could not be changed. All the same Taylor carried out a census of population, cattle, houses and wells in ²⁹ ~~khalsa~~ villages. He reassured the ryats of their tenures and removed illegal exactions and cesses. However, he appears to have tried to increase the State land revenue by reducing the number of traditional village shetsandis for which he had really no authority.

Among the other sources of revenue taxes on traders, baluti collections, salt and saltpetre, continued as before. Introduction of a tax on grazing was a new feature and it was farmed out for Rs. 4000 in Fasli 1269; so was the tax on arrack. The Town Fund for Surapur was also a new feature introduced at the suggestion of the Resident. It was not easy for Taylor to collect all dues exactly and punctually as in the lax administration of the late Raja people were accustomed to irregular and variable demands. But the contract for collecting sair and ahkari was auctioned at a much higher rate. Taylor abolished the tax on vegetables and betel-leaf.

There could not be much alteration in items of expenditure either. Endowments to temples and annual charitable grants to brahmins were continued as in the previous regime. Removal of the royal family did mean a saving in all items of expenditure connected with it. But

provision for the Ranis and the royal family's poor but near relatives and old dependents, had to be made. It does not appear that Taylor secured or was required to secure separate sanction for expenditure except that on establishment. Possibly so long as it did not exceed the income he appears to have had a free hand. The State revenues, however, were not enough to clear the debts incurred by the Raja or to pay off the arrears of pay of hereditary servants for which separate arrangements had to be made.

Clearance of Arrears of Hereditary Servants, Raja's Debts
³⁰
and Other Claims

As a result of the British takeover most of the hereditary servants of the State were thrown out of employment.³¹ During the Raja's administration they had faithfully carried out their routine duties, even though they did not get their allowances regularly. Now their condition became most pitiable. As the Resident had rigidly cut down Taylor's schedule of establishments very few of them could be re-employed. The remaining large number became not only jobless but destitute. Taylor gave some trifling relief in extreme cases of destitution and suggested small pensions for these hereditary servants. The Resident was prepared to consider grant of some subsistence. But when Taylor pointed out that the arrears of pay of these hereditary servants during the 5 years of the Raja's regime were estimated at Rs. 2,20,000 the idea of pension or subsistence allowance receded into the background and Taylor had to plead passionately for at least payment of these arrears. The Resident was not at

all prepared for so heavy a demand and suggested that it should be reduced. In the absence of allowances the servants must have got at least some daily ration or other means of existence, he thought. But the most careful enquiry revealed nothing of the kind. It is indeed a matter of great wonder how they had managed to survive. A few had hereditary lands, but could neither cultivate them themselves nor rent them out. They had lost even their household property during the sack of Surapur and could not think of living by distress sale of household articles either. Taylor insisted on full discharge of arrears of jobless servants while those re-employed could be paid half of their claims. The jobless ones could then take to cultivating their lands or rehabilitate themselves in other ways by using the arrears as capital. The question dragged on till the Government of India authorized the Resident to advance a loan of Rs. 2 lakhs at 6% interest from the military treasury at Lingsugur. The loan was to be utilized not only for clearing off the arrears of the hereditary and other servants but debts incurred by the Raja and all other claims against the State. Taylor had devised a plan to compound the claims. Though the Raja's gross debts ran into a huge sum³² thorough investigation reduced the actual amount to be paid since double charges, exorbitant interest, excessive rate of exchange, false claims and those without documentary proof got rejected. The settlement and adjustment took nearly 2 years; private creditors of the Raja preferred to have at least 7 annas in a rupee than nothing at all. Even the hereditary servants lost 4 to 6 annas in a rupee. All the same, with compounding of the claims, surplus revenue from

Surapur which Tayler managed to save, and loan from the Government of India, all arrears and claims were settled before the State was handed over to the Nizam.

33

Jagirs and Rent-free Lands

(a) General. - As soon as Tayler took over he began to compile a list of all jagirs in the principality so that a definite policy towards them could be formulated. If all of them were resumed and brought under direct British administration revenue could be substantially increased and mismanagement by jagirdars prevented. The jagirdars could be paid suitable cash stipends in lieu of their jagirs. The only exception to the general resumption would be a few jagirs held in lieu of stipends by some old, hereditary servants of the State and those given as endowments and charitable grants. However, as most of the jagirdars were the Raja's near relatives and looked upon their jagirs as much a mark of status as means of subsistence they would resent such a measure. Tayler, therefore, proposed to resume only those jagirs worth Rs. 70,350 freshly granted by the late Raja and to continue the rest whose estimated revenue was Rs. 1,10,000. Pending the Government's decision about this proposal, he sought permission to attach all the jagirs in the meanwhile. The Resident immediately negatived it and recommended that Taylor should only settle ^{with} the jagirdars the leviable amount and let them manage their jagirs under his supervision until final decision. Tayler informed that as in the past he would levy dharanatti and report on the actual amount later. Tayler proposed to resume the jagirs granted by the late Raja because he considered that these were granted

for unworthy or unnecessary purposes and because income from them was 'excessive' in proportion to the State resources. The latter reason is as fallacious as tendentious, the estimated revenue from ancient jagirs being much more than that from the later ones. One can discern in this reasoning an underlying tone of Taylor's hypercritical attitude towards the late Raja and all his doings. The Resident on the other hand was objectively reasonable. He considered that since the ancient jagirs were continued during former British management such jagirdars had earned a prescriptive right to retain them in accordance with their sansads. But the late Raja also had a right as much as his predecessors to grant jagirs. These should be continued for lifetime of the holders with the customary levy of dharapatti. Though the Government of India regarded this alienation of lands by way of jagirs as out of all proportion to the resources of the State they approved the Resident's proposals. But they ordered that every ancient jagirdar must produce his sansad the terms of which should be honoured. These orders arrived rather late. Meanwhile Taylor had completed his list of jagirs which³⁴ totalled upto 239 villages. Of these he resumed 58 jagir³⁵ villages, yielding a revenue of Hyderabad Rs. 70,838-4-5 and³⁶ the rest worth Hyderabad Rs. 86,130-11-9 were continued to the holders. Except the 2 villages granted to temples all the rest were subjected to dharapatti, which amounted to Rs. 16,699-11-4 in 1859. It was less than the full value of the tax but Taylor preferred to be lenient as the jagirdars had severely suffered in the previous regime. As there was no complete survey Taylor could only estimate that lands in jagir villages measured 4,95,470 bighas.

37

(b) Special Cases. - We had noticed earlier that the late Raja had resumed the jagirs of his cousins, the sons of Diwan Pid Naik and promised to pay them instead Rs. 900 p.m. in cash. The Court of Directors had directed the Resident to mediate between the Raja and his cousins. The latter now renewed their petition for restoration of their jagirs. Some of them had been granted by the late Raja to others, the remaining did not equal the value of the stipend. But since they were satisfied with these the Government of India authorised restoration warning that no other claims of this family should be entertained. They, however, rejected the petitions of some other relations of the Raja whose lands had been similarly resumed and assigned to others. The ground for rejection was that these relations could not produce titles while the new assignees could. Even though the resumption by the late Raja might have been unjust the Government of India would not take cognizance of jagirdars ousted by a previous regime.

38

(c) Ranis. - The jagirs held by the nine widows of the late Raja were again treated differently. Some of these were inherited by the Ranis while others were granted by the late Raja. The Ranis had incurred debts and according to Taylor were unable to realize the full revenue of their jagirs which amounted to Rs. 64,783-4-4. Most of them were ^{lapsed to the State} issueless and on that account their jagirs would have/after their death. Three of the Ranis were not married to the Raja in a regular manner. Taylor proposed to pay the eldest Rani Rangamma Rs. 10,000 per annum and annual allowances ranging from Rs. 1200 to 3,500 to the rest, the aggregate to all the nine Ranis amounting to Rs. 26,800 per year.

Though this amount appeared less than the value of their jagirs the Ranis could not have collected even this amount had they managed the jagirs themselves. Besides, Taylor deducted the stipends given to their relations and arranged to liquidate their debts by instalments. The Resident agreed with Taylor that the Ranis should not be allowed to enjoy a false position and empty vanity by retaining jagirs , but directed that their private debts should not be refunded by the State. The Government of India approved of the cash stipends to the Ranis in lieu of jagirs proposed by Taylor³⁹ much before passing their orders respecting other jagirs .

40

(d) Rent-free Lands of the Bedars. - The revenues of the principality were considerably decreased by the rent-free lands of the estimated value of Rs.1½ lakhs held by many classes of Bedars. In theory they were liable to military service in return for those lands, but in actual practice they had not been called upon to do so for several past decades. During Taylor's previous administration his proposal to register their lands had been dropped as force would have had to be employed against the Bedars who would have resisted the measure. The Government of India continued the policy of letting them alone as before on the recommendation of the Resident.

41

Introduction of the Company's Currency

42

Introduction of currency of its own is as much indicative of a country's sovereign power as of its economic strength. Taylor instinctively made use of this characteristic when he proposed to introduce the Company's rupee in the principality where it was never in use before, and during

a period when the final disposal of the territory was under consideration. Though Resident Davidson says in support of its introduction that the rupee in general use was that of Gadwal mint which had closed for some time, he does not substantiate this. In actual practice it would appear that the Hyderabad rupee⁴³ was more current than the Gadwal rupee. Davidson agreeing to the proposal in principle directed Taylor to clarify the date of introduction and the rate of exchange with local currency. Taylor had originally proposed 15½ the then prevailing market rate of exchange. But as demand for Company's rupees rose the exchange rate too increased to 18½ and was likely to rise higher. Taylor could not apply as suggested by the Resident, the conversion rates used in Hyderabad Assigned Districts, as these were not uniform. Though the Resident regarded the intrinsic value of the local currency as the right basis for fixing the exchange rate he felt that it might involve loss to the Government in fresh conversion of Government's claims into Company's rupees of local coins already assessed in the Company's treasury. As the Company's currency was unknown before there could be no average of exchange rates in the past for fixing it nor was the fluctuating market rate the right basis. Taylor wriggled out of the difficulty by insisting upon receiving only Company's rupees so far as payments to the Government were concerned. At the time of jamabandi the following year he decided upon 112 Hyderabad Rs. for 100 Company's rupees as the exchange rate in consultation with village patwaris.⁴⁴ Preparation of accounts, however, was thereby delayed in spite of employing extra hands for calculations.⁴⁵ Though the measure received the Government of India's sanction it must be observed that the introduction

of Company's currency was not formal, nor officially proclaimed but used only for receiving the Government's dues and for purposes of accounting. Whether it found general circulation and acceptance, say in trade, is not known.

Judicial Administration

Taylor announced his intention of following the judicial pattern in Hyderabad Assigned Districts. The actual judicial Department at Surapur comprised just 4 clerks, with different designations whose total salary did not exceed Rs. 62 p.m. and 3 menial employees with a total salary of Rs. 36 p.m.⁴⁶ In the tahsils revenue and judicial duties of the tahsildars were combined. Similarly in villages police patils were vested with magisterial authority, to order simple imprisonment for 4 days and fine upto Rs.2 for petty offences. They were to familiarise themselves with relevant rules in Naldurg District. Sitaramrao was afraid that they would abuse their power but Taylor was confident about them.

So far as civil suits were concerned the tahsildars dealt with cases involving upto Rs.300, the Extra Assistant Commissioner of those limited to Rs.1000, and the Deputy Commissioner cases above that sum. These courts started functioning from 1st October 1858. There were 42 suits for recovery of debts (total value Rs.16,655) of which only 9 could be disposed of within a year. There were 8 suits for hereditary offices which remained undecided. Procedure in these courts was the same as in Assigned Districts. A charge at the rate of 6 pies per gong for

issuing summons, executing decrees etc. was levied on each civil suit which helped to maintain two extra clerks in the tahsils. But stamp duty was not introduced, so the government had to bear the entire establishment charge. Taylor recommended its introduction; alternatively a percentage fee on suits could be charged. This would lead to lessening of vexatious litigation and more settlements out of court. It is surprising to learn that when the Deputy Commissioner used to be absent the Military Officer Commanding at Surapur was allowed the civil charge of the ⁴⁷ Sadr station at Surapur.

Taylor single-handedly dealt out what looks like common justice. However, he forwarded the trial proceedings to the Resident who in turn enquired from the Government of India the procedure to be followed and forwarded correspondence in 1848 which required the Resident to confirm death sentences passed by the panchayats. The Government of India replied that the Resident must confirm all death sentences before execution, but that no further reference to higher authorities was required. They clarified that rules in Hyderabad Assigned Districts regarding administration of criminal justice could not be applied to ⁴⁸ Surapur which was a confiscated territory. When Taylor conducted another murder case applying provisions of the (Indian) Penal Code, the Secretary of State remarked that, besides the Resident Taylor also ought to have been informed of the inapplicability of the Penal Code to Surapur. He advised the Government of India to reconsider their decision regarding confirmation of death sentences by the Resident, that is, suggested further reference to higher authorities. Neither the Secretary of State nor the

Government of India, however, cared to clarify what code was applicable to Surapur. The Secretary of State only remarked that the criminal court at Surapur resembled Political Criminal Court in Bombay Presidency and other parts of India, where such courts had been functioning well.⁴⁹

So far as administration of criminal justice was concerned, under Act XVI of 1857 the Resident issued the commission constituting the Deputy Commissioner as a Sessions Judge. He could pass sentences upto 7 years imprisonment but those above required the Resident's confirmation. Powers of the Extra Assistant Commissioner and the tahsildars were confined to passing sentences upto 6 months and 1 month of rigorous imprisonment and fines upto Rs.200 and Rs.20, respectively.⁵⁰

Crime statistics for the six month period from April to October 1858 which are available make interesting reading. There were: just one murder, one armed assault and four highway robberies. Number of thefts was 34, smaller crimes 29 and petty offences 126. Conceding that many small offences might have gone unnoticed in the irregular conditions prevailing immediately after British occupation the ratio of crimes to a population of 2,21,797 is surprisingly low.⁵¹

No sooner than Taylor took over he had to try a murder case. It was a crime passionnel on 19th March and proceedings started on 7th April 1858. The trial was conducted under Section 300 of the Penal Code prevailing in Hyderabad Assigned Districts. Taylor himself put questions to the witnesses, acquitted one of the accused who was falsely implicated and passed death sentence on

the murderer who had confessed his crime. There was
neither a jury nor any other judicial assistance.

⁵³
Police

To save the cost of establishment Resident Davidson had suggested that the Bedar militia who held rent-free lands could be formed into a police corps for Surapur township. When Tayler pointed out that they were suspected of being involved in the revolt, nor could any saving be effected as they would have to be paid customary daily allowances and rations if called upon to perform police duties, the idea was dropped. All the same Tayler did propose to induct some idle Bedars (not from the holders of rent-free lands) as town policemen for duties at the treasury, daftar, at the gates of Surapur and in his escort, and those formerly in the sibandi for duties at the frontiers. Originally the number proposed was 250 men at 5 Rs. p.m. each. These were to be paid out of a separate Town Fund, as suggested by the Resident (to be subscribed to by inhabitants of Surapur township). Taylor's experience showed him that more policemen were needed at the gates, and in some pettas of Surapur which were centres of trade and manufacture. The extra establishment costing more than Rs.3,000 was temporarily sanctioned by the Resident and approved by the Government of India. In addition to the town police for general policing of the entire region it was divided into 4 thanas covering 800 sq.miles each and costing Rs.8,352 per year. When the Resident insisted on reduction in establishment Taylor decided not to have a separate police department, as such, curtailed the number

of men, proposed to attach them to the tahsildar's office and have just 2 thanadars as subordinate assistants to the tahsildars. The pay of the thanadar being just Rs.20 p.m. the position did not attract qualified men and real police authority got vested in the tahsildar. The annual salary bill of police in tahsils was Rs.9300. The reduced establishment was temporarily sanctioned. The Government of India considered this strength too moderate for efficient functioning but their remark was received too late to have any effect on the police establishment during the brief British regime.

Taylor had also to reduce his original salary bill of Rs.160 p.m. to Rs. 105 p.m. for his 20 mounted police. He provided them with horses seized during the revolt on condition that they must replace the animals if these died. The Resident directed that the policemen must pay for them and the sale proceeds be given to the Prize Committee. Taylor boasts in his annual report for 1859 that on his arrival he organized village policemen on the pattern of his former Naldurg District. As a matter of fact rural police partly paid by baluti collections and partly through grant of lands was already in existence.

It appears from his report that he also posted extra policemen at Kundoli (on the road to Hyderabad), Naikal (opposite Yadgir), Ruddawagi (opposite Firozabad) and Nilinga, at an additional cost of Rs.566 for which he does not appear to have secured previous or even inso facto sanction. They were undoubtedly useful in checking plunder of fields by the Bedars on both sides of the river. Particularly on the northern frontier beyond the Bhima where

some Rehillas and others had been defying the Nizam's authority they could prevent the passage of armed mercenaries. The police on the frontiers along with those in the villages proved adequate when the rivers were full. But when these became fordable only partial vigilance was possible. It is surprising to find him recommend reduction in the rural police in spite of this. Possibly he wanted to resume their lands for the government. However, he did not agree with Sitaram Rao that mounted and frontier police could be reduced. He recommended instead merger of Surapur police with one of the adjoining districts of Hyderabad recently assigned to the British. The recommendation had no chance of even being considered as the principality was soon gifted away.

Public Works

From Tayler's schedule of establishments we learn that he proposed to spend Rs. 900 annually towards the salary of just 7 employees like mistries etc. in the public works department. Fifteen other persons in this department would be thrown out of employment but Tayler could not help it as the Resident had severely and rigidly restricted the total salary bill of establishment. This small staff was⁵⁵ to inspect the tanks, repair public buildings and the like. Rs 67,326 were spent in 1858-59 on public works, but these were really speaking military works such as quarters for European soldiers and officers and accommodation for military stores, guns etc. Tayler prided himself that the military works provided jobs as building labourers for destitute retainers of the Raja who had become unemployed. The only public works proper undertaken by him

were the roads. A mile-long road outside Surapur town towards Hyderabad and another within the town itself were constructed both fit for carriages. Contracts were also given for constructing roads leading up to the Krishna and Bhima rivers. Taylor's enthusiasm for irrigation works was not matched by the superior authorities. The available funds were spent mostly on military works. This did not deter him from putting his dreams on paper. "In the whole of my experience I know of no district of the Deccan more admirably adopted by nature for works of irrigation, whether by canals or large tanks". He not only urged the completion of the tanks at Kachaknur and Sirwal (commenced in 1851-2 but abandoned thereafter) and the repair of the anicut at Benkanhalli which had been breached by the floods, but also outlined the scheme for another anicut over the Krishna which could irrigate 700 sq. miles in Surapur region alone, and 2 crops a year would be possible. The produce would find easy market through the railway from Sholapur to Bellary which was then in blue-print stage. "It is seldom that a railway and apparently feasible irrigation project exist together". If he elaborated his projects it was only for record, fully aware that nothing would be sanctioned in the near future.

57

Medical and Education Departments

The small amounts proposed by Taylor for the staff of these departments (Medical-Rs.1188); (Education-Rs.20 p.m. for a single school teacher) were sanctioned by the Resident without demur. An apothecary, a couple of vaccinators, and a curious appointment 'leechman' at Rs.5 p.m. besides three menial servants comprised the 'Medical

Department'. The vernacular Marathi school at Surapur was expected to attract students from brahmin families. Taylor utilized the surplus money from the Town Fund to set up a school each at Ijeri and Malhalli. He would have established more vernacular schools had funds permitted.

Summing Up of Taylor's Administration

In concluding his annual report for 1859-60 Taylor wrote, "So far I earnestly trust I have fulfilled in some part, the expectations of the Resident in nominating me to my old district, for which my sympathies and interest are as active as ever; and I gratefully acknowledge his support of me in all measures of local importance, and in the independent and responsible situation he has permitted me to occupy". As a matter of fact Taylor's old seal was lacking nor could it be expected to last for ever. In August 1859 Raichur Doab was added to his charge without extra remuneration. He was looking forward to leave and retirement. His health was no longer good enough. He became anxious over his furlough. He was left with little time for Surapur and towards the last months of his service he was in a holiday mood and undertook a pleasure tour of the regions adjoining his charge proper. Most of the real work of administration was left to Sitaram Rao, the Extra Assistant Commissioner. Taylor gratefully acknowledged his services as well as those of Scurappa and Bhimrao, tahsildars brought by him from the Assigned Districts and of hereditary daftardar Venkatrao. Taylor's annual report itself is proof enough of his declining health and interest. To make it look impressive he padded it considerably with gazetteer-like information on Surapur's geology, climate,

land tenures etc. Though quite useful otherwise the annual report was not the fittest place for it. He made all kinds of recommendations which had no chance whatever of being even considered as the final disposal of the principality itself was uncertain. To enlarge and embellish his own achievements he filled the report with the most adverse remarks and reflections upon the administration of the late Raja, who had been his ward earlier and of whose administration he had no direct knowledge. These were pardonable lapses in an administrator who had done his best for Surapur in the past. His regret at having to leave many measures for advancement unfinished looks real and heartfelt.⁶¹

The Principality Gifted Away to the Nizam

On 26th February 1860 Taylor received a farewell address in Marathi from the residents of Surapur recognising and recording all the fine work he had done for them and the principality.⁶² After his departure J.H. Bullock succeeded him as Deputy Commissioner in charge of Surapur but the actual administration was carried on by Sitaram Rao whose reports, on the guide-lines given by Taylor, earned him commendation by the Government of India.⁶³ Nothing of importance, however took place during this period.

Meanwhile another treaty with the Nizam was being negotiated with a view to rewarding him for the support and assistance given by him to the British during the Great Revolt of 1857-58. Surapur once again became a mere pawn in the game of power politics. If we are to believe Taylor the people of the principality would have preferred the British to the Nizam as their new masters.⁶⁴ But in the

British empire in India firmly rooted in after the Revolt there was no place for popular will. It would appear that the Government of India argued to establish its exclusive sovereignty over Surapur only with a view to making it look like a reward to the Nizam.⁶⁵ Just 2 months after the assertion of their claim to Surapur the Government of India communicated their decision to gift it away to the Nizam. "His Excellency in Council is further pleased to cede to His Highness in perpetuity the State of Shorapur, which by the rebellion of the late Rajah lapsed to the British Government whose title thereto has been shewn in my letter No.1680 dated 7 May last to be absolute and indefensible".⁶⁶ This gift was embodied in the 2nd Article of the Treaty of 1860 with the Nizam.⁶⁷ Any surplus revenue was to be applied to clear the late Raja's debts for the rest of which the Nizam was to be responsible and the creditors were to be told that the British would no longer either stand guarantee for payment or intercede on their behalf later.⁶⁸

Surapur was formally handed over to the Nizam's taluqdar on 11th February 1861.⁶⁹ But arrangements for actual and final transfer were completed by 28th February 1861.⁷⁰ Surplus cash in the treasury amounting to Rs. 37,691 was transferred to the military chest at Lingsugur and finally credited to the Government of India's accounts. The Raja's debts had been paid off by then and arrangements made to pay the allowances of the Ranis upto the end of February 1861. The British Government took no guarantee for the continuance of these allowances or of the kwals given by British officers. Though the Prize Committee was not yet able to close its accounts these would have nothing to do with the Nizam. The temple property had not been claimed

as yet and was to be held in deposit by the Prize Committee. Short term prisoners were released on security. The rest were to complete their term under the new regime. Detachments of the Hyderabad Contingent stationed at Surapur returned to their respective headquarters. The English records at Surapur were transferred to Hyderabad Residency. Naturally there was to be no longer any payment to the Nizam on account of Andola-Nilogi.⁷¹

Thus ended the British connection with the principality of Surapur. An article in a treaty between the British and the Nizam 60 years before had started the relationship. Another article in another treaty between the same two powers ended that relationship 60 years later.

Notes and References:

1. FPSP, 30 Dec.1859, No.180.
2. Idem, No.165.
3. Resident Davidson to Govt. of India, 11 May 1858, FDP, Part A, July 1860, Nos.556-69.
4. The Peshwa was conquered in 1818 but Surapur chauth due to him was relinquished by the British only in 1833.
5. Idem, Govt. of India to Resident at Hyd., 7 May 1860.
6. PDFSS, 24 June 1861.
7. FPSP, 30 Dec.1859, Nos.170-1.
8. Idem, No.177.
9. Idem, No.209. Contrast Story (p.408) "I issued a general amnesty".

10. Taylor to Thornhill, 5 Aug.1858, para 10, FDP, Part A, July 1860, Nos.556-69; Story (p.409). The few that survived are either in possession of present descendants of Surapur Rajas or deposited in State Central Archives, Hyderabad. Aurangzeb's panis letter, however, is framed and still hangs in the Durbar hall at Surapur. It has all the outward marks of authenticity but the date therein indicates that it was issued in his first regnal year. In Sir Jadunath Sarkar's voluminous Aurangzeb there is no reference to issue of such a letter during the emperor's first regnal year; but Shri Kapatral believes that it was drafted during Aurangzeb's viceroyalty of the Deccan but issued after his coronatio
11. FPC, 16 Apr.1858, Nos.84-6.
12. Idem and No.87.
13. FPC, 30 Apr.1858, Nos.109-10 and FPSP, 30 Dec.1859, No.205. Even stocks of rice belonging to Rani Rangamma were sold off by the Prize Committee ! FPSP, 30 Dec.1859, No.207.
14. FPP,B, July 1860, No.85 and FDP, Part A, Nov.1860, Nos.186-92.
15. FPSP, 30 Dec.1859, No.190. According to Story (p.405), 3rd April. Taylor says that he covered 500 miles in 3 days from Hyderabad to Surapur, which is improbable. There is a highly colourful account of his arrival in Surapur. (Idem, pp.405-7).
16. FPSP, 30 Dec.1859, No.190. 17. Idem, No.191.
18. FDP, Part A, June 1860, No.418. There are no documents to indicate whether the trials took place before or after Taylor's arrival, though Taylor reports in Idem and Story (pp.409-10) as if these were conducted by him. But Sidi Jehar, one of the accused, was certainly tried by Capt. Campbell, who recommended mercy but was overruled by the Resident's additional consideration that the trial itself was irregular. The Govt. of India upheld the legality of the trial. PDFSS, 16 Mar.1859. Tusduk Husain, leading Arab janadar (whom Taylor simply calls 'a Musalman of Hyderabad') was hanged at Surapur in early Aug.1858. Hyderabad Affairs, Vol.III,p.220.
19. FPSP, 30 Dec.1859, No.191.
20. Thornhill to Taylor, 31 May 1858, FDP, Part A, July 1860, Nos.556-69.
21. Promoted from head accountantship of Dharaseo (Osmanabad) under Taylor. FDP, Part A, July 1860, Nos.556-69.
22. Taylor's letters, 12 May, 14, and 25 June 1858, and Thornhill's replies, 31 May and 22nd June, 1858.
23. Idem, Resident to Govt. of India, 3 July 1860.

24. FPC, 8 Apr.1859, Nos.351-3.
25. As per Trigonometrical Survey it was only 2264 sq.miles, FDP, Part A, July 1860, No.420. Taylor appears to have exaggerated to secure as much establishment as he could.
26. FDP, Part A, July 1860, Nos.556-69, Govt. of India to Resident, 7 May 1860.
27. FDP, Part A, June 1860, Nos.418-33.
28. Cultivated Khalsa Lands - 254427 bighas; fallow Khalsa lands - 206459 bighas.
29. Population - 1,42616; cattle (including bullocks, buffaloes, horses, asses, sheep and goats) - 1,87402; Houses - 28,825; Wells - 1196.
30. FDP, Part A, July 1860, Nos.556-69; FPP, A, Dec.1860, Nos.597-8; FPP, A, Apr.1860, Nos.26-8.
31. Numbering 1710. FDP, Part A, July 1860, Nos.556-69, Taylor to Thornhill, 14 June 1858, para 20.
32. Rs.5,21,724.
33. FDP, Part A, July 1860, Nos.556-69; FDP, Part A, June 1860, No.420.
34. Khalsa villages numbered 326.
35. Presumably these were jagir villages belonging to the Ranis which Taylor was allowed to resume in lieu of each stipends. Their value in Company's Rs. was 64,783-4-3.
36. Break-up of the rest:

<u>No. of villages</u>	<u>Revenue</u>	<u>Class of jagirdars</u>
73	52,280	Raja's relatives
34	6,000	Hereditary <u>silladars</u>
49	13,810	Charitable grants
2	2,690	Temple grants
37. FDP, Part A, July 1860, Nos.556-69.
38. FPC, 31 Dec.1858, Nos.86-8.
39. Contrast Story (p.442), " I recommended that the Ranis should have theirs [i.e. estates] restored to them".
40. FDP, Part A, July 1860, Nos.556-69.

41. Idem.
42. For E.I. Company's efforts to secure permission to set up a mint at Calcutta in mid-1750 see Fort William - India House Correspondence, Vol.I, p.xlviii; they secured it only after the battle of Plassey, Idem, Vol.II, p.xxviii.
43. By 'Hyderabad rupee' is meant the coinage current in the Nizam's dominions. The actual varieties of rupees in usage there, were 'Halea'. 'Garind-bukar', 'Narayanpett' and 'Bagh Chalni', all varying in value and composition of silver and alloys but roughly equivalent to .13/1 of the Company's 'kaldar' rupee. S.N.Prasad, Paramountcy under Dalhousie, p.211.
44. FDP, Part A, June 1860, No.420. 45. Idem, No.419.
46. FDP, Part A, July 1860, Nos.556-69, Taylor to Thornhill, 25 June 1858. The designations were Rukkarnavis, Izharnavis, Nazir, and Head Karkung.
47. FDP, Part A, June 1860, No.420.
48. FPC, 11 June 1858, Nos.80 and 84.
49. ^FPLSS, 16 Mar.1859, paras 33-41.
50. FDP, Part A, June 1860, No.420. 51. Idem.
52. FPC, 11 June 1858, No.81.
53. FDP, Part A, July 1860, Nos.556-69; FPC, 8 Apr.1859; FDP, Part A, June 1860, No.420.
54. Sitaram Rao, in charge of Surapur division also asked for larger strength and Taylor agreed with him.
55. FDP, Part A, July 1860, Nos.556-69.
56. FDP, Part A, June 1860, No.420. All the same Taylor took the trouble of sending surveys, level sections and specifications for these.
57. FDP, Part A, July 1860, Nos.556-69.
58. FDP, Part A, June 1860, No. 420.
59. Story, pp.421-41. Chapters XVI and XVII contain just a few paragraphs on his second administration.
60. FDP, Part A, June 1860, No. 420.
61. Story, p. 449. 62. Idem, pp. 442-7.
63. FDP, Part A, April 1861, Nos. 413-7.
64. Story, p. 442.



65. This gift of the principality was announced in a letter exclusively written for the purpose of mentioning awards to the Nizam and his officials. FDP, Part A, Nov.1860, Govt. of India's letter to the Resident at Hyderabad dt. 7 July 1860. Capt. Hastings Fraser argues (Memoir of James Fraser, p.420) that it could not be regarded as a reward to the Nizam since it was his 'recognized fief'. The fallacy of this view need not be stressed. It is enough to say that Surapur had never rendered any feudal services to the Nizam, his exaction of tribute was an arbitrary demand and after 1842 he ceased to have any claim to the principality except receipt of Rs.40,000 on account of Andola-Nilogi.
66. Idem, para 5.
67. Aitchison, Vol.IX, p.96.
68. FDP, Part A, Nov.1860, Govt. of India to Resdt. 7 July 1860, para 5.
69. FPP, A, March 1861, No. 295.
70. 4th Mar. as given in HPMK, I, p.255 without any proof or reference is an instance of editorial carelessness.
71. FDP, Part A, April 1861, Nos. 413-7.

CHAPTER VII

REVIEW

The Bedar raj of Surapur, though founded on an Adilshahi grant in 1665 A.D. grew and expanded on account of the decline of Mughal power in the Deccan. The Deccan misadventure dug Aurangzeb's grave and the Marathas managed to survive and assert their independence. So did the Bedars. It would not have been possible for them to withstand for long the might of the Mughal arms but for inherent weaknesses in Aurangzeb's long-drawn Deccan campaign.¹ Many petty palegars rose to power in the vacuum created by the practical disappearance of Mughal power in the Deccan and Surapur Rajas were amongst them. Small states survive due to the competition among bigger powers to exercise control over them. Neither the Peshwa nor the Nizam, powers that succeeded the Mughals in the Deccan, showed any anxiety to annex the small sansathan, as it was more convenient to levy tribute than to control from a remote centre the Bedars who had proved their spirit of independence. Nor could Surapur be a tributary in the ordinary sense of the term; it paid only when compelled and its right to collect taxes in their regions was respected by the suzerains. In the latter half of 18th century the Peshwa did establish a regular tributary relationship but never interfered with its internal autonomy. The sansathan was closer to the Peshwa than to the Nizam. Even its language of administration was Marathi.² The sansathan provided a fine illustration of how a martial race could grow into a political body with the aims and

objectives suited to an 18th century state. It would be, perhaps, an exaggeration to say that it was Vijayanagar in miniature, but it does give that impression.

In retrospect it would appear that the growing power of the East India Company was bound to draw into its orbit, as if by gravitational pull, sooner or later, this small samsthan, as happened with all other Indian states, small and big. The 17th article of the Anglo-Nizam treaty of 1800 by which the British promised assistance to the Nizam against Surapur in realizing his dues only provided an occasion. Had this beginning of British connection with the principality been direct it might have proved beneficial to it. No doubt the British would have asserted their paramountcy whenever occasion demanded. But chances were even, considering the principality's past, that it might have not only survived but grown into a model little state, time throwing up some able rajas and divans, as happened in some other Indian states. Lord Wellesley promised aid to a stronger power against a weaker one merely to gain the political advantages of an alliance. Expediency and not justice is the principle of practical politics whatever idealists might think. Wellesley's mistake was in treating Surapur as an exclusive tributary of the Nizam, in so many words in a treaty, even though he was aware that the Peshwa exercised equal suzerainty. Had this aspect been somehow accommodated in the treaty it would have paved the way for direct British intervention, perhaps with such continued benefits of British rule ultimately as were enjoyed in many parts of India.

But that was not to be. Though Wellesley promised aid he had no real intention of providing it. The Nizam took immediate advantage of the treaty by securing Sagar fort and establishing an enclave in the sansathan for non-payment of dues. But there was no further call by the Nizam for British aid till 1828. The British only interfered in 1807-8 to remove the influence on Surapur politics, of Raja Mahipatram who had become anti-British. But after the conquest of the Peshwa in 1818 it was possible for them to assert as successors of the Peshwa their supremacy over Surapur jointly with the Nizam. The opportunity was lost by the indifference of Charles Metcalfe the then British Resident at Hyderabad. An investigation of mutual accounts might have revealed a balance in favour of Surapur. This balance could have been used to pay Surapur's dues to Hyderabad and adjusted in British accounts with the Nizam. Thereby Surapur would have been for ever freed of Nizam's control and the British could have exercised it directly whenever occasion arose.

Taking advantage of the succession dispute in 1828 Hyderabad imposed an impossible nagrana of 15 lakhs on Raja Krishtappa, and further enhanced the tribute with cruel indifference towards the sansathan's capacity to pay. The dispute had been referred to the Hyderabad Resident as well by Surapur itself. It was possible for the Resident to settle it and make such consequent arrangements as would satisfy all parties concerned. Although the Nizam was described as a faithful ally of the British he was in reality only a subordinate and not an equal ally. It was not too difficult to secure his consent to a just and equitable arrangement. Once again the Resident failed in

his duty. Consequently the Raja was caught in a quagmire of financial difficulties. The samsthan virtually came to be ruled by his bankers or their agents. Successive commanding officers at Matkal on the frontiers of Surapur only helped the Nizam to realize kists though never actually using the troops. They intervened in 1831, 1832, 1837, and from 1839 onwards till Capt. Gresley, the last of them, was deputed for a thorough investigation in December 1841. Earlier officers could have also undertaken the task which would have put a stop to continual extortions by the Nizam at an early stage. One must not exaggerate the incapacity of the Raja or the oppression of the peasantry by banker's agents. Capacity to rule is not a hereditary quality and monarchs born without it should be pitied rather than condemned. The peasantry was spirited enough to resist extraordinary oppression. The really baneful result of the Raja's financial difficulties was that it encouraged intrigues of bankers, irregularity in accounts and inherent tendency of state servants towards private speculation. On top of it the Matkal officers stood British guarantee in writing to the bankers without the knowledge of the authorities. Sooner or later this was bound to bring in serious British intervention. For the time being, however, the Resident chose to wait till Surapur's finances reached a critical point. Till then the treaty obligation of ascertaining the justness of the Nizam's demands was not fulfilled. Meanwhile Minister Chandulal toyed with the idea of sequestering ^{at} least a part of the state towards payment and setting up Hanamappa, Raja Krishtappa's half brother, obviously to extort nazrana. The Minister's motives

became suspect and for the first time it dawned on the Hyderabad Resident that there was something unjust in Surapur-Hyderabad relations which the British were helping unintentionally. He, however, did not act further. But the Court of Directors must be commended for taking the nagrana issue into consideration and the Government of India for objecting to such an extreme measure as sequestration.

Resident Fraser deputed Capt. Gresley for full-scale enquiry practically expecting him to propose British management of the sansathan till its dues were liquidated. Gresley, had his objections and instead suggested cession of some districts to the Nizam. Gresley was a capable officer as is evinced by his nipping the threatened disturbances by Hanamappa in the bud, his restoration of Surapur property plundered by the Arabs, his perceptive observation, when asked to investigate the sack of Hemnapur that what apparently looked like depredations were in reality enforcement of rightful dues by the Bedars. But his report on Surapur, though ably drawn up in its own way, did not go more deeply into the question why Surapur should ever have paid tribute to the Nizam, and what was a reasonable amount. He argued that Surapur should pay the cost of protection provided by the Nizam through the British which he computed to be Rs. 2 lakhs per annum, equating it with what he considered to be the Nizam's just demands in the past. In 18th century with its better revenues enhanced by its rusums in the Peshwa's and the Nizam's regions, Surapur had never paid such an amount jointly to its suzerai. It also enjoyed the option of evading it when circumstances were favourable. The amounts were arbitrary demands of stronger powers and when these were met Surapur could expect

peace in return. The situation had now changed. But if Surapur could now count upon protection it was on that provided by the British and not by the Nizam. There had not been a single occasion when the Nizam's forces afforded any kind of protection or even assistance to Surapur. On the contrary Nizam-Surapur relations were full of friction. It was possible to so arrange that whatever the amount on account of British protection it should be directly paid to the British without bringing the Nizam into the picture. No doubt there was a treaty obligation towards him. But if a part of it had been so far ignored it was possible to ignore the other part of it now. Alternatively a fresh agreement with the Nizam could have been concluded. The amount itself was unjust in view of the State's dwindling revenues, and when the principality was also spending money on its own armed forces for defence. To demand from the samsthan more than half of its revenue towards protection was certainly not just. Capt. Jackson had suggested wiping off old scores altogether. If the Government of India could later secure the Nizam's consent, howsoever reluctant to writing off so-called peshkash arrears of 5 lakhs it had even now the power to treat all old accounts as cancelled and start with a clean slate. It is pertinent to point out that the Gosain's debts for which British officers themselves had stood guarantee were considerably reduced by the Court of Directors and as it happened never came to be paid at all. The same, thorough investigation of accounts as was done in the case of the Gosains, could have been undertaken in respect of Surapur-Hyderabad accounts as well. No doubt this would have taken many years, but it might have revealed that Surapur had already paid more than the stipulated

amounts. Capt. Malcolm's able memo had already given enough indication of Hyderabad's extortions. The investigation of accounts, a treaty obligation, could have been carried out by superior authorities while the sansathan was managed by the British. History is, however, full of 'might-have-beens' and historians wise after the event, can but rue over them.

Once Gresley's settlement was accepted by the Government of India the Resident carried it through with determination. The Raja was practically forced to part with a part of his ancient possessions, an objective which Hyderabad had in mind from 1837 onwards. The question of Andola-Nilogi was left hanging in the air. The Raja's sudden death in the first week of August 1842 raised the question of a regent during the minority of young Raja Venkatappa IV. Gresley fell a victim to the machinations of banker Lakshmangir Gosain and his recommendation resulted in the imposition on the state as its diwan, of Pid Naik, Raja Kristappa's brother, in whose ability Gresley himself had no confidence. The rightful regent Rani Ishwaramma who commanded the loyalty of her subjects and her able, honest assistant Chanbasappa were set aside. She defied not Gresley's settlements as is made out by Taylor but the imposition of an incapable diwan. It was quite probable that she and Chanbasappa might have ably ruled the state preventing the later total loss of its independence. Once again we came across that irresistible 'might-have-beens' of history. The Rani's resistance led Gresley to raise the question of the extent of British intervention in the affairs of Indian states. Expediency was the only policy

adopted by the British so far as Surapur was concerned till then. The Government of India had been merely approving the Resident's proceedings offering temporary solutions. It had been consistent only in preventing extreme, coercive measures which the Resident was eager now to adopt.

Where Gresley failed his successor Taylor succeeded (December 1842). Practically without any instructions from the Resident and without any initial armed assistance he managed to instal Pld Naik in office. Gresley too could have succeeded had he been a little more forceful and had the Resident given him a hint of armed aid later on. For, Taylor's success was as much due to the Rani's wisdom in bowing down to superior force which in fact was employed a little later as to Taylor's tact and determination. The extortion of Rs. 1 lakh from her, the temporary occupation of her jagirs, the confinement of Chanbasappa, form but a fraction of the sad tale of British injustice towards Surapur. But Taylor also cleverly managed to reduce the sibandi and to arrange for some payment to the Nizam. Thereafter he succeeded in associating himself with Surapur administration for the next ten years (1843-1853) of the young Raja's minority. He was thoroughly bored with his military duties. This was a life-time's chance for him to prove his born capacity for civil administration and he brought to bear upon it all his energies and vigour.

Initially he was handicapped by diwan Pld Naik's incapacity and later plagued by intrigues to resist his own authority. He was constantly vexed that he had no full control over expenditure. Anxiety gnawed him when the Government of India strangely decided to remove him in

April 1845 due practically to his honest confession that Gresley and he had been deceived by Lakshmangir Gosain's⁶ machinations. He had also lost his dear wife. Nevertheless he applied himself sincerely and with good results to raising the samsthan's resources. His position was saved by the commendatory despatch of the Court of Directors and secured by the eventual illness and death of Pid Naik in August 1845. Taylor thereafter became the monarch of all he surveyed. He had initially proposed to carry out a revenue survey and settlement as in the Company's districts. He also believed that this might curb the disputes among Bedars which were mainly over lands and which he was finding it difficult to settle. But realizing that he could not have carried out the measure during his tenure he dropped the idea. The Government of India was also opposed to employing force against possible Bedar resistance to the measure. He, therefore, used the only means at his disposal: personal janabandi, systematising accounts, regularity in collection and prevention of peculation. Bad seasons marred his results; nevertheless his exertions tended to increase the land revenue. He promoted agriculture by repairing some old tanks and taking up construction of others, encouraging use of better cotton-seed, and cultivation of indigo. He augmented net revenue by auctioning contracts at the highest possible amount, collecting taxes regularly and convincing the Bombay Government that it owed rusums to Surapur on account of Bagewadi taluq. He had already secured the writing off of Nizam's arrears. His effort to secure a considerable amount from the Company on account of Surapur's traditional rights to collect rusums in

Bijapur region now under the Company, however, did not succeed, as it was made too late in the day and the Government of India opposed. Similarly his proposal to get back ceded districts was turned down by the Resident. He could not ~~not~~ cut down expenditure much as customary state expenses had to be met and there were unexpected contingencies. He could only reduce the salaries of state servants till the crisis was past and systematise treasury accounts. All the same he managed to liquidate the state's debts and show a surplus yet. Not much money was available for measures of welfare but he did what he could by opening a dispensary, constructing a few small roads that made Surapur easily accessible, planting tamarind trees and mango groves and erecting some public buildings among which the Raja's new palace was the principal one.

He did not have to do much by way of judicial administration, except establishing a small civil court at Surapur, as panchayats functioned competently and crime itself was infrequent. That also made maintenance of law and order easy. Moreover he could always call upon British troops when he thought that his authority was threatened or the young Raja's life was endangered. On such occasions he exaggerated the violent nature of the Bedars whom he otherwise found to be honest, peace-loving and always keeping the pledged words. Though they went about with arms whenever necessary he disarmed them figuratively, by taking agreements from them for good behaviour and never once did they disobey him. The only blot on his otherwise excellent administration was his somewhat harsh treatment of the Rani - her banishment, quibbling over her allowances on her return, and opposing her

simple desire for a pilgrimage in old age or her wish to stay away from Surapur. This might be due to the fact that she was the only one in Surapur who had the capacity to replace him. He was severely censured by the Government of India for his misrepresenting the events on 4 February 1848 and the preceding ones as Bedar attempt at insurrection and for wrongly associating the Rani with it resulting in her temporary banishment. He deeply felt the censure, and continued to believe himself to have been right though a Court of Enquiry had disproved him after detailed investigation. Once again Taylor was deceived by ⁷mischievous ^amischief-making daftardar, as he was misled by Lakshmangir Gosain earlier. He might have even lost his position on this account but for the continued support of Resident Fraser, the Government of India's own earlier appreciation of his work and the repeated commendation by the Court of Directors.

Viewed in isolation Taylor's first administration of Surapur might fill one with gushing admiration. It might be remembered, however, that there were many other British district administrators in his time who were the real founders of the British empire in India and who brought Great Britain and the Indian people closer than before. He belonged to the best of them. Moreover he was a self-made man. What he really possessed was not training but talent and energy. The glamour of his success in administration somewhat fades when we unweave the close-knit web that is woven on the loom of time and survey at close quarters month by month and week by week, the life and work on which it is based. At the same time it helps us to understand and appreciate a lonely Briton who, amidst a totally alien environment, with no

chance of intellectual intercourse with equals for months together, honestly, sincerely and with all the powers at his command did his best for a small section of Indian society. He not only administered the state but studied its geology, its topography, its history, its records, its people. Whatever little of Surapur's past we know today comes from Taylor. He suffered from very human weaknesses as we all do, he floundered at times; but the manner in which he kept alive his numerous interests despite the burden of official work is an example for all. Even from his official letters and reports, which prove his administrative capacity, he emerges as a warm, engaging personality.

Surprisingly and pleasantly even Resident Fraser, comes to share some of the glow of this personality, by the invariable kindness with which he treated Taylor, his frequent praise of his work which he never failed to convey to the Government of India, his continual support checking Taylor only when really necessary. Otherwise Resident Fraser is seen in this correspondence as one who was unaware of Hyderabad extortions, refused to give much thought to the able memoes of Captains Malcolm and Jackson, who chose to wait for the Supreme Government's orders than to act quickly, implemented Gresley's report and imposed Pid Naik in a rather highhanded manner, was checked only by the Government of India in taking over Surapur administration immediately, was enthusiastic in coercive measures, crushing the Rani's power or curbing the Bedars whom he repeatedly described as 'barbarous' without the least first-hand knowledge of them, supported Taylor in his harsh treatment of the Rani but pig-headedly and with a peculiar sense of justice opposed the

relinquishment of peshkash arrears by the Hyderabad State for whose administration he had nothing but contempt.

Fraser and Taylor jointly exerted pressure in delaying full transfer of power to Raja Venkatappa IV who, when he came of age, began to exhibit signs of his incapacity for managing the sansathan. A few princes brought up under British care proved to be worthy rulers. Venkatappa was not amongst them. Taylor cannot be said to have neglected the young Raja's education. He arranged for his training, kept him by his side in the darbar initiating him to public business, and transferred a routine part of it as soon as he was 16 or so as an experiment to give him experience. He bought him a coach, horses and camels, built for him a new palace. He might have taken him along during his jamabandi tours which would have been the best training for a young prince; but the Raja's delicate health prevented it. He gave him affection and treated him as a ward for whom he felt responsible. But the best care in the world cannot ensure turning out a capable ruler. The indulgent servants, low companions and his own mother's alleged amour for Kasima - the environment in which he grew up in adolescence must have partly influenced his character and capacity for administration. Taylor proposed a test but did not pursue the idea. Lord Dalhousie firmly ruled that the Raja had a right to his raj. Taylor's, and following him Fraser's, attempt to delay the transfer of full powers remained merely a topic of discussion amongst themselves. Critics of Dalhousie's annexations can see him in a different light in this instance. Dalhousie did not consider the sansathan

important enough to appoint a British political agent at the Company's expense and the Raja, keen on freedom from restraint, refused to have one on his own. The Raja was warned of annexation in the event of maladministration, but he was left alone, despite reports of it by British officers in the adjoining regions. The Resident restricted himself to issuing warnings to the Raja and interfered only to compose his differences with his relations. The Government of India did not consider the subject important enough. The Raja might, perhaps, have improved with age and experience but the events of 1857-8 overtook him. He was misguided enough to engage Arabs for fear of annexation but was otherwise thoroughly unprepared to oppose the British. It is these mercenary Arabs, who obeyed none but their isadars, were rash enough to cross swords with the British without fear of consequences, and had a history of creating disturbances during the days of the young Raja's father Raja Kristappa, who gave battle to the British. A few daftardars and others the like of whom were notorious for intrigues during Taylor's tenure, were in league with the Arabs who were beyond the Raja's control. Only blind patriotism can make one regard the brief battle at Surapur as a struggle for freedom in the right sense of the word. The Bedars out of their feudal loyalty would have stood by their Raja who, however, surrendered himself at Hyderabad, was tried for rebellion and sentenced to transportation for life, a verdict to be expected from any military court of the turbulent period. A noble but entirely false speech ascribed to him much later by Taylor in his autobiography has naturally been very misleading. The Raja unconsciously provided further material for

superficial sentimentalism by committing suicide. With his death the Bedar raj of Surapur came to an end.

But not the British relations with it. For the first time in the history of their connection with Surapur the Government of India asserted its exclusive claim over Surapur, but so late that it attracted the attention of the Secretary of State, but somewhat unnecessarily as the Nizam had advanced none of his own. The only other occasion when Surapur engaged so much of Government of India's attention was when the Resident resisted surrender by the Nizam of peshkash arrears and they put their foot down directing it firmly, producing in consequence voluminous minutes and incidentally proposing Taylor's removal. Before the assertion of their suzerainty, however, the samsthan had already been held in sequestration and Taylor was called to take charge after a brief military occupation of about 2 months. The soldiers in the British army had indiscriminately sacked Surapur. Taylor curbed to an extent the Prize Committee's cupidity. His main task was to restore law and order and to carry on civil administration as before. The former was not very difficult as the Bedars could be disarmed by agreements and all sections of society by a fiat. Sanction for staff for the latter, severely restricted by the Resident, was long in coming, perhaps indicative of the little importance attached by the Government of India to Surapur. So in the meanwhile Taylor carried ^{on} with the Resident's temporary sanction. His additional task in his short second spell was to arrange for allowances to the widowed Ranis, clear off the late Raja's debts and the

arrears of hereditary servants. Executive was not separated from the judiciary and revenue officials were entrusted with judicial work. A curious feature of it was the absence of any directive from the Government of India as to what kind of code was applicable to the sequestered sansathan. It was, perhaps, looked upon as a non-regulation region where administration of justice was greatly dependent on the personal discretion of the executive officers. Stamp duty was not introduced but the introduction of British system of justice in preference to panchayats immediately heralded an increasing volume of litigation in a region earlier marked by an absence of litigious spirit. Taylor introduced the Company's rupee, and set up a couple of schools but public works were meant only for the military. Altogether Taylor's second administration suffers in contrast with his first one. For one thing, the period was too short for any spectacular achievements and secondly Taylor no longer enjoyed the same good health. In any case the Queen's Government of India in disregard of popular feeling shortly gifted away the sansathan to the Nizam as a reward for his services during the Mutiny. In contrast the Court of Directors had expressed a genuine feeling for the welfare of Surapur people.

What was the impact of British relations with Surapur on its people at large? The answer is that direct British rule was too short-lived to leave any permanent impress on the Surapur society. Although the connection formally started in 1800 the British did not have much to do with Surapur till 1828. In the next 13 years they acted more or less as a creditor's agents. They only dealt with the Raja and his bankers. Gresley's little

experience in 1842 did not allow him to have much of an opinion of Surapur and Taylor partly shared it till he assumed full charge. Thereafter he was guided by the Resident's instructions who wrote "It will be desirable that you should proceed with caution in the accomplishment of any changes, however promising and advantageous they may appear, in a country so new to us and our rule as that of Shorapur; and it will be better that you should gradually feel your way, and watch the success of such changes or modifications as may appear safe and practicable, till you ultimately arrive at the establishment of a simple and equitable system of rule which we may hereafter deliver over to the Rajah with a fair chance of its permanent maintenance, than that we should now try any hasty experiment, of a nature perhaps to excite among the people of the Country, and to leave no permanent or advantageous result on the reversion of the Government to it's own Native Chief". Under such a policy directive modernization even if attempted would have been very modest, transition from tradition snail-paced and change superficial. Whether such change to modernity with its competitive life, stresses and strains was in itself desirable is a matter of opinion and preference. For, Surapur society as it emerges from Taylor's writings is almost idyllic, closer to Jean Jacques Rousseau's 'state of nature', a society practically free from crime and litigation, engaged in peaceful occupations mainly agricultural, blissful in its ignorance, leading a simple life bound by time-old customs that suited it and enjoying its traditional festivals. Far from triggering off any

intellectual movement or renaissance, Taylor as directed by the Resident did not even introduce any basic change in existing revenue or judicial structure that could shake the traditional fabric of Surapur society. Nawab Framurz Jung Bahadur says that Taylor's work was very much "appreciated by the new generation, Brahmin and Beydur alike - for he was beloved by them all who continue to show their gratitude by annually commemorating his name publicly on a certain day set apart for that purpose, and in many a little hamlet the simple folk mention his name at night when lighting their 'butteries'¹³". He tells it as a fact and we may not dispute him. But it is also a fact that apart from mutual affection, which in itself cannot be lightly dismissed, British relations with Surapur hardly left any permanent impression on its society at large. A few brahmins picked up English, the palace ladies were thrilled by boat-rides on Bonhal tank,¹⁴ local gentry admired Taylor's exotic garden and some Surapur citizen availed of western medicines. But in the main Surapur society continued to live in its old, orthodox style hardly hearing any mark of sixty years of connections with the British to which this study is confined. It is possible that a detailed enquiry into Surapur society and administration under the Nizam might reveal a few more changes brought about by the preceding British connection. But it is very unlikely that far reaching changes took place. Competent administrators alone could have consolidated and even improved upon the benefits of¹⁵ British association. Taylor does not appear to have been so fortunate in his successors so that his administration remains a mere memory.

Notes and References:

1. These have been perceptively analysed by Bhimsen Saxena 'Burhanpuri' in Tarikh-e-Dilkusha.
2. Most of the surviving Surapur records, are in Marathi in modi script.
3. Gresley's report, FPC, 8 June 1842, No.167, para 22. "I visited most of the principal villages, and prepared as I was to see ruined houses and waste lands, I was surprised to find that in point of population and extent of agriculture the country is better off than most of the adjoining districts under the Nizam's Government".
4. FPC, 19 April 1841, No. 103.
5. Letters to Reeve, Nos. 2,8,11.
6. Idem, No.31; Story, p. 188.
7. Letter to Reeve, No.91.
8. For instance, Idem, No.16 where Taylor says that Fraser did not know what to do after Gresley sent in his resignation.
9. For instance, the ruler of Catch. Black Hills, pp. 220-24.
10. The Raja returned this affection by offering a lagir which, however, Taylor was not permitted to accept.
11. Lre to Hyd Resdt, 30 April 1855, FPC, 22 June 1855, Nos.77-9.
12. FPC, 26 Dec.1846, No.405, F. to T., 18 May 1846, para 7.
13. Shorapur, p. viii.
14. Story, pp. 174-5, 200-1.
15. As for example in Mysore, Cubbon's administration was further improved by C.Rangacharlu, Sir Sheshadri Iyer etc. Ain-e-Dakhan or Mss gazetteer compiled in 1834 (p.203), records decline in population of Surapur town to less than 10,000; a couple of middle schools, one of them for girls, a post-office, ^{and} an English dispensary, were the only improvements.

EPILOGUE

Although the principality was finally transferred to the Hyderabad State by 28th February 1861 in full sovereignty a few questions concerning it continued to crop up during the following decade and the British Government was required to deal with them.

After the takeover the Nizam appointed one Chidambar Rao as taluqdar of Surapur. Chidambar Rao demanded in June 1862 from the Collector of Sholapur rusums amounting to Rs.2400 per year as Surapur's share of revenue from Bagevadi pargana of that collectorate. It was Taylor who had originally revived the claim and got it accepted by the Bombay Government during his first administration¹. The Collector of Sholapur had been paying it regularly till the principality was confiscated. The claim was based on the fact that first the Peshwa and then the British Government as his successor owed this amount to Surapur. But even at that time the Government of India had rejected further similar claims on Bombay Government put forth and argued out by Taylor on the ground that the British Government was not and had never been deemed subject to any of the liabilities of the Peshwa in regard to foreign states². Chidambar Rao's claim was now rejected on the same principle. "Where the sovereignty of a state passes to the British Government by an act of power, whether that act be conquest or confiscation the British Government is not bound by the feudal or other relation which the conquered or extinguished dynasty was under". When Surapur was ceded in perpetuity to the Nizam it was done so as a reward and the British

Government's title to the territory was proved to be absolute. The Nizam could not levy any tribute from the Bombay Government thereafter. Consequently the taluqdar derived no right to it either from the Nizam or the British Government.³ It may be noted that while enunciating this principle the Government of India was only asserting its paramountcy and not discussing the subtle, intricate, legal implications to which it would have been compelled were the case to be pleaded before a higher, impartial and international tribunal.

Similarly, when Resident Davidson pointed out that the cession of Surapur was not regarded by the Nizam as "an act of unequivocal liberality on our part" he was duly snubbed by the Government of India. The Resident was stung by criticism in the press that he had failed to acquire the cotton-rich districts of Berar in perpetuity by the Anglo-Nizam treaty of 1860. He thought it fit to answer this criticism by indicating the respective bargaining positions of the two Governments while submitting administration reports of Hyderabad Assigned Districts for 1861-62. This post-mortem analysis was of sheer academic interest but the Government of India took strong exception to it. They reproved him, "... the introduction into the report of references to bygone political transactions [viz. transfer of Surapur] was wholly unnecessary and at any rate if he thought it right to do so he ought not to have omitted to state the reason which led the Government of India to disallow that pretence " [viz. Nizam's better claim to Surapur]⁴.



One of the problems were the petitions which continued to be sent to the British Government, despite the principality's transfer to the Nizam. When Krishtappa Naik whose jagir had been restored in lieu of stipend sent another petition regarding adjustment of villages in it the British Government had no hesitation in agreeing with the Resident that after the cession it was for the Nizam to settle the questions arising out of such rent-free subordinate tenures.⁵ But it could not deal in a similar manner with the repeated petitions of Rani Rangamma, eldest widow of the last Raja, for restoration of the raj to her.⁶ She had entertained vain hopes of regaining it through persuasive appeals and had started submitting them while the sansathan was under British sequestration. Sitaram Rao, Taylor, Resident Davidson, Salar Jang were all approached. Since Taylor had already arranged for cash allowances to all the Ranis in lieu of their jagirs and their private jewels had been returned to them the arrangement was regarded as conclusive and final. Taylor had reported that though the Ranis were somewhat sore at the loss of their rank and importance they were contented and practically better off than before as their creditors too were being paid off in instalments.⁷ As her petitions show Rani Rangamma at least was certainly not satisfied with these arrangements. As the ultimate decision regarding the region was yet to be taken it was then possible to consider her petitions were the Government so inclined. But it was not and the Rani was only shunted from authority to authority. Sitaram Rao informed her that her application was sent to the Bengal Government. The Governor General asked her to

submit it to the Resident at Hyderabad. The latter did not care to respond. On 5th January 1861 she again sent her petition to the Governor General for onward transmission to the Secretary of State recapitulating the history of the principality, trying to prove the innocence of her husband, and requesting for restoration on that ground. The Government of India passed it on to the Secretary of State with the remark that "As the Shorapoor Territory has since been transferred in Sovereignty to His Highness the Nizam, the prayer is not one to which the British Government can listen". On 23 September 1861 she submitted yet another piteous appeal to the Secretary of State through the Resident at Hyderabad and the Government of India. The Resident as usual observed that the prayer of the petitioner was untenable. The Rani banked upon the fact of the Queen belonging to her sex and possessing a merciful nature. "The ear of British justice is closed against all my complaints, representations and remonstrances" she wailed. But her sentimental appeal met the same fate as her previous petitions. The Secretary of State satisfied himself that the Rani's allowances were being punctually paid by the Nizam, that her private jewels had been restored to her and dismissed her application. The Rani made her last bid on 25 June 1867, presumably by then having come to know that the Raja of Jamkhandi had been restored, which stoked the embers of her vain hope. In this last petition she prayed that if the raj could not be restored to her she might be at least given some additional fitting relief her allowance being inadequate. The Government of India

did not think so and her application was turned down in toto with the curt remark, "the petitioner be informed that the Governor General in Council is unable to comply with her prayer".⁸

As noticed earlier the Prize Committee had not been able to close its accounts before the transfer. Particularly the jewelry of the Gopalswami temple had been held in deposit till proper priestly claimants came forward to reclaim it. Maj. Wyndham, President of the Prize Committee reported that after its desecration the temple was no longer used as a place of worship and no claimants for its jewelry had been coming forth. The Government of India therefore, allowed its sale, which fetched the Committee(at Lingsugur) more than Rs.4000, although the Code of Military Regulations compiled by Maj. Jameson had placed temple jewelry beyond the pale⁹ of property which could be treated as prize. It would appear that the temple jewelry being held in deposit was not given due publicity by the Prize Committee on account of its greed. The Government of India had asked it to ascertain public opinion in Surapur in this respect. It is hard to believe that the most famous temple in Surapur whose jagir endowments had been particularly continued¹⁰ by Taylor was no longer used as a place of worship. The priests to whom the idols in the temple and a fraction of the ornaments decorating them had been returned earlier would have certainly claimed the rest had they known that it was with the Prize Committee.

Prominent personalities who do not die in natural circumstances often times give rise to pretenders

and the last Raja of Surapur who had committed suicide was an apt subject for impostors. The British Government had no cause to take note of the disturbances in Surapur created by an impersonator in 1864, except to express¹¹ satisfaction at successful suppression. But on 19th September 1868 one Govinda Hanumanta bearing close physical resemblance to the late Raja and having intimate knowledge of the royal household sought recognition by a petition. The Resident at Hyderabad found after investigation his claim to be false and the Hyderabad State sentenced him to 5 years imprisonment. The soi-
distant Raja in a prison again petitioned and though the Government of India considered the story most improbable it remarked that it ought to be inquired into. When the Resident informed that this had already been done and the pretender imprisoned the Government of India ordered that security for future good conduct be taken from the¹² prisoner after release.

Thereafter Surapur completely ceased to figure in the British Government's papers. Occasional British visitors might have visited the picturesque principality with its bracing climate but the finale had been struck in official British relations with Surapur.

Notes and References:

1. FPC, 9 May 1851, No.54.
2. FPC, 15 Oct.1852, No.52.
3. FDP, Revenue A, July 1862, Nos.20-23.
4. FDP, General A, Aug.1862, Nos.25-7.

5. FDP, Part A, Apr.1864, Nos.253-7.
6. FDP, Pol.A, Nov.1861, Nos.2-4; FDP, Part A., Mar.1864, No.19; FDP, Pol.A., Jul.1867, Nos. 156-7. These also contradict Taylor's contention that 'Rangamma was very grateful; she did not expect half so much. I often paid her a visit and she was gradually growing more cheerful and resigned". Story, p.419.
7. FDP, Part A, June 1860, No.420.
8. FDP, Pol.A., Dec.1862, Nos.362-3; PDTSS, 23 Dec. 1861, 16 June 1862, 4 Feb. 1863; PDFSS, 24 June 1861, No.83A and FDP, Pol.A., May 1862, Nos.206-9.
9. FDP, Finance A., Oct.1862, Nos.10-12 and Mar. 1863, No.19.
10. The worship continues till today.
11. FPP, A., Aug.1864, Nos.63-5.
12. FPP, B., Aug.1869, Nos.25-7 and A., Dec.1869, Nos.117-3 and K.W.

APPENDIX I

The Loans of Motigir Gosain Under British Guarantee

Motigir Gosain was an indigenous banker who gained ascendancy in the Surapur sansathan on account of the loans he gave to the Rajas. It appears that his financial transactions with them had started with Raja Pidd Naik III himself¹ but he became important after the accession of Raja Krishtappa as his principal banker owing to the Raja's perpetual pecuniary difficulties engendered by the Nizam's claims. In 1836 he refused to give any more loans unless the previous account was settled. In the subsequent year, however, Capt. Lee, Commanding Officer at Matkal stood guarantee for Raja's repayment to^{the} Gosain signing a bond to that effect to enable the Raja to borrow from the Gosain for paying kists² to Hyderabad. Motigir died towards the end of 1837. His disciple Mahadeugir and sons Lakshmangir and Guhapatgir thereupon began to quarrel among themselves over division of the Gosain's property. Meanwhile Capt. Ramsay the successor of Capt. Lee signed another bond, similar to the one signed by Lee though the amount was different. Capt. Hampton and Capt. Jackson tried to arrange the accounts between the Raja and the Gosains without success. Unfortunately these transactions were not reported to the Resident fully or adequately. Resident Fraser became aware of them soon after his assumption of office in 1838. To begin with, the Government of India disowned any responsibility for repayment. Moreover, they considered Lee's bond as "not so much an engagement for payment of amount to be advanced by the

Gosain, as a promise that an injunction shall be issued to secure payment". If such an injunction was secured³ the obligation was over. The Resident informed that no immediate action was necessary as the Gosain's heirs were⁴ not pressing their claims due to disputes among themselves. The implied British guarantee to them, however, formed a ground for proposing British management of the sansathan⁵ when Capt. Gresley was deputed for a full-scale enquiry. Gresley computed the amount due to the Gosains at more than⁶ 1½ lakhs. The Raja requested its cancellation as the original creditor was dead. His yakil claimed that investigation would reveal the whole loan to have been repaid. But the heirs naturally would not hear of it. They claimed that Rs. 3,60,653-3-0⁷ was due to them, including the interest on the principal. The Resident enquired from the Government of India whether the Raja should be asked⁸ to cede some territory in payment. Gresley proposed that Nilogi should be assigned to Lakshmangir Gosain temporarily till the debt was realized. The suggestion had emanated⁹ from Lakshmangir himself, but it was not accepted. However, it was proposed to hold Nilogi revenues in deposit for later⁴⁰ distribution. In a later report on the loans Gresley forwarded the Gosain's claims but agreed that the Raja could not earlier pay on account of the heirs' disputes among themselves. Direct evidence of payments made by the Raja was lacking as several taluqdars were dead or had migrated and Surapur daftar records were incomplete in that respect. He felt that the Gosains would accept a compromise as they would not have realized anything at¹¹ all. When Taylor took over he felt that the Gosains would

agree to receiving Rs.3 lakhs, and the Resident asked him¹² to get it in writing from them. Though Lakshmangir and Mahadevgir had not yet settled their feud they agreed to this compromise and Resident Fraser sought permission to advance 2½ lakhs from the Residency treasury to be later¹³ reimbursed by Surapur.

But when the subject was brought to the notice of the Court of Directors they demanded a full enquiry into the nature of British guarantee, and the actual amounts involved. Capt. (then Maj.) Lee who was in England then had disclaimed what was supposed to be his bond. The Court was shocked at the exorbitant rate of interest, viz. 2½ per month which appeared in one document but not in another. At this rate towards the end of 1844 the Gosain's¹⁴ total claims stood at Rs.3,87,319. Enquiries by Taylor and at the Hyderabad Residency proved certain forgeries in the documents produced by the Gosains. Their accounts and those made up by successive British officers appeared irreconcilable. The Gosains had not credited amounts¹⁵ received by them. Taylor's calculations reduced the amount to Rs. 1,98,629-12-10. But he and the Resident could not agree with each other whether compound or simple interest was to be paid. The Resident preferred an out of court settlement in accordance with the practice in Hyderabad¹⁶ in respect of long-standing debts. The Government of India remarked, "These transactions appear to be involved in such intractable confusion as to render the ascertainment of the exact state of the account by further investigation quite hopeless."¹⁷ They therefore, passed on the buck to¹⁸ Taylor and Fraser leaving it to their discretion. But

since they could not agree with each other the Court of Directors laid down the principle that no interest be allowed on Capt. Lee's bond but 12½ per annum on that of Capt. Ramsay till 1840 when the Gosains feuds started in earnest. Even then the accounts so drawn up were not found entirely satisfactory. Taylor's calculations in 1853 brought down the Gosains' dues under British guarantee to Rs.37,294-14-9. It is not known whether this balance in favour of the Gosains was before or after some moneys had been advanced to them at the end of their feuds which their caste panchayats had been unable to settle for long. The Court of Directors appear to have made their own calculations and ultimately the amount adjudicated boiled down to Rs.30,569. Raja Venkatappa V was unable to pay it nor would the Gosains accept it. The amount continued to be unpaid even when Surapur was under sequestration and the Gosains appear to have refused the considerably reduced settlement till the last. The documents, though detailed at times, do not tell the full story. It itself the subject is minor but the British considered themselves morally bound and it formed additional ground for British intervention and management of the principality. Protracted payment should have been to the Gosains ⁵ Jain# but by their dishonesty and the Court's insistence on thorough investigation they were losers in the end.

Notes and References:

1. FPC, 21 Dec.1842, No.71.
2. Malcolm's Memo, FPC, 15 Apr.1842, No.102.
3. FPC, 21 Dec.1840, No.53.

4. FPC, 19 Apr.1842, No. 101.
5. FPC, 20 Aug.1852, Nos. 72-4 & K.W.
6. FPC, 17 Aug.1842, Nos.151-3.
7. FPC, 21 Dec. 1842, No.71.
8. FPC, 17 Aug. 1842, No.151.
9. FPC, 21 Dec. 1842, Nos.74-5.
10. FPC, 3 May 1843, No.33.
11. FPC, 21 Dec.1842, No.71.
12. FPC, 12 Apr.1843, Nos.65-6.
13. FPC, 3 May 1843, No.31.
14. PLFC, 6 Nov. 1844.
15. Ibid, 2 Jan.1846; Story, pp.203-4.
16. FPC, 20 June 1846, Nos.114-5.
17. Ibid, No. 129.
18. Ibid.
19. PLFC, 13 Feb.1850.
20. Ibid, 21 Jan. 1852.
21. FPC, 28 Oct.1853, Nos.47-8.
22. FDP, A Progs., Dec.1860, Nos.597-8; PLFC, 20 Feb.1856.

APPENDIX II

A Critical Note on Taylor's Autobiography as a Source

Capt. Meadows Taylor's "The Story of My Life" was completed in June 1874. There is no mention in it when exactly he began to write it, but it may be safely inferred that it was begun sometime in the latter half of 1872, when he had finished his last historical romance Seeta. It was more than a dozen years since he had left Surapur; blindness was approaching and he was suffering from many infirmities and ailments. But declining memory was not amongst them according to Henry Bruce, editor of a new edition of the Story. "It depended, not on an old man's uncertain recollections, but on the mass of correspondence which had passed between Taylor and his father". Occasional extracts from his letters to his father are interspersed throughout the Story. It is further strengthened by incidental extracts from official correspondence, which are quite faithful to the original except for a minor word here and there. The Story also contains a few extracts from private letters by officials written to Taylor. There are incidents and instances in it which, when compared with a contemporary official letter, tally more or less perfectly thereby confirming Bruce's certificate of the author's unfailing memory. All this lends ^{an} aura of complete authenticity and accuracy to every statement made by Taylor in regard to Surapur. A political agent's autobiography coming from a man of Taylor's ability, integrity, honesty and memory was naturally likely to be fully believed in all respects.

Had Bruce checked the Story with Taylor's official correspondence available in the India Office Library when preparing the new edition the present note would have been superfluous. Bruce, however, chose to provide only literary criticism of Taylor's novels by way of introduction. So far as notes were concerned he mainly drew upon the Imperial Gazetteer of India, and some other published works. He also wrote to those related to or interested in Taylor and received help from them. But it occurred to none of them to verify Taylor's facts with their unpublished, official version. These remained unchallenged.

The Story comprises 19 chapters of which only 9 relate to Surapur, (Chapters VII-XII and XIV-XVII) two of them very cursorily. Many of Taylor's statements therein are found to be inaccurate when compared with what he himself wrote at the time in his official letters, or what the officials wrote to him. Most of these have been pointed out in preceding notes and references. A few are too trifling to deserve notice. Here only two major faults are dealt with.

Gravest injustice has been done by Taylor to Rani Ishvaramma. Throughout the Story she has been described as a woman of easy virtue. At the very beginning of his appointment he describes her as "dissolute to a degree - in fact a very Messalina" (p.143) and closes his account of her saying that "her profligacy and baneful influence over her son were terrible to think on, and continued to have effect on him to the last".(p.275). He first met her in December 1842 and she died on 27 May 1853. The above might have been his honest opinion of her during this period, but was

he justified in forming it? At the time he first met her he knew only what Gresley and Lakshmangir Gosain told him about her. The latter had filled the former's mind with false stories and Taylor merely repeats them. At the time when Chanbasappa was released he came to learn from him the deceit practised by the banker upon him. In the Story he not only gives Chanbasappa's version but also has good words for him. So far as their illicit connexion was concerned he merely remarked that "whether he was her paramour or not was no business of mine" (p.179) and leave it at that. But in a long letter to the Resident on the banker's doings he confessed of having been deceived by the banker in respect of the Rani and Chanbasappa. It would have been fair on Taylor's part to mention this in his autobiography. At least if he had really considered the Rani's alleged amours as none of his business it would not have resulted in so much of character assassination. But he continues to mention a number of paramours. It is significant that he does not mention anyone by name except Kasima. Kasima was a partly handsome man brought up by Raja Krishtappa himself from his childhood in the palace and naturally moved freely in the Rani's apartments. That is not to say that he was the Rani's lover. Like Lakshmangir earlier, a daftardar Venkappa filled Taylor's mind with gossip about their illicit love to gain his own ends and Taylor was once again deceived. He was finding it too difficult to settle land disputes among the Bedar clans and attributed it to Kasima's ascendancy among the Sarnoubats, who he assumed, were encouraged by the Rani on account of her forbidden love. He therefore got her banished from Surapur. But the Court

of Enquiry found her innocent. It is equally significant that not one of the 56 witnesses examined by the Court mentioned Rani's alleged love for Kasima. It is perhaps, needless to point out that the quarrel between Kasima and the Rani before her removal is a dramatic invention by Taylor; nor did the "rebellious" party thunder at the gates to get them. She was already on her way to banishment when Resident Fraser arrived at Surapur.

Taylor persisted in his prejudices till the last. It is, of course, difficult to prove charges of profligacy but unless positive proof is forthcoming it is only fair and gentlemanly to give benefit of doubt and leave the matter at that. But Taylor continues to report bazar gossip of which he had neither first-hand knowledge nor definite proof. To say the least this is unbecoming in him. It may also be noted that after the so-called Kasima affair he did not report officially on any of the Rani's alleged paramours, presumably because he could not have given any proof.

Another of his suspicions against the Rani was that she was constantly intriguing against him. This has been repeatedly mentioned in the Story but quite vaguely. Since he did not report officially it is safe to assume that either no intrigues existed or if they did they were too trifling to engage his attention officially. If so, it is again unfair to the Rani to convey mere suspicions as established facts to the readers of a published autobiography. He goes so far as to drag in Lord Dalhousie, who, he says, confirmed her intrigues whereas there is nothing on record to that effect. There are a few other misstatements about

the Rani: that she defied Gresley's settlement, that it was proposed to send her to Vellore from Bangalore on account of her constant intrigues, that her banishment was ordered by Lord Hardinge, that she professed herself content with her allowance after her return to Surapur, that she was on her way to Tirupati before her death. We have already given sufficient proof that what she defied was not Gresley's settlement but imposition of Pid Naik as divan. If Lord Hardinge ordered banishment it was on Taylor's recommendation and the Governor-General in Council had added that it should be carried out with all due courtesy. No intrigues on her part at Bangalore were mentioned officially at the time. Taylor did mention them while refusing to clear her debts 5 years after her death. Neither she nor her creditors had pressed their claims any further when she was alive and the Government of India was happy to reduce the burden on Surapur under sequestration with such a handy pretext. She contracted these debts on account of her charity and generosity and she was unable to live within a paltry allowance reduced to Rs.500 per mensem from her former allowance of more than Rs.1500 per mensem. Even after her return Taylor continued to give her only Rs. 1000 per mensem deducting from them instalments on loans. She may not have known what Parliament was, but she sent her petitions for restoration of jagirs to the Governor-General through whom they were forwarded to the Court of Directors. All the authorities concurred in Taylor's view and she had to reconcile herself to this final decision. The Court of Directors, also ultimately withdrew their earlier permission to her to

stay outside Surapur on Taylor's initial insistence. It is he who prevented her from undertaking a pilgrimage to Tirupati, a decision which was naturally supported by superior authorities. Taylor fails to mention that Bangalore was Rani's second choice during banishment, and also omits to state that the Rani was not only allowed to return but also all her privileges were to be restored to her. It is difficult to believe that the detailed conversation with her on her return was conveyed to his father in the manner in which it is reported in the Story. Taylor did not know Kannada and this kind of conversation would not be easy to be carried on through interpreters.

All in all from the Story emerges a picture of the Rani not corroborated by official papers. It is easy to understand why Taylor harboured suspicions and prejudices against her. He felt in his heart that she was the only one in Surapur who had the capacity to replace his authority, particularly because her Bedar subjects were loyal to her. He meted out to her the treatment one is most likely to give to possible rivals. On the other hand through the Story one can see the efforts made by the Rani to develop and maintain good relations with him. He smarted under the censure conveyed to him by the Government of India mostly on her account but for which he alone was responsible. But while one can understand his behaviour that does not justify it. Particularly, to harp upon his prejudices giving them as if they are statements of facts in an autobiography published 20 years after the Rani's death when he was expected to have a more generous attitude, certainly detracts from the merits of an excellent work.

Taylor's version of the so-called Raja's revolt is equally faulty. It appears that he was unacquainted with Capt. Campbell's report on events leading to the skirmish on 7th February 1858 which proved the Raja's unpreparedness and want of any intention to rebel. He was not defeated for he gave no battle, and therefore did not hold his position bravely at all. Taylor mentions his 3 visits to the Raja but fails to mention that howsoever incoherent he was he gave out the names of all those whom he believed to be involved in the 'Mutiny'. Instead he puts in a noble but entirely false speech in the mouth of the Raja which is so misleading. Taylor's later assertion that the Raja did not give out names is contradicted by his own earlier official reports to the Resident. The Resident's assurances to Taylor on that account, therefore, must be equally false. The Resident did not commute the sentence of transportation for life given by the military tribunal, nor did the Governor-General do so. In fact the trial papers reached the Governor General on the day the Raja committed suicide.

The prejudiced presentation of his relations with the Rani and the faulty account of the Raja's 'revolt' in addition to Taylor's many other misstatements are sufficiently indicative to show that his Story must not be relied upon in its entirety as a source for British relations with Surapur. For example, he misappropriates to himself the settlement effected by Gresley, giving on top of it the wrong figure of Rs. 60,000 per year as Surapur's dues towards Hyderabad instead of Rs. 40,000. He also claims false credit for having stopped the nagrana, a decision taken by

the Government of India before his time on the accession of Raja Venkatappa IV in August 1842. The Story, therefore, must be read with due caution towards factual accuracy. Many of his statements and versions in the Story are contradicted by his own contemporary official letters to the Resident. The latter are obviously more trustworthy not only on account of their contemporaneity but also because he was required to be more cautious in them and could not afford to write as loosely and vaguely as he does in the Story. From the latter one can see that Taylor undoubtedly enjoyed the position of power he had earned. In the former as a subordinate he could but only submit his views for final decision by the higher authorities. They checked him whenever necessary and such instances have been altogether passed over in the Story while approbation, which was due and certainly justifiable, has been repeatedly mentioned. Even in his official letters and reports at times he appears confused, muddle-headed and contradicts himself. Nevertheless they leave no doubt about his devotion to duty, his zeal, integrity and sincerity.

While his official letters are more reliable his Story is more readable. So far as his revenue work, public works and schemes of irrigation are concerned the Story is trustworthy except for a minor detail here and there. And these naturally come out more alive there than in the ⁻²³dry~~dust~~ official letters. His conjecture that the Raja's suicide might have been accidental is worthy of consideration. The valedictory address presented to him by ^athousand citizens of Surapur is a good summing up of the work done by him for them but not available in official

records. His account of the continual conflict with Pid Naik is in fair accordance with his contemporary official reports on them. Besides, the Story has the advantage of extracts from private correspondence of officials. The descriptions of various ceremonies could not have been so vivid and graphic in an official letter. His observations on the Bedars are uniformly appreciative in the Story while officially he had to exaggerate their violent character to urge the presence of British troops. It is difficult to assess how far his misstatements in the Story are due to failing memory in old age, natural egotism of a successful administrator or prejudices and predilections developed over the years. With all its defects as a historical source one can feel from the Story that there was a gradual evolution of the process of his identifying himself with the sansathan of Surapur; he had fallen in love with the land and the people of Surapur. This is not the place to estimate the Story as a work of art, as we are more concerned here with it as a source. Suffice it to say that merely read as autobiography without bothering about its authenticity it reflects the sublimation of his subconscious sentiments. It is a polished and revised version of his life and work, a result of mellow and mature reflection in the evening of his life presented with the superb artistry of a seasoned novelist.

GLOSSARY

<u>Abkari</u>	:	Revenue derived from duties levied on the manufacture and sale of inebriating liquors and intoxicating drugs.
<u>Adalat</u>	:	A court of justice.
<u>Aligol</u>	:	Irregular infantry without regular arms composed mainly of Muslims.
<u>Altamsha</u>	:	Royal grant conferring title to rent-free land in perpetuity, hereditary and transferable.
<u>Ashwin</u>	:	Month in Hindu calendar roughly corresponding to September-October.
<u>Baira</u>	:	Variety of millet (<u>panicum spicatum</u>)
<u>Bakshish Inam</u>	:	Gift of land, especially garden land, by ruling power held rent and tax-free but liable to resumption by Government.
<u>Balutedar</u>	:	Village official or servant receiving a share of the village produce for his services.
<u>Baluti</u>	:	Share of crops in kind recoverable by a village servant from village lands.
<u>Barat</u>	:	Assignment or order upon revenues or treasury; order for payment.
<u>Bhagnal</u>	:	System of tenure based on apportionment of shares of the crop in kind between the cultivator and the Government.

<u>Bhut Manai</u>	:	Inferior quality of land held at a low assessment or altogether free in consideration of services done to the State.
<u>Bigha</u>	:	Measure of land equal in Surapur to roughly one-third of an English acre.
<u>Butties</u>	:	Lamps
<u>Chabutra</u>	:	Raised platform.
<u>Chali</u>	:	Land bearing highest rate of assessment cultivated by permanent inhabitants of the village agreeably to allotment, by which each cultivator has a fixed proportion of the lands of the highest, medium and lowest assessment; also hereditary land, which cannot be thrown up, held at fixed rate but assessable at rates proportionate to quality and to custom, after being brought into cultivation from waste.
<u>Chaprasi</u>	:	Courier or messenger with a badge; inferior public servant.
<u>Chaauth</u>	:	One-fourth of original assessment or government collections of actual revenue demanded by the Marathas as the price of forbearing to ravage other states.
<u>Chavdi</u>	:	A public place which could be used as a police or customs station, an inn, a magistrate's court or for any other public purpose.
<u>Coss</u>	:	Measure of distance varying from one to two miles or more.

<u>Daftar</u>	:	Office. In Surapur it denoted revenue office as distinguished from treasury office.
<u>Daftardar</u>	:	Record Keeper; registrar, accountant, revenue officer.
<u>Darbar Kharch</u>	:	Political and diplomatic expenditure; court charges; charge for presents and gratuities made to princes and public functionaries, bribes etc.
<u>Darbari</u>	:	Member of the royal court or levee.
<u>Darga</u>	:	Muslim shrine or the tomb of some reputed holy person which is an object of worship and pilgrimage.
<u>Darshan</u>	:	View
<u>Dasra</u>	:	Hindu festival on the 10th day of the first fortnight of <u>Ashwin</u> .
<u>Devasthanam</u>	:	Temple as an institution.
<u>Dharapatti</u>	:	Tax on <u>jagir</u> roughly equal to one-third of its revenue in Surapur.
<u>Diwan</u>	:	Chief minister of a native state.
<u>Diwankhana</u>	:	Hall of audience.
<u>Divani</u>	:	Chief ministership.
<u>Fasli</u>	:	Era introduced by Shah Jahan in the Deccan. By adding 590 to it the corresponding Christian year is obtained.
<u>Faujdari Adalat</u>	:	Criminal court of justice.

<u>Ganachari</u>	:	Fees on marriages and deaths and fines for violations of caste.
<u>Ghury</u>	:	Fortified place
<u>Golandas</u>	:	Artillery-man.
<u>Gur:</u>	:	Clarified and solidified sugarcane juice
<u>Grandevara</u>	:	Tutelary divinity of a village.
<u>Gurkar</u>	:	Royal representative on Bedar panchayat also acting as chief of Bedar community.
<u>Hao</u>	:	Privilege; fee; perquisite or grant claimable under established usage.
<u>Harkara</u>	:	Messenger; courier; emissary; spy.
<u>Holi</u>	:	Hindu festival in the first half of <u>Phalgun</u> (corresponding to March-April).
<u>Huzurati</u>	:	Bodyguard; escort
<u>Inam</u>	:	Gift; grant of land usually rent-free but nominally taxed in Surapur.
<u>Inamdar</u>	:	Holder of <u>inam</u> .
<u>Inayatnama</u>	:	Letter of recommendation; written order or patent from superior.
<u>Isharnavis</u>	:	Court official who takes down deposition
<u>Jagir</u>	:	Hereditary or personal assignment of land and of its revenue with or without conditions of service.
<u>Jagirdar</u>	:	Holder of a <u>jagir</u> .
<u>Jamabandi</u>	:	Settlement of the amount of revenue to be assessed upon a village, estate or district.

<u>Janadar</u>	:	Petty officer or chieftain.
<u>Jandarkhana</u>	:	Treasury. In Surapur the private treasury of the royalty was not distinguished from public treasury.
<u>Jangan</u>	:	Lingayat priest.
<u>Jawar</u>	:	Species of millet.
<u>Joad Inam</u>	:	Grant of land to be held in quit-rent.
<u>Joshi</u>	:	Brahmin astrologer employed in casting nativities and in priestly functions.
<u>Kalali</u>	:	Tax upon anything relating to spirituous liquors; excise.
<u>Karkun</u>	:	Clerk.
<u>Kasba</u>	:	Small town or large village with a market.
<u>Khadaiangi</u>	:	Sanguinary skirmish (which could lead to a palace revolution).
<u>Khalsa</u>	:	Lands or villages the revenue of which remains the property of government, not being made over in jagir; sometimes immediately under the government, of which the State is the manager.
<u>Khan-Saman</u>	:	House steward.
<u>Kharif</u>	:	Autumnal harvest.
<u>Khilat</u>	:	Dress of honour; article of costume presented by the ruling or superior authority to an inferior as a mark of distinction.

<u>Kist</u>	:	Instalment; amount paid as instalment.
<u>Kowl</u>	:	Writing of assurance, agreement or engagement as granted by Government.
<u>Kulkarni</u>	:	Village record-keeper and accountant.
<u>Kuru</u>	:	Measure of land equal to 30 <u>bighas</u> .
<u>Kutgoote</u>	:	Tenure of land held at a fixed rate of revenue, usually lower than ordinary rate.
<u>Linewalla</u>	:	Infantry soldier armed and dressed in European style.
<u>Mamla</u>	:	Administrative division equivalent to or bigger than a British Indian district but smaller than a province.
<u>Mamlatdar</u>	:	Revenue official in charge of a <u>mamla</u> or smaller administrative unit.
<u>Mansab</u>	:	Military title and rank conferred by the Mughal Government regulated by the number of horse the holder of the title could, if required, bring into the field, varying from 10 to 10 thousand for maintaining which <u>jagirs</u> were assigned.
<u>Mansabdar</u>	:	Holder of a <u>mansab</u> who could also be wholly employed in civil duties.
<u>Mazundar</u>	:	Auditor-cum-accountant.
<u>Math</u>	:	Hindu religious institution.
<u>Mauza</u>	:	Village comprising one or more clusters of habitations and all the lands belonging to their inhabitants, with known limits and brought under one separate name in revenue record though not necessarily contiguous or compact.

<u>Miras</u>	:	Inheritance; inherited property or right.
<u>Mirasdar</u>	:	Holder of a <u>miras</u> .
<u>Mistry</u>	:	Artificer; mason; mechanic; carpenter.
<u>Mohatarfa</u>	:	Tax on traders, artificers and professions.
<u>Hokasa</u>	:	Land or village assigned to an individual at low quit-rent; also share of the Government in a village or in the revenue paid by it.
<u>Muchalka</u>	:	Written obligation, agreement, bond or deed.
<u>Mudra</u>	:	Brand.
<u>Mudradharan</u>	:	Bearing an indelible mark on some part of the body made with hot brands representing the insignia of some deity as a sectarial indication; ritual ceremony connected with it.
<u>Mulla</u>	:	Muslim jurist or theologian.
<u>Munshi</u>	:	Writer or Secretary.
<u>Mutsaddi</u>	:	Writer; clerk.
<u>Naib</u>	:	Deputy Collector (of revenue).
<u>Navar</u>	:	Long strip of cloth used in cot.
<u>Nazar</u>	:	Present from an inferior to a superior.
<u>Nazir</u>	:	Court official charged with the serving of process.
<u>Nazrana</u>	:	Succession fee; also used in the sense of <u>Nazar</u> .

<u>Orki Kowli</u>	:	Irrigated land held on lease terms.
<u>Paga</u>	:	Stable.
<u>Paigah</u>	:	Stable; estates granted for maintenance of troops. (Nizam's personal estates)
<u>Palegar</u>	:	Semi-independent petty chieftain.
<u>Pan</u>	:	Aromatic leaf of <u>piper betel</u> which is chewed along with areca-nut, lime, catechu and other spices.
<u>Pania</u>	:	Palm; impression of the palm of issuing authority as a mark of authenticity.
<u>Pargana</u>	:	Administrative division smaller than a district.
<u>Patil</u>	:	Headman of a village forming the medium of communication with Government officers
<u>Pattabhisheka</u>	:	Coronation.
<u>Patwari</u>	:	Same as <u>patil</u> ; also sometimes acting as accountant and record-keeper of village lands.
<u>Peshkar</u>	:	Agent; manager in general for a superior or proprietor or one exercising delegated authority.
<u>Peshkash</u>	:	Tribute.
<u>Petha</u>	:	Market town with adjoining territory treated as an administrative unit.
<u>Petta</u>	:	Suburb.

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<u>Piada</u>	:	Footman; armed servant, police or militia-man serving on foot.
<u>Qabulavat</u>	:	Deed of agreement.
<u>Qazi</u>	:	Muslim judge who administers both civil and criminal law, chiefly in towns, according to the principles of the Koran.
<u>Qiladar</u>	:	Governor or Commandant of a fort.
<u>Rai-rayan</u>	:	Title given to Hindu civil officers of high rank, especially finance minister and treasurer.
<u>Rayatwari</u>	:	Revenue settlement made by the government officers with each actual cultivator for a given term (usually 12 months), at a stipulated money-rent, without the intervention of a third party.
<u>Rukkanvis</u>	:	Clerk of the court.
<u>Sadr</u>	:	Chief office of revenue or judicial administration.
<u>Sadr Adalat</u>	:	Court of highest jurisdiction.
<u>Sadr Diwani Adalat</u>	:	Chief civil court.
<u>Sahukar</u>	:	Banker; dealer in money and exchanges.
<u>Sair</u>	:	Term used to cover variety of items of taxation and impost such as customs, transit duties, license fees etc.
<u>Samsthan</u>	:	Principality.
<u>Samat</u>	:	Division of a district smaller than a <u>pargana</u> .

<u>Sanad</u>	:	Grant; diploma; charter; patent; document conveying to an individual emoluments, titles, privileges, offices or the government's rights to revenue from land etc. under the seal of the ruling authority
<u>Sardeswat</u>	:	Rights of <u>sardeshmukhi</u> .
<u>Sardeshmukhi</u>	:	Ten percent of revenues appertaining to the office of head <u>deshmukh</u> (i.e. head of district revenue collectors).
<u>Sardar</u>	:	Chief; headman; commander.
<u>Sarkar</u>	:	Government; state; supreme authority.
<u>Seth</u>	:	Merchant; banker; trader.
<u>Shastri</u>	:	Hindu jurist.
<u>Shetsandi</u>	:	Person holding the land for military service, applied especially to a local militia acting also as police and garrison of forts.
<u>Shikar</u>	:	Hunting.
<u>Sibandi</u>	:	Irregular soldiery, militia or imperfectly disciplined troops engaged in garrisoning forts and as guards in towns and villages, and for revenue and police duties.
<u>Silladar</u>	:	Cavalryman providing his own horse.
<u>Sindi</u>	:	Fermented intoxicating sap of a variety of palm-tree.
<u>Tahsildar</u>	:	Collector of revenue in charge of a tahsil.
<u>Tankwah</u>	:	Assignment by ruling authority upon revenue of any particular locality in payment of wages, pay, gratuity or pension.

<u>Taqavi</u>	:	Advance of money made by the government to the cultivators at the time of sowing to extend their cultivation, in bad seasons and the like, to be repaid when the crop is gathered.
<u>Taqid</u>	:	Injunction; warning, direction; order from a superior.
<u>Thana</u>	:	Station; revenue or police station.
<u>Thanadar</u>	:	Chief of a <u>thana</u> .
<u>Toshakhana</u>	:	Store-room; wardrobe.
<u>Vakil</u>	:	Authorized representative.
<u>Wailbul-Arz</u>	:	Written representation or petition.
<u>Watan</u>	:	Hereditary estate, right, office, privilege, property or means of subsistence; patrimony.
<u>Watandar</u>	:	Holder of a <u>watan</u> .
<u>Watandari</u>	:	Belonging to a <u>watan</u> .
<u>Yugadi</u>	:	First day of Hindu calendar celebrated as a festival.
<u>Zamindar</u>	:	Landholder who also acted as local revenue officer getting a commission on revenues collected.

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(i) Foreign Department Records:

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(ii) Hyderabad Residency Records:

Vols. 24, 33, 35-6, 40, 56, 76-82, 84, 89-91, 94, 98, 102-3, 110, 126, 140, 190-1, 232, 259, 329, 392, 403, 417, 469, 489-90, 494, 501, 505, 507, 512, 550-3, 555, 561, 570-7, 595, 618, 632-3, 644-5, 649, 668, 681, 733, 752. These volumes, however, are incomplete containing in many instances only the agents' letters but no replies. Indexes to them are equally defective. The Court of Directors themselves expressed dissatisfaction that full record was not maintained. Almost all the material is duplicated in (i) above but the records are useful as a control. Both (i) and (ii) are at the National Archives of India, New Delhi.

(iii) Surapur Accounts:

There are about 120 bundles at State Central Archives, Hyderabad. Before Capt. Taylor took charge the accounts appear to have been maintained on loose slips

of paper. Most of Surapur daftar was destroyed or dispersed in 1858. The above are the few surviving bundles but they make little sense without accompanying correspondence.

(iv) Durbar Records:

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